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ABSTRACT
When Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the White House in 
1933, the leaders of the Army Air Corps wanted to create an 
independent air force. Using Billy Mitchell's tactics of 
public confrontation, exploitation of the Air Corps' poor 
condition and unproven claims about air power, these 
officers only antagonized the people who could grant them 
independence.
After 1934, Oscar Westover, H.H. "Hap" Arnold, Frank 
Andrews and a number of other Air Corps officers started a 
concerted effort to promote themselves as "team players" who 
had given up Mitchell's methods. With demonstrations, like 
long range flights to South America, they proved the 
efficiency of the Air Corps. By 1941, these officers had 
convinced Roosevelt, Congress and the General Staff that 
they could f u l f i l l  t h e i r  c l a i m s .  T h i s  t r u s t  w a s  
demonstrated in Roosevelt's Air Corps expansion programs and 
the Army's war plans.
After the war in Europe substantiated the ability of 
land-based airplanes to force unprotected naval forces to 
w i thdraw, R o o s e v e l t  and his military advisors placed 
increasing emphasis on the role of the Air Corps. While 
preparing to invade Europe, American bombers would destroy 
Nazi Germany's ability to resist. In the Pacific, the
v
United States would fight a defensive war until Germany was 
defeated.
For two decades, the Army had believed that the 
Philippines could not withstand a Japanese invasion and made 
little effort to fortify the Islands. The Luftwaffe's 
defeat of the Royal Navy at Norway and Crete caused a 
reassessment. Placing its faith in advanced technology to 
compensate for Japan's military preponderance in the Far 
East, the Army reinforced the Philippines with long-range 
bombers. Confident that the Army Air Force could defend the 
Philippines, American civilian and military leaders expected 
the Philippine based bombers to cut off J a p a n ' s  sea 
communications. Also, they planned to take advantage of the 
long standing Japanese fear of air attacks burning their 
wooden cities. Threatened with the destruction of their 
cities, the Japanese would have been forced to a ccept  
American demands. However, it was not an idle threat.
INTRODUCTION
In writing about an air force not at war, I tried to 
step outside the traditional boundaries of military histo­
ry. Avoiding a detailed discussion of tactics, organization 
and weapons development, I have emphasized the political 
growth of the officers who built the air force with which 
the United States fought the Second World War.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President of the 
United States of America in 1933, he inherited a factious 
group of airmen in the Army Air Corps. Convinced that air 
power held the key to m odern warfare, these aviators 
incessant!y claimed that their airplanes could sink any 
battleship, bring a quick victory on the battlefield or 
force an enemy to surrender before the armies met on the 
battlefield. But when the Army failed to heed their claims, 
they, led by General William "Billy" Mitchell, concluded 
that separating the air force from the Army was the only 
solution. Hoping to rally public opinion and force the 
government to respond, these men had been a problem to the 
three previous Republican Administrations.
By using public confrontations, constantly bemoaning 
the poor condition of the air arm, and making unproven 
claims about air power, Mitchell and his followers only 
antagonized the General Staff of the United States Army, the
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people who could grant them independence. This antagonism 
turned to distrust; the General Staff started to ignore 
anything the Army Air Corps said. Even after Mitchell was 
court-martialed and left the Army, other air officers were 
using his tactics when Roosevelt took office. During 
Roosevelt's first term, however, a change occurred in the 
Army Air Corps. Men with the same conviction about the 
importance of air power but with extraordinary political 
a c u m e n  took command. Together, Oscar Westover, Henry 
H. "Hap" Arnold, and Frank M. Andrews launched a concerted 
effort to convince the General Staff and the Roosevelt 
Administration that the Army Air Corps had given up the 
caustic, s e p a r a t i s t  a t t i t u d e s  of Billy Mitchell. By 
presenting themselves as "team players," these men reduced 
the animosity of their superiors, and no longer blinded by 
rage, the General Staff started listening to what the Army 
Air Corps had to say. With spectacular, long-range flights 
and other examples of efficiency, they proved that the Army 
Air Corps could deliver what it promised. As a result, the 
Roosevelt Administration and the General Staff more readily 
accepted the claims of the air power advocates.
Then, beginning in 1939, the war in Europe further 
substantiated many of the claims about air power, especially 
the claim that land-based airplanes could force unprotected 
naval forces to withdraw. The Roosevelt Administration, 
convinced of their trustworthiness and efficiency, gave the 
Army Air Corps an important role in carrying out America's
foreign policy. For twenty years, the Army had considered 
the Philippines indefensible, but on the eve of American 
entry into World War II, the Army Air Corps was given the 
task of defending the Islands with its long-range bombers. 
Confident that the Army Air Corps could fulfill the task, 
Roosevelt and his military advisors believed the long-range 
bombers could effectively blockade Japan. Almost as an 
afterthought, the bombers were expected to deter further 
Japanese expansion by playing upon Japan's long standing and 
well known fear of having its cities b u r n e d  by e nemy 
bombers. However, this would not have been an idle threat. 
The Army Air Corps made every effort to rush the necessary 
incendiary bombs to the Philippines for use if a war broke 
out.
I reject the "back door to war" theory of Charles A. 
Beard and Charles C. Tansill and the other revisionist 
historians. I agree with the internationalist that Roose­
velt wanted to avoid a war in the Far East because it would 
divert supplies from the European war. However, I cannot 
ascribe to the argument put forth by Herbert Feis in The 
Road to Pearl Harbor that Japanese aggression alone account­
ed for the war. William Appleman Williams' The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy has convinced me that the United States 
and Japan were intent upon establishing economic hegemony in 
the Far East. The result was a test of wills. Throughout 
the 1930s, the Japanese won. Since the Japanese navy 
dominated the Far East, the U nited States l acked the
military and naval power to force its will upon the Japan­
ese. It could do little more than threaten nonrecognition, 
trade embargoes and move the United States Fleet closer to 
Japan. American air power promised to change the balance of 
power. Five years before the United States exploded its 
first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico, the concept of 
using superior American technology to deter a enemy had 
taken root in American foreign policy.
While conducting my research for this dissertation, I 
discovered that I had a m i s c o n c e p t i o n  about F r a n k l i n  
D. Roosevelt. Misled by the knowledge of Roosevelt's love 
affair with the sea and ships, I had thought that he lacked 
an appreciation for the importance of air power before the 
Munich Crisis in 1938. John F. Shiner holds that opinion. 
He notes that as Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt 
had opposed the creation of a separate air arm. "When 
Roosevelt did concern himself with defense issues, his 
interest focused on his old love--the Navy. As B illy 
Mitchell said in 1935 after seeing the President's desk 
covered with naval mementos: 'I wish I could have seen one 
airplane in that collection.' Those who believed FDR would 
intervene in the Army air arm's behalf were victims of their 
own wishful thinking."1 To my surprise and pleasure, I 
found that Roosevelt possessed an appreciation for the 
p o t e n t i a l  of air power while he was President Woodrow
^Ljohn F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 
1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 
United States Air Force, 1983), p. 81.
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Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Also, Roosevelt's 
view of air power was influenced by Billy Mitchell in the 
e arly 1930s. However, I found the pragmatic side of 
Franklin Roosevelt in his willingness to see the potential 
of air power while demanding proof of its feasibility. Once 
the Army Air Corps proved the feasibility, Roosevelt quickly 
turned to it as a solution for diplomatic and military 
problems. Furthermore, I discovered the reason b e h i n d  
Roosevelt's change from a man wanting to ban bombers and 
aerial bombardment into a man willing to bomb civilian 
populations.
CHAPTER I
THE BILLY MITCHELL YEARS
"Join the Army Air Service," exhorted a recruiting 
poster in 1918, "...Be an American Eagle!" The illustration 
showed a sleek, powerful American bald eagle subduing a 
mangy eagle of Imperial Germany. Behind them, American 
planes on their way to fight the Huns darkened a brilliant 
sunrise.1
Using a bald eagle to represent the air force became 
common, but the poster was significant because it appealed 
to a number of assumptions held by Americans during the 
First World War. Its clashing eagles symbolized the super­
iority of American democracy over German autocracy, and the 
image of skies blackened by a vast fleet of American-built 
aircraft reflected Americans' belief in their industrial 
capabilities. Yet, the poster also displayed what would 
b ecome a dominant theme in twentieth century American 
military planning: fighting a war with machines rather than 
great numbers of troops.
The American preference for fighting with machines 
became apparent immediately. In June 1917, the Aircraft
^■Illustrated in Ezra Bowen, Knights of the Air, The 
Epic of Flight (Alexandria, Virginia: Time Life Books, 
1980), p. 146.
Production Board created an ambitious plan for placing 4500 
airplanes, 5000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics on the Western 
Front within a year. The Board said that its plan would 
allow the United States to win air superiority, "and with 
that we hope to become an immediate, decisive factor in 
ending the war." Congress enthusiastically appropriated 
$640 million on July 24, 1917, for the Army Air Service to 
implement the production plan.
Ironically, Americans' conceptions of how they would 
fight to make the world safe for democracy were just the 
opposite of how they actually fought the war. Although many 
Americans flew over the Western Front, American-built planes 
never filled the skies over the Western Front. Beset by a 
wide variety of problems, the American aircraft industry 
failed to fulfill the Aircraft Production Board's expecta­
tions, and only 696 American-built airplanes reached the 
Front before the Armistice. The American fliers had to use 
French or British airplanes. In contrast, millions of 
American doughboys reached the Western Front. American 
manpower, not American technology or industrial power, made 
the difference in 1 918.2
Even if the skies over Europe had been darkened by 
American planes, disagreements over how to use the new 
weapons would have hindered their use. President Woodrow
2Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army 
Air Force in World War II, 6 vols. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948-1955), vol. 2: Plans and Early Opera­
tions, January 1939 to August 1942, pp. 5-10.
3Wilson would have objected to using American planes to 
attack civilians. When the war broke out in 1914, Wilson 
tried to convince the Germans not to bomb Allied cities; 
but, as with his attempts to stop the Germans from using 
submarines, he failed. Desperately seeking a way to win the 
war, the Germans refused to let either their submarines or 
aircraft go unused. They launched air raids against England 
with Zeppelins and Gotha bombers. Although the air raids 
did little real damage, public opinion forced the British 
government to defend England from the German air raiders, 
and the air arms of the British Army and Navy were joined 
t o g e t h e r  into the Royal Air Force in April 1918. To 
retaliate for the German air raids, the RAF placed General 
Hugh Trenchard in command of a strategic bombing force, the 
Independent Air Force, to carry the air war deep into 
Germany. H o p i n g  to c o o r d i n a t e  the aerial assault on 
Germany, the British convinced the F r e n c h  to join an 
Inter-Allied Independent Air Force, and the American Army 
Air Service planned to participate also. Once the Germans 
learned of the IAF, they tried to forestall the Allied 
bombing campaign by announcing that future bombing would be 
li mited to the battle zone, but the Allies refused to 
recognize the deescalation and continued their prepara­
tions .3
Early contact with the British helped to shape the way
3Lee Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), p. 60-61; Craven and 
Cate, Plans and Early Operations, p. 15.
4American airmen prepared to fight. Major William "Billy" 
Mitchell visited Trenchard in May 1917, and the British 
commander's ideas on strategic bombing influenced him. When 
promoted to brigadier general and placed in command of the 
Army Air Service for the First A rmy G r o u p  in France, 
Mitchell put into practice Trenchard's teachings and used 
his airplanes as an offensive weapon behind the German 
lines. During the attack on the St. Mihiel salient in 
September 1918, General Mitchell successfully led a combined 
force of 1,500 American, British, French, Italian and 
Portuguese aircraft against the Germans. Later, with fewer 
planes at his disposal, Mitchell commanded the American air 
assault during the Meuse-Argonne offensive with equal 
success. On October 9, 1918, Mitchell concentrated over 350 
American and French aircraft to attack German troops massing 
for a counterattack. In the Air Service's most significant 
attack of the war, Mitchell's planes overwhelmed the German 
a ir d e f e n s e s  and d i s r u p t e d  the c o u n t e r a t t a c k .  The 
Associated Press, reporting on the October 9 attack, claimed 
that the bombing squadrons of "this air fleet probably 
represent the first d e f i n i t e  A m e r i c a n  unit of major 
importance in the independent air forces which are being 
built up by the Entente powers. This navy of the air is to 
be expanded until no part of Germany is safe from the rain 
of bombs..,,.The work of the independent force is bombing 
munitions works, factories, cities, and other important 
centers far behind the German lines. It has been promised
that eventually Berlin itself will know what an air raid 
means, and the whole great project is a direct answer to the 
German air attacks on helpless and unfortified British, 
French, and Belgian cities."4
Political leaders back in the United States, however, 
opposed the use of aerial bombardment. On November 8, 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker ordered Chief of Staff 
General Peyton March to inform the Army Air Service that the 
United States would not take part in any plans for the 
"promiscuous bombing upon industry, commerce, or population, 
in enemy countries disassociated from obvious military needs 
to be served by such action."5 Baker showed that the United 
States government remained consistent in its views on the 
conduct of war. Refusing to condone unrestricted submarine 
warfare, the United States government also re f u s e d  to 
approve the aerial bombardment of civilian populations. The 
Armistice ended the Inter-Allied Independent Air Force and 
prevented an open breach between the American military 
leaders in France and the political leaders at home over the 
t actical conduct of the war. Throughout the nineteen 
twenties and thirties, America's political leaders continued 
to reject the idea of bombing civilian targets, but many 
Americans came to believe that strategic bombing would 
prevent any future war or end it quickly.
4Craven and Cate, pp. 12-15.
^Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell; Crusader for Air 
Power (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1964), p. 37.
While playing an important role, air power did not 
decide the outcome of the World War. The inability of 
airplanes to take or hold ground caused military men to 
adhere to one of two different ideas on how to employ air 
power in warfare. One group wanted airplanes to provide 
support for the ground forces and control the airspace above 
the armies. The other group believed that using airplanes 
to bomb strategic targets would cripple an enemy's ability 
to wage war. During the interwar years, the E u r o p e a n  
nations developed their air forces to perform one of these 
two missions. France, Russia and Nazi Germany developed 
their air forces to support their traditionally large 
armies, but the Italians and British adopted the doctrine of 
strategic bombing. The terrible casualties of the World War 
made politicians in Italy and Great Britain receptive to the 
strategic bombing doctrine. Realizing that modern industri­
al systems made possible the recent war of attrition, the 
proponents of strategic bombing concluded that bombing an 
enemy’s cities and factories could disrupt the production of 
war materiel needed to sustain a war of attrition. Further­
more, they believed that bombing the capital of an enemy 
nation would paralyze that nation and make it incapable of 
conducting a war. The resulting deaths of many civilians, 
advocates of strategic bombing explained, would be justified 
in the long run. A quick, successful air campaign would 
mean fewer casualties than a drawn out war of attrition. 
The threat of air attacks on cities and industry would deter
any future wars. Taking great comfort in these assurances, 
the politicians in Italy and Great Britain readily accepted 
the concept of strategic bombing.6 Underlying the theories 
of those advocating air raids on an enemy's capital was the 
experience of 1918, when Kaiser William II abdicated in the 
face of street disorders and a naval mutiny. This experi­
ence apparently influenced American and British planning 
during the Second World War. The Allies expected the German 
people to force Adolph Hitler to abdicate and create a 
liberal government as they had in 1918.
In the United States, different political considera­
tions hindered the acceptance of strategic bombing as a 
doctrine. Disillusioned by the World War, the United States 
returned to its traditional defenses, the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, and reduced its Army and Navy to a size just 
large enough to repel an invasion. Choosing to stay out of 
European affairs, America refused to join the collective 
security of the League of Nations. But Americans willingly 
participated in international disarmament efforts at the 
Washington Arms Conference of 1921-1922, the disarmament 
talks at Geneva and London, and signed the Briand-Kellog 
Pact of 1928. Since strategic bombing is offensive in 
nature, the adoption of strategic bombing as a military 
doctrine met resistance from government officials preferring 
defense and disarmament.
^Robin Higham, Air Power; A Concise History, London: 
Macdonald, 1972), pp. 68-69.
8Within the United States Army, two views on the employ­
ment of air power developed. The General Staff viewed the 
Air Service as the servant of the ground forces, and they 
opposed the adoption of an air force based on a doctrine of 
strategic bombing. With Billy Mitchell as their spokesman, 
the supporters of strategic bombing looked to the wartime, 
long-range flights made by Italian Caproni bombers and Major 
General Hugh Trenchard's planned raids on Germany with 
bombers of the Independent Air Force as examples to follow. 
Because the General Staff had the final say as to which 
doctrine would be adopted, the supporters of strategic 
bombing started seeking independence in order to implement 
their ideas. The movement to create a separate air force 
like the RAF gained momentum when Mitchell and the other 
fliers returned home.
M i t c h e l l  expected to be given command of the Air 
Service upon his return from France in 1919, but Major 
General C.T. Menoher, who had no aviation experience, was 
named the Chief of the Air Service. Mitchell became the 
Assistant Chief, and undaunted, he launched a campaign to 
promote the cause of air power. Ignoring the prevailing 
antiwar sentiment, he advised the nation to put its "defense 
money and effort into active offensive equipment designed 
directly to defeat the enemy." Then, to the displeasure of 
the Navy, he claimed that surface ships were h e l p l e s s  
against aircraft unless protected by their own aircraft. He 
urged the nation to stop wasting its money on battleships
and spend it wisely for airplanes. Like his E u r o p e a n  
counterparts, Mitchell asserted that airplanes could end 
wars of attrition. By using air power to attack what he 
called "vital centers," Mitchell claimed that an enemy could 
be paralyzed and defeated without having to destroy his army 
first.7
Mitchell expected people to adopt his ideas and became 
upset when they did not. The Navy exacerbated his anger by 
refusing to let him use surrendered German battleships for 
bombing tests. When Henry H. "Hap" Arnold met with Mitchell 
in El Paso on the Fourth of July, he noticed an "under­
current of angry impatience" in Mitchell. "He seemed," 
Arnold wrote later, "to brush aside the possibility that a 
lot of people still might not understand his theories, and 
he could not be convinced that air power was not being 
blocked by deliberate and well-organized enemies." Mitchell 
blamed admirals "unable to face the fact that sea power was 
done for," old-fashioned generals, and profiteers building 
battleships for blocking him. Mitchell's main concern that 
summer, Arnold recalled, seemed "to be to show them--with 
activities like the trans-continental air race, the Border 
Patrol, the Forest Fire Patrol, and now a mass flight to
7H.H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1949), p. 91; William Mitchell, Winged Defense:
The Development and Possibilites of Modern Air Power-Econom­
ic and Military (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1925? third printing, 1926), pp. 101-102; Russell F. Weig- 
ley. The American Way of War: A History of United States 
Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 234-235.
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Alaska and a mass flight around the world— and above all, to 
sink those damned battleships!"
Statements by Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval 
Operations, finally goaded Mitchell into action. Assistant 
Secretary of War Crowell headed a board studying the various 
forms of air forces, and Admiral Benson told one of the 
Board members that he could not "conceive of any use the 
fleet will ever have for aircraft." He also told Crowell 
that the Navy "doesn't need airplanes." Then on August 1, 
1919, Admiral Benson issued a secret order abolishing the 
Navy's Aviation Division. Somehow, Mitchell got a copy of 
that order and told the Senate Military Affairs Committee on 
September 12, 1919, that the Navy did not have a separate 
b u r e a u  of aviation. Un a w a r e  of the order, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the 
defense of the Navy. Mitchell's comments, said Roosevelt, 
showed that he "knew absolutely nothing about the organiza­
tion of the Navy Department." Mitchell embarrassed Roose­
velt by reading the order to the Committee.**
Mitchell was the best known, but he was not the only 
Army flier to attack publicly the Navy and General Staff. 
Benjamin D. Foulois, also launched public attacks on the 
opponents of air power. While advocating a separate air arm 
before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on October 16,
^Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 95-97; Thomas M. Coffee, 
Hap; The Story of the U. S. Air Force and the Man Who Built 
It, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 
1982), pp. 102-103.
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Foulois accused the General Staff of being "reactionary" and 
l acking interest in aerial research and development. 
Turning his ire toward the Navy, he complained that the Navy 
had upset the Army's wartime logistics by taking away 
priorities for engine and aircraft procurement. Then, he 
disclosed for the first time in public how the Navy had 
negotiated independently with the Italians to buy a large 
number of Caproni bombers already purchased by the Army. In 
closing, Foulois denounced Roosevelt's earlier claim that 
"not only the Navy Department officially, but the entire 
naval service, is absolutely opposed to the creation of 
another branch of national defense." He challenged Roose­
velt's testimony and critici2ed him personally by stating 
that "our naval authorities at home" had hampered the 
development of the Army Air Service in France.®
While both Mitchell and Foulois attacked F r a n k l i n  
D. Roosevelt, they were not conspiring. Mitchell had been 
subordinate to Foulois during the war, and their relation­
ship had been strained. In 1919, Foulois had been made 
subordinate to Mitchell and the situation became worse. The 
antagonism between the two became so great that, in spite of 
having adjacent offices, they never spoke. Clearly, anti- 
Navy feelings were about the only thing that Mitchell and 
Foulois could agree upon. They lumped together anyone
®Benjamin D. Foulois with C.V. Glines, From the Wright 
Brothers to the Astronauts; The Memoirs of Major General 
Benjamin D. Foulois (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1968), pp. 186-188.
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connected with the Navy into a monolithic enemy, and their
narrow view blinded them to the fact that Roosevelt felt
differently about the role of aviation than did most of the
admirals. Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee
James Wadsworth, Jr. asked Roosevelt if aviation could
become the principal factor in the Army or Navy. Exhibiting
greater foresight than Admiral Benson, Roosevelt answered,
It might conceivably, in the Navy, become the 
principal factor. I don't know whether the Chief 
of Naval Operations will agree with me, but I 
might say that later on, in the future, aviation 
might make surface ships practically impossible to 
be used as an Arm.1^
Twenty-two years later, on the eve of America's entry into
World War II, President Roosevelt believed that bombers had
made that possiblity come true.
Mitchell's efforts in 1919 to separate the Air Service
from the Army through Congressional legislation failed. The
National Defense Act of 1920 left the General Staff in
control of the Air Service. Furthermore, the General Staff
retained control over promotions, which gave it a tighter
rein over the airmen. Even though the National Defense Act
recognized the Air Service as a combat arm of the Army, put
flyers in command of tactical units, and authorized flight
pay at fifty per cent of base pay, the hopes of those
wanting a separate air force were crushed. Bitter over the
turn of events, Mitchell and his followers refused to accept
^ F o u l o i s  and Glines, Memoirs, pp. 185-186; Arnold, 
p. 97.
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an inferior status for Army aviation quietly.11
In magazine articles, books, and lectures, Mitchell 
made sensational claims that airplanes could do anything. 
Specifically, Mitchell pressed his claim that airplanes 
could sink battleships. The Navy replied by saying that 
Mitchell's claims were unproven, but they refused to let 
Mitchell test his theories on the surrendered German battle­
ships. Two summers after Mitchell had spoken to Arnold in 
El Paso, the Navy, under pressure from Congress, gave the 
Air Service permission to conduct bombing tests.
Given wide press coverage, the tests took on a circus 
atmosphere as both sides made wild claims. Former Secretary 
of the Navy Josephus Daniels bragged that he could stand 
bareheaded on the bridge of any battleship while it was 
being bombed and be safe. Daniels regretted that the planes 
could not attack under real combat conditions to find out 
how quickly they would be shot down. When the Army flyers 
heard Daniels' boast, they begged Mitchell to have the Navy 
shoot back. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, and nobody 
was on board the Ostfriesland when the Air Service sank it 
on July 20, 1921. However, the airplane versus battleship 
question remained unsettled. The Joint Army and Navy Board 
report on the bombing tests stated that airplanes were 
valuable auxiliaries, but it concluded that the battleship 
was "still the backbone of the fleet and the bulwark of the
11Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 396-400; 
Craven and Cate, p. 24.
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nation's sea defense." The Air Service sank three more 
obsolete American battleships over the next two years, but 
the official results remained the same.12
The refusal of the Joint Army and Navy Board to accept 
the results of the battleship tests frustrated the Army Air 
Service, but the failure of the Joint Board to provide 
sufficient funds for equipment left the Air Service in a 
very poor condition. The situation became so bad that Chief 
of the Air Se r v i c e  M ason M. Patrick, who opposed the 
creation of a separate air force, pointed out the shortage 
of personnel and the unsafe equipment in his annual report 
for 1922. In response, the General Staff c r e a t e d  the 
Lassiter Board in March 1923, to investigate the situation. 
The Lassiter Board recommended a ten-year expansion program 
and agreed with Patrick's suggestion to mass most of the Air 
Service's offensive aircraft into a strike force under one 
g e n e r a l  h e a d q u a r t e r s  rather than i n d i v i d u a l  g r o u n d  
commanders. The Secretary of War approved the Lassiter 
Board's report, but opposition from the Joint Army and Navy 
Board prevented the report from being sent to Congress for 
action. After four years of hard work, Mitchell had little 
to show. He became very depressed. "Air power," he told 
Arnold, "doesn't seem to be getting anywhere at all." He 
had interested the American public, but the leaders in 
Washington with the power to do something would not listen
12Arnold, p. 102-105.
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to him.13
In an unsuccessful effort to calm him, the Army sent 
Mitchell to the Orient after the September 1923, battleship 
tests. Alarmed by what he saw on his tour of Hawaii, Guam, 
the Philippines, Japan, China, India, Java, and Singapore, 
Mitchell returned in July 1924, more vituperative than 
ever. He filed a 323 page report in October 1924, which 
noted Japan's interest in air power. Judging the Japanese 
to have the second most powerful air force in the world, he 
warned of the virtual absence of American air power in the 
Orient. The Army and Navy officers he had spoken to had 
been ignorant of and indifferent to the disparity between 
Japanese and American air power. Believing that the United 
States and Japan would eventually go to war over control of 
the Pacific, he made his famous prediction that Japan would 
start that war with an air attack on Pearl Harbor. When the 
War Department ignored his report, Mitchell took his message 
elsewhere.14
S e c r e t a r y  of War John Weeks had tried to muzzle 
Mitchell in 1923, by ordering the vocal aviator to submit 
all of his articles to the War Department for clearance 
before publication, but Mitchell soon found a way to get 
around Weeks' order. At the ceremonies for the Army fliers, 
who had just completed the first around-the-world flight,
13Craven and Cate, pp. 25-26; Arnold, p. 111.
14Craven and Cate, p. 27; Weigley, The American Way of 
War, pp. 230-231.
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Mitchell saw that President Coolidge seemed interested in 
aviation. So, he went over Weeks' head and asked Coolidge 
for permission to write a new series of articles. Unaware 
of the content of the articles, Coolidge granted Mitchell 
permission but stipulated that the a r t i c l e s  c ould be 
p u b l i s h e d  only with the ap p r o v a l  of his s u periors. 
Interpreting Coolidge's stipulation to mean his direct 
superior, the Chief of the Air Service, Mitchell submitted 
his articles for publication without showing them to the 
General Staff. Later, the Chief of the Air Service denied 
having given Mitchell his permission, but it was too late. 
The Saturday Evening Post ran the articles from December 
1924, through the following March.15
As always, Mitchell continued to blast the Navy in the 
articles. "How Should We Organize Our National Air Power," 
the second article, included six photographs of the Ost- 
friesland being sunk. In the same issue as Mitchell's third 
article, the Post ran a cartoon showing Uncle Sam as an 
ostrich with his head stuck in the sand. "I don't see 
anything in the air," Uncle Sam said as airplanes flew 
overhead. Although the cartoon was not part of Mitchell's 
article, it fit. With a circulation of more than two and a 
half million, the Saturday Evening Post gave Mitchell's 
a r t i c l e s  a large audience. However, the Post allowed 
Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur to state the Navy's 
case. In an article titled "A Balanced Navy," Wilbur warned
15Hurley, Billy Mitchell, pp. 79-80 and 92-93.
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against placing too much emphasis on one type of weapon. He 
stated that the fundamental naval policy of the United 
States was to maintain a Navy strong enough to support the 
nation's policies, commerce, and overseas possessions. 
"Only a Navy— a well balanced Navy— with its surface and 
subsurface vessels and its aircraft and aircraft carriers, 
can accomplish this," he wrote. So, the effect of M itch­
ell's articles was tempered, but he was not.1**
When Mitchell again carried his campaign to congres­
sional hearings that spring, he expanded his attacks to 
include the War Department with the Navy and General Staff. 
Mitchell charged them with opposing improvements in the air 
force, not listening to suggestions by air officers, and 
trying to control the public testimony of air officers with 
veiled threats. This time, the War Department did more to 
silence Mitchell. When his tour as Assistant Chief of the 
Air Service ended in March 1925, Secretary Weeks (with the 
a p p r o v a l  of Coolidge) refused to reappoint him to the 
position. So, Mitchell reverted to his permanent rank of 
colonel and was sent to Texas as the Aviation Officer for 
the Eighth Corps Area.1?
Undeterred, Mitchell continued to press the cause of 
air power through public attacks on the Navy, General Staff,
^ W i l l i a m  Mitchell, "How Should We Organise Our 
National Air Power?" Saturday Evening Post, March 14, 1925, 
pp. 6-7; Mitchell, "American Leadership in Aeronautics," 
p. 18, Cartoon, p. 20, and Curtis D. Wilbur, "A Balanced 
Navy," p. 10, Saturday Evening Post, January 10, 1925.
17Hurley, pp. 97-98; Caven and Cate, p. 27.
and War Department, but in September he finally went too 
far. When the Navy dirigible Shenandoah crashed during a 
thunderstorm, Mitchell released a nine page statement to the 
press on September 5, 1925. Remembering how public pressure 
had forced the British government to create the RAP, he 
tried to form the same type of pressure by blaming the crash 
on "the incompetency, criminal negligence, and a lmost 
treasonable administration of the National Defense by the 
Navy and War Departments." The Army responded by court- 
martialing Mitchell. Coolidge himself drew up the charges. 
Aware of the seriousness of Mitchell's charges, the Secre­
taries of War and the Navy asked President Coolidge on 
September 10 to form a committee to study national de­
fense.1®
A year earlier, Coolidge had escaped being tarnished in 
the Teapot Dome scandal by appointing a special counsel to 
prosecute the accused. Similarly, he took much of the 
political threat out of the Mitchell c o u r t - m a r t i a l  by 
quickly naming Dwight W. Morrow to head a committee to study 
military aviation in the United States. Together, Coolidge 
and Morrow chose committeemen who had the confidence of the 
American people and Congress. Then, Coolidge took another 
step to lessen the impact of the court-martial by directing 
the Morrow Board to produce its report by the end of
18Ironically, the first of the series of articles that 
Mitchell published in the Saturday Evening Post was printed 
along side one about the Shenandoah. Stanford E. Moses, 
"Life on the Shenandoah," Saturday Evening Post, December
20, 1924, p. 5; Hurley, pp. 101-102; Craven and Cate, p. 28.
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November, about the time Mitchell's court-martial would be 
finished. Coolidge knew that the existence of the Morrow 
Board would counter any claims that the government was 
unconcerned about American military a v i a t i o n . -*-9
The Morrow Board allowed Mitchell to testify, but he 
s q u a n d e r e d  the opportunity. Rather than presenting a 
spirited defense, he just read his recently published book, 
Winged Defense, to the Board. He continued to read his book 
until Board member Senator Hiram Bingham, a former air 
officer and supporter of air power, reminded Mitchell that 
each member had a copy of the book. "I'm trying," Mitchell 
snapped back "to make a point!" With that remark Mitchell 
lost his chance to influence the Board. The Morrow Board 
released its report on December 3, 1925. Opposing the
creation of a separate air arm, the Board said that air 
power had not "demonstrated its value for independent opera­
tions," and it recommended only superficial changes. A t 
his court-martial, Mitchell staged a better show. He often 
put the prosecution on the defensive. Airmen from across 
the United States came to Mitchell's defense. Hap Arnold, 
Carl Spaatz, Herbert Dargue, Robert Olds, and others sat 
through the trial. In a show of support, they directly 
quoted Mitchell when they were on the stand. However, the 
court found Mitchell guilty on the seventeenth and issued a
l-^Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome; Oil and Politics in the 
1920's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962; 
reprint ed., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965), p. 175; 
Hurley, p. 101-102.
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harsh sentence. It suspended him from duty for five years, 
which forced his early resignation from the A r m y . 20
Angered by the trial, Arnold and Dargue tried to keep 
up the fight by contacting friends on Capitol Hill and 
writing letters, but the War Department frowned upon their 
actions. Quickly, both were called in to answer for their 
"irregular" correspondence concerning changes in the status 
of the Air Service. Dargue received a reprimand, but Arnold 
found himself "exiled" to Fort Riley, Kansas. The Army had 
taken care of its internal critics.21
Mitchell's court-martial aroused a great deal of public 
interest and spawned a host of bills in Congress to create a 
separate air force. But public interest and support for the 
legislation in Congress withered away when Congress passed 
the Air Corps Act on July 2, 1926. The law changed the name 
of the Air Service to the Air Corps, created an Assistant 
Secretary of War for Air and authorized a five-year program 
to expand the Air Corps to 20,000 officers and men and 1800 
serviceable aircraft. In reality, however, the Air Corps 
Act changed little more than the name of the Air Service. 
The new organization remained inferior to the Infantry, and 
the effectiveness of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air 
was limited by the Secretary of War. Its authorization of 
men and planes meant little because funds were not made 
available to carry out the expansion. The Coolidge and
20Arnold, pp. 119-121; Craven and Cate, pp. 27-28. 
21Arnold, pp. 121-122.
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Hoover Administrations emphasized economy, small government, 
small military establishments, and disarmament. Coolidge 
succinctly explained his unwillingness to spend tax money on 
the military by asking: "Who's gonna fight us?" Congress 
agreed with both administrations— or at least followed the 
wishes of its constituents— and never appropriated enough 
funds to fulfill the Air Corps Act. Still, the passage of 
the Army Air Corps Act did not end all agitation. From 1926 
to 1933, twenty-nine bills were introduced into Congress to 
give aviation a greater freedom, but none of the proposed 
legislation reached the floor. More importantly, nobody in 
the Air Corps stepped forward to take Billy Mitchell's place 
as the champion of air power.22
The Depression increased the Hoover Administration's 
unwillingness to spend money on the Army Air Corps. Hoping 
to stabilize his budget for the next few years, Secretary of 
War Patrick J. Hurley cut the Department's estimates in the 
fall of 1930 for the fiscal year 1932 by $20 million, with 
the bulk coming out of the Air Corps' budget. However, 
Hoover's Bureau of the Budget refused to accept the scaled 
down estimates and instructed Hurley to make even further 
cuts from the Air Corps. In an effort to come up with the 
additional budget cuts, Hurley started looking at cutting 
back on the cost of airplanes.
22Craven and Cate, pp. 28-29; Edwin H. Rutkowsky, The
Politics of Military Aviation Procurement, 1926-1934: A
S tudy in the Political Assertion of Consensual Values 
(Columbus: Ohio State University P r e s s , 1966) , p p . 20, 
59-61.
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Mass production would lower the price, but building 
military airplanes by mass production techniques is very 
difficult. To take full advantage of the cost savings of 
mass production, the article being produced must be stand­
ardized, but unlike an automobile assembly line, an airplane 
production line requires a great deal of flexibility. If a 
new improvement is presented to an automobile manufacturer, 
it can be added to the next year's model. Then, the 
advertisements for that model can emphasize the improve­
ment. But when an aircraft manufacturer is presented with 
an improvement, he wants to incorporate it immediately. 
Even a slight improvement that adds one or two miles per 
hour to an airplane's speed could save a military p i l o t ’s 
life. Obviously, military aviators want the most up to date 
aircraft possible, but once an airplane has gone into 
production, any change increases the final cost of produc­
tion. Increased production costs means that fewer planes 
can be purchased, especially when budgets are fixed. So, 
clashes are bound to occur between fliers wanting the most 
up to date aircraft and budget officers wanting to buy the 
most planes their fixed budget allows.
Secretary Hurley found himself in quite a dilemma. He 
had to cut the Air Corps budget just when its five-year 
expansion program was supposed to be finished. Congress had 
failed to provide enough funds to complete the expansion, 
but the War Department would have been blamed for the 
failure. So, the War Department opted to purchase the most
23
planes instead of improved planes. Chief of the Air Corps 
Major General James F. Fechet objected loudly. He told the 
House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations that the 
attempt to stabilize the costs of the Air Corps with lower 
priced, standardized aircraft left it with inferior a ir­
craft. He tried to explain that aircraft improved so much 
every year that by the time production of a standard model 
started it was obsolescent, but his complaints were ignor­
ed. As a result, the Air Corps received planes that were 
new but lacking the recent improvements available on 
commercial airplanes.23
The study of air power doctrines in the United States 
progressed as slowly as aircraft procurement and develop­
ment. The Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, 
Alabama, served as the Air Corps' center for doctrinal 
development, but without the guidance of a strategic bombing 
advocate, the study of stra t e g i c  b o mbing langu i s h e d .  
Dominated by the General Staff, the Tactical School worked 
only on air defense and ground support. The influence of 
the General Staff was demonstrated in a 1928 Tactical School 
paper titled "The Doctrine of the Air Force" which stated 
that, regardless of how decisive the air force's operations 
were or how indirect the support, the air force "always 
supports the ground forces." Chief of the Air Corps Major 
General James E. Fechet rejected the paper b e c a u s e  it
23John W. Killigrew, The Impact of the Great Depression 
on the Army (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), pp. 
111-18-23.
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suggested that the air force was an auxiliary of the ground 
forces. Worried about the Tactical School's submissiveness, 
Fechet reminded them air power had removed the necessity "of 
ground forces ever coming in contact."24
Feeling that he could best p r o m o t e  the cause of 
aviation as a civilian, Fechet retired from the service on 
December 19, 1931, ten years before he reached the age 
limit. As his farewell act, Fechet told the New York Times 
that America's great wealth made it the most hated nation in 
the world, and he said that its wealth was virtually 
unprotected. Unless the nation p r e p a r e d  to meet the 
impending trouble, Fechet warned, "our fool's paradise" 
would soon be lost. Upon leaving the service, F e chet 
started a campaign to shape public opinion with denuncia­
tions and scare tactics. Speaking to the L' Enfant Chapter 
of the Daughters of the American Revolution on January 20, 
1932, Fechet warned that the United States had fallen too 
far behind other nations in air defense. To scare his 
audience, he claimed that the major cities of the United 
States could be leveled in twenty-four hours by air at­
tacks .25
Brigadier General Benjamin D. Foulois replaced Fechet 
as Chief of the Army Air Corps, and he readily entered a 
struggle between the House Subcommittee on Military Appro­
24John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 
1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 
United States Air Force, 1983), pp. 43-45.
25New York Times, January 2 and 21, 1932.
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priations and the General Staff over budget cuts. The 
General Staff proposed keeping personnel while cutting back 
on materiel, but Representative Ross Collins, believing that 
the decisive element in a future war would be weapons and 
machines rather than men, opposed their plans. Foulois 
sided with Collins and told the Subcommittee that "it would 
be a splendid thing if additional expense would be put in 
materiel, meaning heavy bombers, rather than into person­
nel." Through the strenuous efforts of Chief of Staff 
General Douglas MacArthur, the General Staff succeeded in 
keeping its personnel o r i e n t e d  army, but F o u l o i s  had 
d e m o n s t r a t e d  that he would continue to antagonize the 
General Staff like his predecessor.2®
Foulois used his new position to attack publicly any 
opponent of air power. In late January 1932, Representative 
Charles Martin of Washington, a former Assistant Chief of 
Staff, told reporters that the Air Corps personnel were the 
most extravagant and unruly group of men in the world. He 
criticized the flyers for going up several times in an 
airplane, then calling the planes flaming coffins in an 
effort to get more money for airplanes. "If we had followed 
Mitchell's program," Martin said, "we would bankrupt the 
gover n m e n t .  Those fellows have no sense of economy." 
Foulois went before the House Committee on Expenditures in 
the Executive Departments on February 4 to give testimony
2®Killigrew, Impact of the Great Depression on the 
Army, pp. V-5-7, 21.
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for creating a Department of Defense, and he used the 
opportunity to attack publicly Representative Martin, who 
sat on the Committee. Foulois enlivened the session by 
saying that Martin's remarks showed a "pitiful lack of 
knowledge regarding the administration and operation of the 
Army Air Corps" and were an "unwarranted public criticism of 
a body of men who...are not exceeded in efficiency today by 
any other branch of the United States army."
During the ensuing questioning, Representative Schafer 
mentioned a magazine article in which Fechet had claimed 
that Congress was killing national defense units by inade­
quate appropriations. "I am going to insist that we call 
General Fechet," stated Schafer, "and see who is paying him 
to carry on this propaganda— the airplane builders or who." 
Foulois came to Fechet's defense and, in a statement that 
could have easily been attributed to Billy Mitchell, told 
the committee that it was the duty of any soldier to point 
out defects in the national defense system. Though enemies, 
Foulois and Mitchell used the same method to press the cause 
of air power: public confrontation.2?
Despite being the Chief of the Air Corps, Foulois had 
little direct control over the air arm. For organizational 
purposes, the Army had divided the United States into areas, 
and operational control over the tactical units belonged to 
the Corps Area commanders. Still, his control over aircraft
2?Foulois, pp. 221-224; Shiner, F o u l o i s  and the 
U.S. Army Air Corps, pp. 76-78; New York Times, February 5, 
1932.
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procurement, equipment dispersal, personnel assignments, 
writing of regulations for aircraft operation and training, 
and expenditure of Air Corps funds gave him a great deal of 
power to supervise each tactical unit. However, Foulois 
left the actual running of the Air Corps to his staff. He 
concerned himself with getting the General Staff and the 
Navy to recognize the Air Corps as the agency primarily 
responsible for coastal defense. The agency charged with 
coastal defense would be assured of funding, and Foulois' 
concentration on securing that duty was a matter of practi­
cality.
Development of air force doctrine fell to the Assistant 
Chief of the Air Corps, Brigadier General Oscar W e s t o v e r . 
Under his direction, the Air Corps Tactical School began 
formulating a specifically American view on the employment 
of strategic bombing. Since 1919, Westover had opposed the 
separation of the air force from the Army and believed that 
officers who advocated independence were insubordinate. But 
he strongly advocated the development of air power. At his 
insistence, Captain George C. Kenney and a civilian at the 
Air Corps Tactical School translated Giulio Douhet's work 
into English. Arguing that air power would be the decisive 
factor in any future war, Douhet reduced the role of the 
army and navy to preventing a surface invasion while the air 
force destroyed the enemy's industrial c a p a b i l i t y  and 
morale. Douhet felt that the nation whose air force 
finished its work first would win. Foulois approved the
28
translation and had it distributed widely through the Air 
Corps. He also gave copies to the House Committee on 
Military Affairs.
Billy Mitchell continued writing to Air Corps officers 
after he left the Army in 1926, and he tried to press his 
arguments on them. By this time he had started to echo 
Douhet. He too began preaching that the bombing of an 
enemy's industrial and population centers would bring about 
a quick victory. However, his efforts had little impact on 
the formulation of air power doctrines at the Tactical 
School. Neither did the translated writings of Douhet.
Independently of Douhet and Mitchell, the Air Corps 
Tactical School had developed its own doctrine of strategic 
bombing. Its textbook on bombardment for the 1933-34 class 
stated that bombardment could "shatter a nation's will to 
resist; it can d e s t r o y  the economical and industrial 
structures which make possible the very existence of modern 
civilization." It also noted the defensive role of bombard­
ment in preventing the establishment of enemy airfields 
close enough to strike American industry, unlike Douhet and 
Mitchell, the Air Corps Tactical School did not advocate the 
bombing of population centers.28 So, by the early 1930s, 
the influence of Billy Mitchell on the Air Corps had started 
to decline.
Within the Air Corps, the emphasis turned increasingly
28 Foulois, p. 225; Shiner, pp. 41-48; Weigly, The 
American Way of War, pp. 234-236.
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toward long-range bombers. The Air Corps Tactical School 
allowed the study of attack (or ground support) aviation to 
languish. Also, pursuit aviation, which had been the 
dominant branch of the air arm during the 1920s, lost its 
position during the first five years of the 1930s. Claire 
Chennault continued to champion pursuit aviation, but he had 
little influence. The trend toward long-range bombardment 
was reversed only by the need for ground support aircraft in 
North Africa and long-range fighter escorts over Europe.29
The Air Corps and the General Staff held differing 
views on the decisiveness of strategic bombing and the 
importance of ground support, but they a g r e e d  on the 
importance of Army control over coastal defense. For over a 
century the Army had been charged with coastal defense, and 
the Navy had been recognized as the nation's first line of 
defense. The dividing line between their areas of responsi­
b i l i t y  had been determined by the range of the Army's 
coastal artillery, but the advent of airplanes forced a 
reconsideration of where the dividing line rested. The Army 
wanted its jurisdiction extended to the range of the Army's 
planes, but the Navy refused to surrender its traditional
29Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in 
the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Insti­
tute, Air University, 1955; reprint ed., Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1985), 
pp. 52-57 and 66-67. Even though Chennault advocated a 
strong pursuit arm, he too believed in the importance of 
bombardment planes. In an article for the Infantry Journal, 
he wrote about the importance of bombardment. Major Claire 
L. Chennault, "Some Facts about Bombardment Aviation," XLII 
Infantry Journal (September-October 1935): 387-393.
domain. The dispute dragged on from the sinking of the 
Ostfriesland until President Hoover took interest. He 
wanted to avoid the expense of two services duplicating a 
single function and encouraged Chief of Staff D o uglas  
MacArthur to settle the matter. In January 1931, MacArthur 
and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William V. Pratt 
s i g n e d  an agreement recognizing the Army as primarily 
responsible for coastal defense. The Navy w o u l d  have 
absolute freedom of action without having to worry about 
coastal defense. But Naval officers were never happy with 
the arrangement and wanted to control all aviation over the 
water. Soon after Pratt retired, the Navy renounced the 
M a c A r t h u r - P r a t t  agreement, and the dispute started up 
again. Despite the personal attention Foulois gave to the 
problem, the dispute continued until the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor.30
Within a few months of the MacArthur-Pratt Agreement, 
however, the Air Corps embarrassed itself in the public 
eye. Given an old freighter, the Mount Shasta, the Air 
Corps intended to use the ship for routine target practice 
and made no effort to publicize it. Unfortunately for the 
Air Corps, the press found out about the Mount Shasta and 
played up the bombing practice until it appeared to be as 
important as the Ostfriesland sinking. Not expecting so 
much publicity, the Air Corps failed to carefully plan the 
b o m b i n g  exercises. On August 11, 1931, the Air Corps
30Shiner, pp. 52-54, 72; Craven and Cate, pp. 30, 62.
bombers, led by Major Herbert Dargue, failed to find the 
ship anchored only fifty-five miles out. Three days later, 
Dargue found the freighter, but he used bombs that were too 
small. The Air Corps bombers set the ship on fire, but it 
was sunk by a Coast Guard cutter. Hanson Baldwin, an 
Annapolis graduate who was a military affairs correspondent 
for the New York T i m e s , wrote that the test showed the 
"inefficiency of land-based pilots over water." He pointed 
out that flying over water was something that naval fliers 
did regularly.
The poor showing inspired little confidence in the Air 
Corps' ability to defend the coastline. On August 26, Hap 
Arnold told Carl Spaatz that he could not "help but feel 
that it will have a very detrimental effect on this newly 
assigned Coast Defense project." He also showed other 
officers cartoons that ridiculed the Air Corps. Yet, the 
Mount Shasta farce made Air Corps officers realize that many 
of the problems faced by the Air Corps resulted from their 
own mistakes. Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Andrews, execu­
tive officer of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps in 
Washington, D.C., told Hap Arnold that his office had issued 
instructions that no publicity was to be given to the 
bombing, "but it was reversed higher up." Obviously vexed, 
he admitted that what originally had been a target more 
interesting than a circle on the ground had let the Navy 
"have a good laugh at us." But what bothered the OCAC most, 
Andrews explained, was "the possibility that something is
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wrong with our training and our ability to attack targets at 
sea."
Andrews realized that the Air Corps had to do more than 
just make claims. It had to substantiate its claims to win 
support. "What we have got to do," he told Arnold ten days 
later, "is to get down a proper system of training in 
navigation and bombardment, improve our equipment, and keep 
out of the limelight for a while until we know exactly what 
we can do." Unfortunately, Andrews was not in a position to 
put his suggestions into effect. The Air Corps opened an 
over-water navigation school in April 1932, but it provided 
no formal training in over-water navigation for the tactical 
units. So, most Air Corps pilots had little navigation 
training. More importantly, however, the Air Corps failed 
to stay out of the limelight and soon found itself in a 
situation more embarrassing than the Mount Shasta fiasco.31
Thus, before Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected Presi­
dent of the United States, a few officers in the Air Corps 
realized that the method of public confrontation used by 
B i l l y  Mitchell, James Fechet and Benjamin Foulois was 
inappropriate for winning support from the public, govern­
ment and military. They knew that the Air Corps had to 
prove itself deserving of support by fulfilling its claims. 
Within a year of Roosevelt's inauguration, these officers
31Sh iner, p. 56-59; Andrews to Arnold, August 17 and 
27, 1931, Frank M. Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, 
Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "A" 1930-1942, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
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rose to positions from where they could carry out their 
ideas.
CHAPTER II
THE ARMY AIR CORPS AND THE NEW DEAL
The Democratic party held its 1932 c o n v e n t i o n  at 
Chicago and chose Franklin D. Roosevelt as its presidential 
candidate. Customarily, the candidate waited for official 
notification before accepting the nomination, but Roosevelt, 
physically, flew in the face of tradition. Without waiting, 
he boarded a trimotor airplane on July 2 and flew into 
strong headwinds to the Convention to make his acceptance 
speech. Roosevelt told the Convention that his flight from 
Albany to Chicago symbolized a breaking of traditions, and 
he promised the American people a new deal. His bumpy 
flight also foreshadowed the rough and bumpy development of 
the Army Air Corps during his presidency.1
During his p r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign, R o o s e v e l t  had 
different experiences with aircraft manufacturers. In 
Seattle, Roosevelt ran into open political partisanship at 
the Boeing Aircraft Company. They refused to let him enter 
the factory to address their employees, but Boeing allowed 
R e p u b l i c a n s  inside. Back on the East Coast, however, 
Roosevelt found himself courted by R.H. Fleet, president of
Barnes MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt; The Lion and the 
Fox, 1882-1940, (New York: Harcort, Brace & World, Inc., 
1956), p. 139.
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Consolidated Aircraft Corporation; T.P. Wright, vice-presi­
dent of C urtiss A e r o p l a n e  and Motor Corporation; and 
L.D. Bell, president of the Aero Club of Buffalo. They 
cabled Roosevelt from Buffalo, New York, on October 15 to 
remind him that thousands of skilled aircraft workmen were 
unemployed. Arguing that seventy-five cents out of every 
dollar spent on airplanes went to skilled labor, they 
suggested that Roosevelt come out for spending money on 
aircraft because it would be "more effective in relieving 
distress than other forms of public building" and a "great 
factor toward guaranteeing peace and national security." 
The three men told Roosevelt that his flight to the Chicago 
convention had made a "hit with airminded people." They 
promised that Roosevelt would win thousands of votes in 
Buffalo and across the nation if he would announce his 
support of aviation.
Fleet tried to cover his bets by sending President 
Hoover a letter similar to the telegram for Roosevelt. He 
sent General Foulois copies of his messages to Roosevelt and 
Hoover. Fleet confided to General Foulois his plan to get 
Roosevelt's commitment to support the aeronautical industry, 
"and then perhaps Hoover would fall in line." Foulois noted 
with interest the efforts of the aircraft manufacturers in 
Buffalo, but he wisely declined any comment on Fleet's 
plans. The Chief of the Air Corps explained to Fleet that 
he could not comment because it was a matter "outside of my 
official province." Foulois fully understood that military
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men should stay out of politics, and he had enough sense to 
know that whatever he said could be used against him later.2
Roosevelt's election on November 8, 1932, ended the 
partisan political struggle for the presidency but started 
an internal political struggle for control of air power 
policy. Freely approaching their Commander in Chief, the 
Army and Navy involved Roosevelt in their rivalry from the 
very start. Impressed by Roosevelt's flight to Chicago, 
both services told the press on Election Day that they 
expected Roosevelt to make full use of their airplanes. The 
Navy bragged about having several large cabin planes that 
the President and his council could use. The Army replied 
that its "land" planes were superior to Navy planes. Trying 
to outdo the Navy, Army flyers emphasized that they would 
have a trimotored, metal transport plane ready for the 
President when he took office on March 4, 1933. "He ought," 
said a naval official, "to use the navy one time and the 
army the next." An Army man replied that Roosevelt "should 
use army equipment all the time unless he flies out over the 
ocean." Then, a civilian further clouded the issue by 
suggesting that Roosevelt use the Ford trimotor belonging to 
the Department of Commerce and "avoid any fights."3 Amid
2Coffee, H a p , p. 172; Telegram from R.H. Fleet to 
Roosevelt, October 15, 1932, Fleet to Hoover, October 18, 
1932, Fleet to Foulois, October 18, 1932, and Foulois to 
Fleet, O c tober 19, 1932, B e n j a m i n  F. Foulois Papers,
Correspondence, Box 5, File Number 3, 1931-1935, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
^New York Times, November 9, 1932.
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the Depression and bank holidays, the incoming President had 
more important considerations than how he would travel, 
and Roosevelt solved the tit for tat squabble in a way that 
neither side expected. He traveled by car or train.
The Air Corps could not be blamed for overestimating 
President Roosevelt's commitment to aviation. In February 
1932, the press was still reporting that the new Administra­
tion would be more airminded than the old because both 
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt preferred flying to any other 
form of transportation. However, people returning from 
visits with Roosevelt at W a r m  Springs w a r n e d  a g a i n s t  
expecting too much. They reported that neither Roosevelt or 
James Farley, the incoming Postmaster General, s e e m e d  
impressed by claims that the air transportation industry 
needed air mail lines where there was no mail to survive. 
Nor were Roosevelt and Farley convinced by the claims of 
Edward P. Warner, editor of Aviation magazine, that survival 
of the aviation industry depended upon military purchases. 
Fiscally conservative and wanting cuts in military expendi­
tures, the New York Times stated that increased military 
spending was unnecessary because "the naval arm is strong 
and capable, and army aviation lags a bit, but is efficient 
with new squadrons authorized." Roosevelt soon showed that 
he a g r e e d  with the T i m e s . In his campaign speeches, 
Roosevelt had promised to cut federal spending by twenty- 
five percent. "I regard," Roosevelt said at Pittsburgh in 
October 1932, "reduction in Federal spending as one of the
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most important issues of this campaign." To the surprise of 
the Air Corps, Roosevelt carried out his pledge by cutting 
back on military expenditures.4
During the celebrated "Hundred Days" from March 9 to 
June 16, Roosevelt asked for and C o n g r e s s  p a s s e d  the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Civilian Conservation Corps, 
Federal Emergency Relief Act, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
H ome Owners Refinancing Act, Farm Credit Act, and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act with $3.3 billion for the 
Public Works Administration. Roosevelt realized that his 
New Deal programs would be expensive; he warned Congress on 
March 10 that the federal government would have a deficit of 
more than a billion dollars unless immediate action was 
taken. "Too often in recent history," Roosevelt said, 
"liberal governments have been wrecked on rocks of loose 
fiscal policy." To contain the projected deficit, he asked 
Congress for the power to make economies within the govern­
ment, and Congress gave it to him.5 President Roosevelt 
knew that spending tax dollars on defense would provide 
relief, and the cable from the East Coast aircraft manufac­
turers told him that laborers would receive most of the 
benefits from increased aircraft purchases. Nevertheless, 
Roosevelt refused to support a military increase that might
4New York T imes, February 19, March 5 and 6, 1933; 
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1932-1940, The New American Nation Series, ed. by 
Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (New York: Harp­
er & Row, 1963), p. 11.
5Burns, The Lion and the Fox, pp. 166-171.
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wreck his liberal programs.
Congress passed the War Department appropriations bill 
for the 1934 fiscal year on March 4, 1933, and most of the 
Army took cuts. Through hard work, the Air Corps had 
managed to get almost all the funds it requested, but those 
efforts went for naught. In April, Roosevelt carried out 
his campaign pledge and ordered the War Department to cut 
$144 million from its 1934 budget. He also started talking 
about furloughing 3,000 to 4,000 Army officers and cutting 
flight pay.
Roosevelt's plans for economy caused great concern in 
both the Army and Navy flying services. Since he had not 
specified which officers would be released, the fliers 
feared that reductions in personnel would come from their 
ranks. Acting without the approval of the General Staff, 
General Foulois and his staff argued before Congress that 
funding for the Air Corps should be increased rather than 
decreased. Their actions upset the General Staff because 
extra funds for the Air Corps meant reduced funds for the 
rest of the Army.6
The General Staff also tried to prevent the cuts, and 
at a White House meeting Chief of Staff MacArthur angered 
the President with his arguments. MacArthur said that, when 
the United States lost the next war, "and an American boy, 
lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his belly and 
an enemy foot on his dying throat spat out his last curse,"
6Shiner, pp. 113-117; New York Times, May 7, 1933.
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he "wanted the name not to be MacArthur but Roosevelt." 
"You must not," Roosevelt replied lividly, "talk that way to 
the President!" MacArthur apologized and o f f e r e d  his 
resignation, but Roosevelt, showing remarkable self-control, 
refused to accept it. "Don't be foolish," Roosevelt told 
him, "you and the budget get together on this." As they 
left the White House, Secretary of War George Dern told 
MacArthur that he had saved the Army, but MacArthur just 
vomited on the White House steps.
MacArthur quickly got over his illness, and he con­
tinued to protest loudly about the proposed cuts. Again, he 
threatened to resign if the cuts were not put back. The 
Administration compromised and restored nearly half the 
cuts, but appropriations for the Air Corps were reduced from 
$26 million to $12 million.?
Despite the budget cuts, the supporters of air power 
had hopes for improvement under Roosevelt because of his 
connections with Billy Mitchell. In July 1931, Mitchell met 
Roosevelt and became convinced that Roosevelt recognized the 
i n c r e a s e d  i m p o r t a n c e  of aviation. Mitchell supported 
Roosevelt for the Democratic nomination and helped in the 
presidential campaign. Mitchell and his supporters assumed 
that Roosevelt would name Mitchell to fill the post of 
Assistant Secretary of War for Air. However, when Roosevelt
^Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw 
Hill Book Co., 1964), pp. 100-101; Robert Dallek, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New 
York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  Press, 1979), p. 36; Shiner, 
p. 115.
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delayed in filling the post, rumors circulated that he never 
would fill it. The hopes of Mitchell and his supporters 
fell when the New York Times reported on April 9, 1933, that 
Roosevelt would cut the Assistant Secretaries for Air in the 
Army and Navy.8
Since the Assistant Secretary for Air gave the Army 
fliers direct contact with Congress, the War Department 
wanted to abolish the post. The War Department got its 
chance when the Director of the Bureau of the Budget asked 
Secretary of War George B. Dern on May 23 for recommenda­
tions on what money saving changes could be made in the War 
Department. Dern turned the matter over to General Mac­
Arthur, and the General Staff recommended only that the 
office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air be abolish­
ed. The Administration accepted MacArthur's recommendation 
and announced the abolition of the Assistant Secretaryship 
in June.9
By cutting the Air Corps' budget and abolishing the 
Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the General Staff 
significantly increased its control over the Air Corps. 
Major Carl Spaatz expressed the dismay felt throughout the 
Air Corps. "As was anticipated," he complained to Hap 
Arnold, "the War Department is hot on the trail of the Air 
Corps since the buffer (Assistant Secretary for Air) has
^Hurley, pp. 122-126; New York Times, March 25; April 
9, 1933.
^Killigrew, Impact of the Great Depression, pp. IV- 
13-14; New York Times, June 8, 1933.
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been removed.h10
The rest of the Army also felt dismay over the budget 
cuts. It must have appeared that Roosevelt was cutting the 
military budget in a blind disregard for national defense. 
That was not the case. His cuts in military spending were 
m a t c h e d  by his effort to reach an international arms 
reduction at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of A r maments. Better known as the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, the League of Nations-sponsored conference had 
opened in February 1932, with hopes of reaching a world wide 
arms agreement. Although neither were members of the League 
of Nations, both the United States and the Soviet Union had 
sent representatives to the conference.
The Conference made great efforts to place limitations 
on military aircraft. In November 1932, Stanley Baldwin 
expressed the Conference's concern with aircraft before the 
House of Commons. He said that a failure to abolish bombing 
planes would mean the end of European civilization. The 
fear Baldwin and others expressed over bombers during the 
interwar years reflected their perception of the horrors an 
air attack would bring. They envisioned the first wave of 
bombers dropping explosives on cities to drive civilians 
into underground shelters. Then, more airplanes would sweep 
overhead spraying poison gas. The gas, heavier than air, 
would seep into the basements and shelters and find the
lOCarl Spaatz to Hap Arnold, September 29, 1933, Carl 
Spaatz Papers, Diaries, Box 6, August 3-October 3, 1933,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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people hiding there. Very small children would be helpless 
because there were no gas masks their size. The image of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of people hideously choking to 
death in shelters while buildings toppled by high explosive 
and incendiary bombs crushed and burned to death those 
people on the surface approached that of the modern fear of 
nuclear war, with its i n s t a n t a n e o u s  i n c i n e r a t i o n  and 
subsequent nuclear winter. Yet, their fear of not having 
bombers outweighed their fear of air raids.
France proposed placing all bombing planes under the 
control of the League of Nations for use as an international 
police force; but, as if the ghost of the Versailles Treaty 
had arisen, the United States refused to allow its military 
forces to be used in any European squabble and rejected the 
French proposal. Operating under the popular assumption 
that c i v i l i a n  p l a n e s  could be converted into bombers 
overnight by simply adding machine guns and bomb racks, the 
French then suggested placing all civilian aviation under 
League supervision. This proposal was rejected also. Great 
Britain proposed outlawing all bombing planes except those 
used for police actions. Because the Royal Air Force had 
b een used successfully in Iraq as a police force, the 
British were unwilling to give up the right to use bombers 
in policing their Empire. They apparently felt differently 
about bombs that fell on their homes than those which fell 
in their territories. President Hoover suggested doing away 
with entire categories of arms. He proposed ending all
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military aviation except naval observation planes, but his 
proposal was rejected too. So in spite of all their fears 
and efforts, no agreement had been reached by the time 
Adolph Hitler and Roosevelt came to power.11
Hitler cared little for disarmament and demanded parity 
in armaments. Roosevelt, however, worked hard at trying to 
achieve a reduction in offensive armaments through the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference. As the President-elect, 
Roosevelt asked Under Secretary of State William Phillips on 
A p r i l  27 for the Soviet delegate's definition of "an 
aggressor nation." Phillips reported that on February 6, 
1933, Maxim Litvinov had defined an aggressor nation as one 
that declared war; invaded without a declaration of war; 
used bombardment by land, sea or air; crossed frontiers 
without permission or infringed on that permission when 
granted; or conducted a naval blockade.12
Once he had been inaugurated, Roosevelt became involved 
personally with the disarmament efforts. Meeting with Dr. 
Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichbank, on May 6, 1933, 
Roosevelt expressed his ideas on reducing offensive arma­
• ^ Kennett, S t r a t e g i c  B o m b i n g , pp. 68-70. For an 
example of how people expected a war would be conducted see 
Hanson W. Baldwin, "If War Should Again Assail the World," 
New York Times Magazine, June 4, 1932, pp. 8-9. Also, see 
the photograph of Parisians being taught how to use gas 
masks by the Prefect of Police in the same day's photograph 
section of the New York Times.
12W i l l i a m  P h i l l i p s  to Assistant Secretary to the 
President Marvin H. McIntyre, April 28, 1933, in Edgar
B. Nixon, ed. Franklin D. Roosevlet and Foreign Affairs, 4 
vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1969), 
vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934 , p. 91.
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ments. Explaining that the United States regarded Germany 
as the only possible obstacle to a disarmament treaty, 
Roosevelt insisted on the status quo in land armaments for 
Germany. But he promised that the United States would 
support any effort to bring the offensive armaments of all 
other nations down to Germany's level. Roosevelt reiterated 
his idea of limiting offensive weapons during a White House 
p r e s s  conference four days later. "If you remove the 
weapons of offense and thereby strengthen the weapons of de­
fense," he said off the record, "you give security to every 
nation." He named gas, airplanes and tanks as the offensive 
weapons that render defensive weapons ineffective.I3
On May 16, President Roosevelt made public his ideas 
about limiting offensive weapons in a message to the leaders 
of all nations represented at the Disarmament Conference and 
the World Monetary and Economic Conference, better known as 
the London Economic Conference. He blamed the need for 
armaments on two causes: either governments desired to 
enlarge their territories at the expense of another nation, 
or they feared being invaded. Believing that "only a small 
minority of Governments or of peoples" wanted expansion, 
Roosevelt said that the "overwhelming majority of peoples" 
kept excessive armaments out of fear of aggression. Their 
fear, he continued, came about because fixed fortifications
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Roosevelt to Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, May 6, 1933, and Presidental Press Conference, 
May 10, 1933, in Nixon, FDR and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1,
pp. 91 and 107-109.
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were vulnerable to attack by airplanes, heavy m o b i l e  
artillery, tanks and gas. "If all nations will agree wholly 
to eliminate from possession and use the weapons which make 
p o s s i b l e  a successful attack," he reasoned, "defenses 
automatically will become impregnable, and the frontiers and 
independence of every nation will become secure." Roosevelt 
proposed that the ultimate objective of the Disarmament 
C o n f e r e n c e  should be the complete elimination of all 
offensive weapons.14
The War Plans Division of the General Staff opposed the 
President's plans for a b o l i s h i n g  bombers. W h i l e  not 
favoring an independent air force, the WPD recognized the 
value of aerial bombardment. On May 3, Brigadier General 
Charles Kilbourne, chief of the WPD, prepared a memorandum 
for the American Delegation at Geneva stating that the 
abolition of bombing planes would be a real sacrifice for 
the United States. Explaining that the Army's bombers "were 
primarily valuable in defense of our overseas possessions 
and coasts," Kilbourne said he could see "very l ittle 
possibility" of the United States fighting an offensive 
war. MacArthur approved the memorandum on the sixth and 
sent it to the State Department. Clearly at odds with the 
Army, President Roosevelt ignored their wishes. When the 
British proposed in late May to limit the United States to 
only 500 m i l i t a r y  and naval a i rcraft as p a r t  of a
14Roosevelt to the Heads of Nations Represented at the 
London and Geneva Conferences, May 16, 1933, in Nixon, 
vol. 1, pp. 125-128.
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disarmament plan, Roosevelt approved it without consulting 
the Army or Navy. Then, on May 28, a member of the American 
Delegation told the Geneva Conference that the United States 
government wanted an absolute abolition of bombing. The 
only way to make it effective, he said, would be to capital­
ize on "the growing conviction that bombing from the air is 
a crime."15
Even as he attempted to reach a disarmament agreement 
in Geneva, Roosevelt received warnings about Germany and 
Japan. Samuel Fuller, the president of the American Bemberg 
Corporation, often sent Roosevelt reports about his visits 
to Germany. On May 27, Fuller warned Roosevelt that Hitler 
would cause a war someday. Roosevelt sent Fuller's warning 
to the State Department, which replied with a memorandum 
from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew warning that the United 
States was inferior to Japan in land forces, about equal in 
naval forces, but "probably potentially superior in the 
air."15
C o n c e r n e d  by these warnings, President Roosevelt 
decided to build up America's naval forces. Knowing that 
the Navy had fallen well below the limitations placed on it
15Memorandum from Brigadier General Charles Kilbourne 
to Lieutenant Colonel George V. Strong with the American 
Delegation at Geneva, May 3, 1933, Record Group 165, WPD, 
599-169, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; W i l l i a m  
Phillips to Roosevelt, May 27, 1933, in Nixon, vol. 1, 
pp. 185-186; New York Times, May 28, 1933.
15Memorandum from Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, May 27, 
1933, Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, May 27, 1933, in 
Nixon, vol. 1, pp. 172-176.
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by the Washington Treaty of 1921 and the London Treaty of 
1930, Roosevelt authorized in June the expenditure of $238 
million in PWA funds for thirty-two new ships. Hailing it 
as a measure to aid the economy, Roosevelt said that his 
ship building program would employ people all across the 
nation.^
Already suspicious, the United States rejected in June 
a proposal from the Japanese Delegation at Geneva to abolish 
aircraft carriers while allowing an increase in Japan's 
naval strength. On June 29, Secretary of the Navy Swanson 
announced that the United States would "maintain the navy in 
sufficient strength to guard the continental and overseas 
possessions of the United States... c r eate, maintain and 
operate a navy second to none and in conformity with treaty 
provisions...provide great radius of action in all classes 
of fighting ships...[and] develop national aviation primari­
ly for operations with the fleet." Swanson's declaration 
was directed at Japan, and they understood it immediately. 
New York Times correspondent Hugh Byas reported from Tokyo 
that Swanson's statement directly confronted the Japanese. 
His reference to guarding overseas possessions meant the 
Philippines, and Japan presented the only threat to the 
islands. Also, a navy second to none with a great radius of 
action would be needed in a war with Japan. Byas added that 
if "national aviation is developed primarily to give wings
^ R o b e r t  Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, p. 75.
to the shells of that fleet, the inflammable wooden cities 
along the coast in which Japan's industry is concentrated 
may be menaced with risks greater than those of earth­
quakes." The Japanese would not be indifferent to any 
improvement of American naval aircraft, he warned.18 The 
only American planes capable of reaching Japan's cities were 
those launched from aircraft carriers; Japan's willingness 
to abolish that threat made sense. More important, the 
p u b l i c  me n t i o n  of threatening to burn Japanese cities 
appeared seven years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Eventually, that threat became part of America's foreign 
policy.
In addition to upsetting the Japanese, Roosevelt's 
naval expansion program evoked protests at home. When 
Reverend Malcolm E. Peabody protested to him about the naval 
expansion, Roosevelt explained how Great Britain, the 
United States and Japan had agreed to a naval ratio of 
t e n :t e n :s even, respectively. Although the British and 
Japanese had built up to the treaty limits, the United 
States had not built enough ships to keep up with the 
Japanese's smaller ratio. He assured Peabody that the new 
building program would just keep the United States even with 
the Japanese and not come close to the British. "I am not," 
he wrote, "concerned about the latter, but I am about the
18New York Times, August 20, 1933.
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first. "10
Convinced that the Army would receive PWA funds too, 
the General Staff instructed the Air Corps to d r a w  up 
estimates for completing the five-year expansion program. 
To the Army's surprise, Roosevelt gave the Air Corps only 
$7.5 million in PWA funds, the same amount given to the 
Naval Air Service. After much effort, Secretary of War Dern 
convinced the President to release another $3 million from 
impounded Air Corps funds. This total of $10.5 million 
provided the Air Corps with just enough money to replace the 
planes it lost to normal attrition and left it short of the 
1800 planes authorized in the Air Corps Act.20 Most people, 
therefore, thought Roosevelt was prejudiced in favor of 
b a t t l e s h i p s .  They were wrong. He opposed offensive 
weapons. From his days as the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Roosevelt viewed the Navy as America's first line of 
defense. And as he told Reverend Peabody, building up the 
Navy was a defensive measure against the only naval threat 
facing the United States: Japan.
Budget cuts and President Roosevelt's determination to 
reduce offensive weapons put the Air Corps in a precarious 
position. Lacking a specific purpose for existing, the Air 
Corps was susceptible to additional budget cuts. Therefore, 
General Foulois' efforts at getting the General Staff to
10Roosevelt to Malcolm E. Peabody, August 19, 1933, in 
Nixon, vol. 1, p. 370.
20Shi ner, pp. 118-123.
recognize the Air Corps as the agency primarily responsible 
for coastal defense became increasingly important. The 
MacArthur-Pratt agreement of 1931 had given the Air Corps 
responsibility for coastal air defense, but the General 
Staff failed to give the Air Corps directions on how it 
should carry out that mission. So, Foulois pressured the 
General Staff to formulate a policy, and in January 1933, 
General MacArthur finally issued a directive detailing the 
Air Corps' duties. Titled "Employment of Army Aviation in 
C oast Defense," this directive divided the Air C o r p s ’ 
mission into three phases. First, the Air Corps would 
o p e r a t e  "to the limit of the radius of action of the 
airplanes" to find and destroy approaching enemy vessels and 
forces. Second, when the enemy came within range of the 
ground defenses, the Air Corps would assist them w ith 
continued observation and offensive operations. Third, if 
the enemy made a successful landing on American shores, the 
Air Corps would provide ground support. Foulois got his 
policy but at the cost of making a powerful enemy on the 
General Staff. General Kilbourne, chief of the War Plans 
Division, supported the Air Corps and a p p r e c i a t e d  the 
military value of airplanes, but he was a stickler for team 
spirit. By endlessly demanding that the General Staff 
formulate a policy, Foulois convinced Kilbourne that he 
lacked team spirit.21
21C r a v e n  and Cate, pp. 63-64; Shiner, pp. 59-65; 
Foulois, p. 227.
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With a definite policy as a guideline, Foulois planned 
extensive maneuvers for May 1933. Placing Westover in 
command, Foulois wanted him to prove that the Air Corps 
could defend either coast by quickly concentrating its 
airplanes on the West Coast and to show the need for long- 
range aircraft which could conduct operations against enemy 
fleets far from American shores. The maneuvers had just 
s t a r t e d  w hen the need for officers to administer the 
Civilian Conservation Corps forced their c a n c e l a t i o n . 22
Despite the early end, the combined fighter and bomber 
operations that were conducted influenced Westover. The 
newly arrived Martin B-10's, a monoplane with a top speed of 
more than two hundred miles per hour, outran the Air Corps' 
P-12 biplane fighters. Westover realized that any intercep­
tor would need to be faster than the bomber, but he believed 
that fighters could not operate efficiently or safely at 
such high speeds. Westover concluded, therefore, that 
fighters could not stop bombers flying in close formation 
from reaching their target without fighter escort. Since 
Foulois had left the formulation of d o c t r i n e  to him, 
Westover influenced the Air Corps Tactical School with his 
beliefs. In the following years, the T a ctical School 
started moving toward the policy of daylight strategic 
bombing that the Army Air Forces practiced in World War II.
However, Foulois had not given up the idea using the 
airplane for offensive duties. He recognized the strong
22Foulois, p. 227: Arnold, pp. 140-141.
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antiwar feelings in America and realized that efforts to
secure an offensive role for the Air Corps would be a waste
of time. When his air staff complained that the General 
Staff would not give the Air Corps the bombers it requested, 
Foulois advised them to stop asking the General Staff for 
bombers to conduct offensive operations. He told them to 
ask for bombers to carry out defensive operations and espec­
ially bombers to reinforce the Hawaiian Islands. Unconcern­
ed about the language used in papers sent to the General 
Staff, Foulois only wanted bombers with longer range and 
greater bomb loads.
In July 1933, the Air Corps Materiel Division reported 
that an airplane capable of carrying a one-ton bomb load 
5000 miles at a speed of 200 miles per hour was feasible. 
On the basis of that report, the Air Corps asked the General
Staff in December for a plane of those specifications.
Taking his advice, Foulois' air staff justified the request 
by pointing out that the bomber could reinforce Hawaii and 
Panama. Their argument worked. On May 16, 1934, the
General Staff authorized the Air Corps to negotiate con­
tracts for an experimental aircraft, named "Project A." The 
General Staff required the experimental plane to be able to 
destroy "distant land or naval targets" and "reinforce 
Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska without the use of intermediate 
servicing facilities." Boeing won the contract and the 
airplane it produced was designated the XB-15. Completed in 
1937, the XB-15 proved to be too underpowered for use in
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combat, but Boeing gained valuable experience that it used 
to develop the highly successful B-17.23
While the Air Corps was working out the proposal for 
Project A, the Geneva Disarmament Conference collapsed 
without reaching an agreement on arms reduction. In October 
1933, Germany withdrew from the Conference and the League of 
Nations. The other delegates stayed on in Geneva until the 
spring of 1934, but the conference was effectively over. 
France announced a return to its traditional methods of 
security: armaments and alliances.24
In the fall of 1933, Pre s i d e n t  R o o s e v e l t  b e c a m e  
c o n v i n c e d  that the leaders of Germany and Japan were 
preventing arms reductions. From Germany, A m b a s s a d o r  
William E. Dodd reported that more than half of Germany was 
liberal at heart and opposed arbitrary and minority govern­
ment, but they "dared not speak out." Walter Lippmann told 
the President during the first week of November that "about 
8 per cent of the population of the entire world, i.e., 
Germany and Japan, is able, b ecause of i m p e r i a l i s t i c  
attitude, to prevent peaceful guarantees and armament 
reductions on the part of the other 92 per cent of the 
world." The influence of these two men on the President 
became apparent when he spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Founda­
tion Dinner on December 28, 1933. Roosevelt enunciated his 
belief that the "blame for the danger to world peace lies
23Craven and Cate, pp. 64-66; Foulois, pp. 227-230.
24Kennett, pp. 70-71.
not in the world population but in the political leaders of 
that population." Echoing Lippmann, he estimated that at 
least ninety percent of the world's population would be 
willing to reduce armaments if all nations would do so. 
Without mentioning Germany or Japan, Roosevelt said that the 
ninety percent would not disarm because they feared the ten 
percent would follow their leaders in seeking territorial 
expansion. "If," he continued, "that 10% of the world 
population can be persuaded by the other 90% to do their own 
thinking and not be so finely led, we will have practical 
peace, permanent peace, real peace throughout the world." 
Again, he called on the world to eliminate every offensive 
weapon and have international inspections to assure that no 
new offensive weapons would be built.25
After ten months in office, Roosevelt had little to
show for his efforts to disarm the world. His attempt to
lead the way by reducing America's offensive armaments had 
failed, but he believed that his budget cutting had not 
seriously hampered Army or Navy aviation. On January 11, 
1934, six Navy seaplanes flew from San Francisco to Pearl 
Harbor, breaking the record for a mass flight. The command­
er of the flight told reporters that it demonstrated the 
possibility of sending any number of squadrons to Hawaii in 
a time of national emergency. Assistant Secretary of the
25William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, October 13, 1933, Dodd
to Roosevelt, October 28, 1933, Roosevelt to Dodd, November
13, 1933, and Speech by Roosevelt at the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation Dinner, December 28, 1933, in Nixon, vol. 1, 
pp. 424-425, 442-443, 484-485 and 558-563.
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Navy, Colonel Henry L. Roosevelt, claimed that the flight 
was "in no sense a stunt." He said they "did an extraordin­
ary thing in a routine way" with unaltered service planes. 
The Navy proved it could reinforce Hawaii while the Army was 
still secretly considering the long-range, P r o j e c t  A 
bomber. Roosevelt and Japan grasped the meaning of the 
flight. The President congratulated the Navy fliers, and a 
spokesman for the Japanese Navy Office said the flight 
showed the increased powers placed in the hands of men. "It 
remains," said the spokesman, "to be seen whether these 
powers will be used beneficently or destructively."
The annual report of the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics, the forerunner of the National Air and 
Space Administration, made Roosevelt feel more confident 
about American aviation. The NACA report boasted that 
aeronautical development in the United States had equaled or 
surpassed that of any other country. Roosevelt concurred 
with the NACA. When he submitted the report to Congress, 
Roosevelt said that fundamental research in aeronautics was 
"essential to the national defense" and "to the future of 
air transportation."2®
Roosevelt soon discovered, however, that the Air Corps 
was poorly equipped and inadequately trained. He was 
presented evidence on February 9 that President Hoover's 
Postmaster General had misused his authority to make air 
mail contracts. By alt e r i n g  the competitive bidding
2®New York Times, January 12, 13 and 24, 1934.
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procedures to prevent smaller airlines from r e c e i v i n g  
contracts, three large holding companies had created a 
monopoly on the profitable air mail carrying business. 
Roosevelt prepared to cancel the contracts. He had Assis­
tant Postmaster Harllee Branch ask General Foulois if the 
Air Corps could carry the air mail. Unaware that Roosevelt 
meant to take immediate action, Foulois said that the Air 
C o r p s  c ould be ready in "about a week or ten days." 
Informed of Foulois' statement, President Roosevelt can­
celled the air mail contracts that day, and he ordered the 
Air Corps to start carrying the mail as of February 19. FDR 
wanted to use the Air Corps to further his domestic polic­
ies. The Air Corps would become a trust buster to insure 
fair competition, just as the Tennessee Valley Authority did 
with the utilities holding companies. A few years later, 
Roosevelt would use the Army air arm to futher his foreign 
policies.
When he spoke to Branch, Foulois knew that the Air 
Corps was unprepared to fly the mail. The air mail had to 
be flown at night, and the commercial carriers had cargo 
planes designed for the work. Also, the commercial pilots 
w e r e  trained to fly on instruments in darkness or bad 
weather. The Air Corps had few cargo planes, and the Army 
pilots had not been trained to fly on instruments. Never­
theless, Foulois thought that the Air Corps' bombers and 
observation planes could carry the mail, and he believed 
that the Air Corps could use this opportunity as a training
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exercise. He also felt obligated to say yes to a request 
from his Commander in Chief. Furthermore, Foulois saw an 
opportunity to win support for the Air Corps through public 
pressure. Later, he remembered thinking that any problems 
encountered "would focus national attention on the Air Corps 
and maybe we would then get the funds we needed for expan­
sion...." Like Billy Mitchell after the Shenandoah crash, 
Foulois felt that the way to get changes would be through 
the use of a bludgeon.27
Along with the air carriers, Will Rogers, Captain Eddie 
Rickenbacker and Charles Lindbergh denounced the President's 
decision, but Roosevelt refused to rescind the order. So, 
before the airlines relinquished air mail operations to the 
Army, they insulted the Roosevelt Administration with a 
publicity stunt. Flying a special Douglas DC-2 transport 
plane, Rickenbacker, who worked for one of the airlines, and 
two other airline pilots carried a partial load of mail from 
California to Newark, New Jersey. Leaving on the evening of 
February 18, Rickenbacker set a new, cross-country speed 
record. Adding to the insult, a storm that had chased 
Rickenbacker across the country forced the Air Corps to 
cancel its East Coast mail flights on the first day of 
operations.2^
27Shiner, pp. 125-127; Foulois, pp. 236-237.
2®Norman E. Borden, Jr., Air Mail Emergency, 1934: An 
Account of Seventy-Eight Tense Days in the Winter of 1934 
When the Army Flew the United States Mail (Freeport, Maine: 
Bond Wheelwright Co., 1968), pp. 14-20; Shiner, pp. 134-137.
Given command of the air mail operations, Westover set 
up his headquarters in Salt Lake City and divided the air 
mail routes into three zones. Designed for combat rather 
than carrying cargo, the Army's planes were poorly suited 
for their new assignment. The War Department's earlier 
decision to standardize its aircraft meant that the Army 
planes lacked the night flying instruments and the radio 
navigation equipment found on the more modern commercial 
planes. Added to the Air Corps' difficulties, the winter of 
1934 was one of the worst in American history. Aware of 
these deficiencies and knowing that the younger pilots would 
fly under suicidal conditions in their eagerness to carry 
the mail, Foulois gave orders to sacrifice delivery rather 
than pilots. But a number of pilots died in crashes 
anyway. Rickenbacker called the deaths "legalized murder," 
and Republicans in Congress used the deaths to attack the 
Roosevelt Administration.29
In the field, the Air Corps commanders willingly 
accepted their new assignment but complained about the way 
it had been given to them. Major C.L. Tinker, commander of 
the Seventeenth Pursuit Group, explained to reporters that 
Army and commercial pilots had different training for their 
different tasks, and he complained that the Air Corps had 
not had enough time to retrain its pilots. In Salt Lake 
City, Westover blamed the deaths on a lack of equipment and 
unfamiliarity with the routes rather than a lack of experi­
2^Foulois, pp. 241-245; Shiner, pp. 135-137.
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ence. "When you consider how the job was dumped in our 
laps," he continued, "how little warning we had, how little 
time for preparation, the men have done exceptionally well, 
particularly with our present equipment." Air Corps pilots 
in the New York area resented statements that sending them 
on air mail flights amounted to legalized murder. Eager to 
carry out their assignment, they promised to "drag those 
mail sacks" once they got organized. Air Corps spokesmen in 
Washington, understandably, made no mention of how little 
time the Air Corps had to prepare for carrying the mail. 
The Chief of the Air Corps had been responsible for having 
only ten days to p r e p a r e . 30
Like Billy Mitchell, General Foulois felt that the best 
way to win increased support for the Air Corps was to rally 
public opinion. Foulois hoped the air mail problems would 
force the government to make changes in the Air Corps. To 
publicize the changes he desired, Foulois contacted Russell 
Owen, a sympathetic aviation writer for the New York Times. 
After conferring with Foulois, Owen reported in his paper on 
March 2, that proponents of a separate air force saw the air 
mail operations as an opportunity to attain their objec­
tive. Rather than divulging that Foulois was his source, 
Owen referred to him as unnamed "Air Corps officers" in 
W a s h i n g t o n .  Owen said the unnamed officers exhibited 
suppressed jubilation over getting their first "man's size 
job." However, their excitement was mixed with a desire to
30New York Times, February 24 and 26, 1934.
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show the poor condition of the Air Corps' e q uipment. 
Claiming that the United States needed airplanes capable of 
intercepting enemy bombers, aircraft carriers or battleships 
far out to sea, they complained that not enough had been 
done to produce those planes. The officers hoped that the 
air mail problems would prove the need to place the aviation 
industry under government supervision and stimulate the 
design of faster aircraft with longer range. If given these 
planes, they promised to form an almost impenetrable barrier 
around the United States. Admitting an inability to find 
their objectives in difficult weather like low fog or 
clouds, they as s u r e d  Owen that carrying the mail was 
training the Air Corps to carry out their mission. "Given 
training in flying the air mail," Owen wrote, "over moun­
tains and through all sorts of weather, by means of instru­
ments, these pilots would be able successfully to ride 
through any conditions and meet the enemy." Nine days 
later, Owen revealed in a second article that Foulois was 
his source. Reusing several direct quotations attributed to 
"Air Corps officers" in his first article, Owen attributed 
the comments to Foulois. Whether or not Foulois wanted to 
be identified, his plan for playing up the bad aspects of 
the air mail duties to get better planes for the Air Corps 
became public knowledge.31
^ New York Times, March 2, and March 11, 1934. I am 
not suggesting that Foulois had callously risked the lives 
of his men to win independence or appropriations for better 
aircraft. He always showed great concern for the safety of 
his men.
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Despite Foulois' efforts to reduce the risks involved 
in flying the mail, more Army fliers died in crashes. As a 
result, public pressure forced President Roosevelt to act. 
He ordered the Post Office to draw up new commercial air 
mail contracts, and he took the Air Corps off air mail 
duty. On March 10, after giving Foulois the worst tongue 
lashing of his career, Roosevelt asked Congress for an 
a d d i t i o n a l  $10 million to buy more Army airplanes and 
improve facilities.32
Obviously, Foulois had forced President Roosevelt to 
spend more money on the Air Corps by a r o u s i n g  p u b l i c  
pressure. Only ten months before, Roosevelt had proposed 
the abolition of military airplanes because they were 
offensive weapons, had approved a British plan to limit the 
United States to only five hundred Army and Navy planes and 
grudgingly had approved the spending of PWA funds on the Air 
Corps. But political necessity was not the only factor 
motivating him. German rearmament, Japanese aggression in 
Manchuria and the collapse of the G e n e v a  D i s a r m a m e n t  
Convention had convinced Roosevelt before the air mail 
fiasco that his policy of d i s a r m a m e n t  by e x a m p l e  had 
failed. With the New Deal moving toward increased govern­
ment spending as a way out of the Depression, he had little 
reason to continue reducing expenditures on aircraft for the 
Army and Navy. Furthermore, Roosevelt had demonstrated a 
willingness to increase spending on aircraft before he
32Shi ner, p. 140-148; Foulois, pp. 253-258.
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cancelled the air mail contracts. In January, he gave his 
full support to the Vinson-Trammell bill, which proposed the 
construction of one hundred new ships and more than one 
t h o u s a n d  new a i r p l a n e s  for the Navy over a five-year 
period. These additional ships and planes w o u l d  have 
increased the Navy only to the limits set for it by the 
Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 
1930. However, adverse public reaction and threats from 
isolationists in Congress to hamper his domestic programs 
fo r c e d  R o o s e v e l t  to back away from naval expansion. 
Congress approved the Vinson Naval Parity Act in March, but 
without Presidential support for the measure, Congress 
appropriated only enough funds to replace overaged s h i p s . 3 3
A more important change occurred among the junior 
officers of the Air Corps as a result of the air mail 
episode. They learned the right and wrong way to press 
their case. While on air mail duty. Captain Ira Eaker saw 
that the mail had been delivered with little trouble or 
delay in California, and he wondered why the higher author­
ities had not publicized what the Air Corps had been doing 
well. Keeping a scrap book with newspaper clippings about 
the Air Corps, Eaker noticed that the Air Corps had managed 
to keep everything derogatory out of the newspapers in 
California. Only the Los Angles Times, whose owner had stock 
in an airline that had its mail contract canceled, attacked 
the Air Corps. Eaker concluded that the favorable press was
33Dallek, p. 75.
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the result of personal contact with aviation editors, and he 
suggested that the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps use 
the public relations techniques employed by the airlines.34
A meeting with an editor further impressed upon Eaker 
the need to make personal contacts on newspapers. When 
Eaker offered him an Air Corps press release, the editor 
refused to take it. He said that he had no confidence in 
the Army's ability to carry the mail, and he refused to 
print propaganda. Whereupon Eaker told him that his mail 
route carried more mail than the commercial companies had 
carried before the Army took over. The information changed 
the editor's mind about using the press release, and he 
asked Eaker why the Air Corps did not "let somebody know 
this?" Eaker realized the importance of having spoken to 
the editor personally. If the press release had been sent 
through the mail, the editor would have thrown it away 
without reading it. But by meeting with the editor, Eaker 
had been able to correct his misconceptions and win his 
support.
Eaker told Hap Arnold about the meeting, and Arnold 
said that he could not tell whether the truth about the Air 
Corps was being kept out of the newspapers by politics or by 
propaganda. Although the Air Corps had flown over 138,000 
pounds of mail through Salt Lake City, Arnold doubted that 
anyone outside of his staff knew it. "I have talked the
^ E a k e r  to Colonel Walter R. Weaver, March 14, 1934, 
Ira C. Eaker Papers, Correspondence, Box 3, 1934 Air Mail 
File, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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matter over with the Chief of Air Corps," Arnold informed 
Eaker, "expecting that something would be done there but to 
date they have not used or not been able to get published 
the data which they and they alone have a v a i l a b l e . " 3 5
Foulois could have gotten Arnold's information printed 
in the New York Times through his connection with Russell 
Owen. Yet, rather than proclaiming the Air Corps' achieve­
ments, Foulois denounced the poor condition of its equipment 
in an effort to force Roosevelt to give the Air Corps more 
funds. Of course Foulois did not intend or expect the death 
of his pilots. He, unlike Eaker and Arnold, simply did not 
understand the proper method for advertizing the Air Corps' 
needs. Like Billy Mitchell, Foulois presented the negative 
side of the Air Corps to the press to show what was needed. 
Eaker on the other hand understood that the Air Corps had to 
use its personal contacts to present a positive picture to 
advance the cause of air power. Eaker wanted to project a 
"see what we can do" and "just think what we will be able to 
do with m ore support" attitude, and Foulois took the 
negative approach of "we cannot do anything unless we have 
better equipment." It was a subtle difference, but it would 
have a profound effect in future perceptions of the Air 
Corps.
The Navy already used the approach advocated by Eaker. 
Meeting with the press on the last day of March, Chief of
35Eaker to Arnold, April 5, 1934, and Arnold to Eaker,
April 6, 1934, Eaker Papers, Correspondence, Box 3, 1934 Air
Mail File.
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Naval Operations Admiral William H. Standley discussed the 
tactical maneuvers conducted by the Fleet in January. He 
praised the Naval Air Service for making more than 1,000 
flights in two days without a single casualty. Then, taking 
a dig at the Army, Standley said that an "excellent idea of 
the flying efficiency of the navy can be derived from the 
fact that approximately 80 per cent of the total aircraft 
operating strength of the fleet was engaged in the exercises 
and without a single actual casualty." He felt that the 
official reports were gratifying to all interested in the 
national defense of the United States.
After years of practice, the Office of the Chief of the 
Air Corps knew how to handle attacks from the Navy, and it 
released a photograph of the U.S.S. Lexington taken by an 
Air Corps photographer. Published in the New York Times, 
the photograph showed the U.S. S. Lexington shortly after 
being caught and "sunk" by Army bombers. The c a p t i o n  
read: " T H E O R E T I C A L L Y  SUNK IN THE CANAL WAR GAME: THE 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER LEXINGTON."36
While the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps continu­
ed its traditional policy of embarrassing the Navy, Hap 
Arnold started presenting the Air Corps along the lines 
suggested by Eaker. On that same day that the Times ran the 
Air Corps' photograph of the Lexington, Arnold admitted to 
the press that the Air Corps had lacked enough p l a n e s  
equipped with blind-flying instruments and radios to meet
36New York Times, April 1 and May 6, 1934.
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the mail requirements, but he said that the problems experi­
enced by the Air Corps had brought attention to the defi­
ciency and funds were provided for the necessary equipment. 
While not advocating the continuation of Army air mail 
operations, he declared that the experience had improved the 
equipment and the capabilities of the Air Corps. He claimed 
that the Air Corps had learned more while flying the mail 
than it had on any single project since the World War. 
Budget cuts had forced the Air Corps to limit flying time, 
and the detailing of officers to the Civilian Conservation 
Corps had kept Army pilots from flying at all. Explaining 
that pilots cannot be taught to fly on the ground, Arnold 
admitted that the Army's pilots had become inefficient. But 
in flying the mail, the Army pilots had become efficient 
flyers by logging thousands of hours in good and bad
weather. He bragged, furthermore, that the Air Corps had
"shown a remarkable economy of operation" while flying the 
mail.37
Unlike Foulois, Arnold used his access to the press to 
promote the achievements of the Air Corps. Although he 
mentioned the deficiencies of the Air Corps like Foulois, 
Arnold pointed out what the Air Corps could do with proper 
funding. Army pilots then backed up Arnold's words with 
actions. Still fuming over Rickenbacker's flying the last 
commercial transcontinental air mail in record time, several 
pilots wanted to show the world what the Air Corps could do
37New York Times, April 1, May 6 and 7, 1934.
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with their new B-10 bombers. On May 7, Lieutenant Ellwood 
Quesada flew a B-10 from Oakland to Newark only forty-nine 
minutes short of Rickenbacker's record. However, the Air 
Corps pilots let it be known that Rickenbacker had made 
three fewer stops and had flown 279 miles fewer on his
flight.38
The negative approach used by Foulois and his predeces­
sors had its greatest effect on the General Staff. In 1934, 
Brigadier General Kilbourne complained that for "many years 
the General Staff of the Army has suffered a feeling of 
d i s g u s t  a m o u n t i n g  at times to nausea over statements 
publicly made by General William Mitchell and those who 
followed his lead." He believed that Mitchell and his 
followers made unsubstantiated claims about the effective­
ness of air power to get preferential treatment over the 
other arms. The War Plans Division felt that zealots in the 
Air Corps "adopted the tactics of attacking and belittling 
all other elements of our national defense forces, sea and 
land. This course of action led many officers to instinc­
tively close their minds to perfectly legitimate and honest 
claims" made by the Air Corps.39
H ap A r n o l d  recognized the problems caused by the 
tactics used by Mitchell and his followers. In his memoirs, 
Arnold said that the War Department did not profit from the 
Mitchell period. Members of the War Department, he wrote,
38poulois, p. 259; New York Times, May 8, 1934. 
39shiner, p. 51.
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...seemed to set their mouths tighter, draw more 
into their shell, and if anything, take even a 
narrower point of view of aviation as an offensive 
power in warfare. Our Navy, on the contrary, made 
a study of the entire affair and of all the 
incidents relating thereto, and became air-minded 
in a big way. They even went out of their way to 
f i n d  n e w  means of using a ircraft in naval 
operations.
A l t h o u g h  the War Department as a whole failed to 
profit, many of his supporters profited from the Mitchell 
period. These supporters took Mitchell's teachings to 
heart, but a few took away much more. These few learned the 
lesson of how not to press their cause. For them, Billy 
Mitchell became a dual symbol of the right message but the 
wrong presentation. Hap Arnold was one who learned the 
lesson well. When finally recalled from "exile," he put 
that lesson to practice.
40Arnold, p. 122.
CHAPTER III
A NEW ARMY AIR ARM
General Foulois soon discovered that the air mail 
fiasco had marked only the beginning of his troubles in
1934. When people saw the poor condition of the Air Corps' 
equipment, they wanted to know what had happened to their 
tax dollars. In February, the House Mil i t a r y  A f f a i r s  
Committee began investigating aircraft purchases and found 
hints of improprieties.
As written, the Air Corps Act of 1926 embodied the 
Congressional desire for competitive bidding. The purchase 
procedure called for the Air Corps to test aircraft sub­
mitted by manufacturers and purchase the best design. Then, 
the manufacturer submitting the lowest bid received the 
contract to build the plane. Often, the contract would not 
be given to the company that designed the plane. Looking 
askance at airplanes built by the lowest bidder, the Air 
C o r p s  felt that n e g o t i a t e d  contracts provided better 
aircraft. Using loopholes, the Air Corps ignored the intent 
of the law and purchased aircraft through negotiation. In 
1929, the Army Judge Advocate General reversed an earlier 
ruling and declared illegal the method used to skirt the 
law, but he and the Secretary of War continued to approve
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all purchases of aircraft through negotiated contracts. 
Despite the new ruling and warnings from his staff in 1932, 
Foulois continued to purchase airplanes through subterfuge.
Trouble came in December 1933, when Foulois prepared to 
purchase aircraft with the $7.5 m i l l i o n  in PWA funds 
released by President Roosevelt. Hoping to spend the PWA 
money quickly to create jobs, Foulois purchased more planes 
of the types already on order. Rather than going through 
the lengthy competitive bidding process, he negotiated 
contracts with Northrop, Glenn L. Martin, and Boeing to 
increase their existing aircraft orders. As to be expected, 
the other aircraft manufacturers felt cheated and complained 
to Assistant Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring. Himself a 
staunch believer in competitive bidding, Woodring rejected 
the negotiated contracts and told Foulois to write up a new 
proposal based on competitive bidding.
Woodring did not order a change in the a i r c r a f t  
specifications. However, to allow at least two companies to 
make bids, the Air Corps significantly lowered the speed, 
range and load specifications in its new proposal. Woodring 
approved the new plan, and the Air Corps declared the 
original three winners of the negotiated contracts as the 
winners of the competitive bids. Woodring did not approve 
the new contracts. He had become the target of a federal 
grand jury looking into Army purchases of motor vehicles and 
disposal of surplus materiel. The grand jury found him 
innocent of wrongdoing, but the investigation had caught the
attention of Congress. Cautiously, Woodring decided to 
defer approval of the new contracts. William E. Boeing, 
chairman of the board of United Aircraft and Transport, made 
matters worse when he testified before a Senate committee 
investigating air mail contracts. Boeing bragged that his 
companies had profited greatly from airplane and engine 
sales to the Army and Navy. The House Military Affairs 
Committee, chaired by Representative John J. McSwain, began 
an investigation into Air Corps purchases in February. 
Another believer in competitive bidding, McSwain was shocked 
to discover that the Air Corps had evaded the law. Upon 
l e a r n i n g  that the Air Corps had lowered its original 
specifications, the Committee suspected that the specifi­
cations had been changed to grant special favors. Already 
skeptical of the Assistant Secretary, they questioned the 
ease with which the aircraft manufacturers had convinced 
Woodring to reject the original Air Corps proposal.
The Military Affairs Committee had no reason to suspect 
Foulois when they called him to testify on February 14. 
Relations between Foulois and the Committee always had been 
cordial, and the Chief of the Air Corps went to Capitol Hill 
with no misgivings. However, relations between Foulois and 
the Committee soon deteriorated. Asked who was responsible 
for the changes in the specifications, Foulois left the 
impression that Woodring had specifically o r d e r e d  the 
changes. Foulois compounded the problem by promising to 
provide all the documents p e r t i n e n t  to the p roposal.
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Misunderstanding, the Committee thought that he had papers 
proving that Woodring ordered the changes.
Responding to the deaths of Air Corps pilots flying the 
mail, the Military Affairs Committee created a subcommittee, 
chaired by William N. Rogers, to conduct a deeper investiga­
tion of the Air Corps' methods of procuring aircraft. 
Woodring told the Subcommittee that he had intended to 
insure competitive bidding and denied ordering the changes 
in aircraft specifications. Foulois tried to correct the 
problem by saying that Woodring had not changed the specifi­
cations. After further investigation, the Subcommittee 
found no sign of collusion, but the Committeemen showed 
hostility toward Foulois. On March 1, Foulois promised the 
Rogers Subcommittee that the Air Corps could fly the mail, 
and he blamed the deaths on the weather. Accepting Foulois' 
assurances, Rogers and other committeemen defended the Air 
Corps on the House floor. To their great embarrassment, 
more Army pilots died. Convinced that Foulois had tried to 
dupe them, the Rogers Subcommittee unanimously charged him 
with violating the Air Corps Act.1
When the War Department failed to act upon its charges, 
the Rogers Subcommittee put direct pressure on Secretary of 
War Dern. In June, the Subcommittee unanimously recommended 
that the Secretary of War immediately replace Foulois as 
Chief of the Air Corps. While praising the Air C o r p s
Shiner, pp. 150-166; New York Times, April 4, May 8,
1934.
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fliers, the Subcommittee accused Foulois of dishonesty, 
gross misconduct, inefficiency, inaccuracy, unreliability, 
incompetency, and mismanagement. These charges brought 
forth expressions of indignation from Foulois' many associ­
ates, especially over the charge of dishonesty. Everyone 
acquainted with Foulois admired his honesty, It was well 
known that Foulois refused small gifts from businessmen or 
politicians to protect his integrity. To his credit. Secre­
tary Dern refused to act too hastily, and the White House 
refused to act without his recommendation.2 Roosevelt had 
every reason to dump Foulois, who had publicly embarrassed 
him years before. Also, he could have used Foulois as the 
scapegoat for the air mail trouble. The Rogers Subcommit­
tee's recommendation had given Roosevelt an opportunity to 
get even with Foulois while appearing to follow the wishes 
of Congress. That he did not use the opportunity indicates 
Roosevelt's self-restraint.
Undeterred, the Rogers Subcommittee continued pushing 
for the General's removal, and Dern ordered the Inspector 
General to conduct an investigation. In June 1935, the 
Inspector General reported that he had found nothing wrong 
in Foulois' claim that the Air Corps could fly the mail. 
Nor did he find any improprieties in aircraft purchases. 
However, the Inspector General reprimanded Foulois for
2New York Times, June 18 and 19, 1934. For examples of 
Foulois turning down small gifts see his letters to Glen 
Martin, August 28, 1934, and Congressman A.C. Willford,
February 23, 1934, Foulois Papers, Correspondence, File 3, 
1931-1935.
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making unfair and misleading statements about the General 
Staff before the Military Affairs Committee. Foulois wanted 
to drop the matter, but Rogers complained on the House floor 
that the reprimand was little more than a "slap on the 
wrist." Rogers' persistence convinced Foulois that the Air 
Corps would suffer. Rather than see the Air Corps hurt, 
Foulois chose to leave the Air Corps. In September, he went 
on terminal leave and retired at the end of the y e a r . 3
Like Billy Mitchell, Foulois had been forced to retire 
from the Army. Foulois had done nothing to justify his 
being forced to retire, but his departure placed officers 
with different ideas on how to promote the Air Corps into 
positions of authority. These new officers also received 
the organization and the airplane with which they carried 
out their ideas.
After the passage of the Air Corps Act, the supporters 
of a separate air force continued their efforts. They 
introduced into Congress a number of bills to create a 
separate air force over the following years, but none made 
it out of committee. Thus, by 1933, many Air Corps officers 
had concluded that independence was unachievable. Turning 
to a more realistic goal, they sought to deny local ground 
commanders control over offensive aviation. By gathering 
all the offensive tactical units under a single commander,
3Shiner, pp. 188-192. For detailed information on the 
procurement provisions of the Air Corps Act of 1926 and 
Foulois' dealings with Congress see, Edwin H. Rutkowski, 
Politics of Military Aviation Procurement.
76
the organization would be the unified striking force the 
airmen envisioned. Concurrently, the General Staff decided 
that the fulfillment of the MacArthur-Pra11 a g r e e m e n t  
required a unified air arm for coastal defense. To chose a 
workable plan for unifying the offensive units, the General 
Staff created a review board, headed by Major General Hugh 
A. Drum. The Drum Board recommended the creation of a 
General Headquarters Air Force with 1,800 airplanes under 
one commander, and MacArthur approved the recommendations on 
October 12. Keeping the recommendations secret, the General 
Staff did nothing to implement the recommendations until the 
following January.4
Unaware of the General Staff's plans, advocates of an 
independent air force continued attacking the G e n e r a l  
Staff. Retired General Fechet wrote a series of virulent 
articles for the Washington Herald that elicited a strong 
response from General Kilbourne. In a memorandum for the 
D e p u t y  Chief of Staff, Kilbourne said that Fechet had 
renewed "the effort to get results through frightening 
people by referring to bombers making attacks 'devastatingly 
disastrous to national defense....'" He bitterly denounced 
this type of article for causing a "false indoctrination of 
members of our Air Corps" and misleading "the uninstructed 
civilian." Also, he explained that Fechet's attack on the 
cost of the Navy was "the type of public statement that has 
embittered the Navy to a degree threatening cooperation
4Craven and Cate, pp. 29-30; Shiner, pp. 94-99.
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between the services."5
In the end, Fechet only stirred up bad feelings. On 
January 31, 1934, the Army sent a bill to the House Military 
A f f a i r s  Committee creating the GHQ Air Force, but not 
because of Fechet's articles. Rather, Chairman McSwain's 
announcement that his Committee would consider once again 
creating an independent air arm forced the General Staff 
into action. McSwain introduced the Army's bill on February 
1 and called Foulois to testify. Still on good terms with 
Congress, Foulois attacked the General Staff for being the 
"main obstacle" to the growth of the air force. Although 
willing to accept the GHQ Air Force if necessary, Foulois 
said that the ultimate solution for national defense was a 
separate air force. Much to the General Staff's surprise, 
McSwain introduced a bill calling for independence the next 
day. When asked by the General Staff, Foulois pleaded 
ignorance about the bill, but a few months later, the 
General Staff discovered that Foulois had lied. The Office 
of the Chief of the Air Corps had drafted the McSwain bill. 
The General Staff opposed McSwain's bill, and Foulois' claim 
that the General Staff had hindered the growth of the air 
arm angered General Kilbourne as much as Fechet's articles 
had. In a twelve-page memorandum to the Chief of Staff, 
K i l b o u r n e  a d m i t t e d  that there had been conflicts. 
Nevertheless, he protested that the WPD had supported the
5Meworandum from Kilbourne to Deputy Chief of Staff, 
November 17, 1933, RG 165, WPD, 888-81.
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Air Corps "whenever such support could logically be extend­
ed." The Air Corps, he concluded, had little reason to 
complain because it had been "accorded a greater latitude 
than has any other arm or service."6
McSwain's bill and Foulois' testimony upset Secretary 
of War Dern also. In a letter to McSwain, Dern rejected the 
idea of independence for the Air Corps. Denying the ability 
of airplanes alone to defeat an enemy or protect the coasts 
of the United States, Dern stated that a fleet "can operate 
at night, in fog, and in weather when airplanes are help­
less, if not indeed chained to the ground." Unconvinced and 
resentful, McSwain continued his efforts to separate the Air 
Corps from the General Staff, but the air mail f i a s c o  
sidetracked him.
Public uproar over the air mail episode forced both the 
War Department and the White House into action. In March 
1934, Secretary Dern named Newton D. Baker to chair a board 
studying the Air Corps. As Wilson's Secretary of War, Baker 
had opposed a separate air force. Nonetheless, the General 
Staff feared the influence of Foulois and McSwain upon the 
board and p a c k e d  it with opp o n e n t s  of independence. 
Ignoring pleas from Air Corps pilots, the Baker B o a r d  
rejected independence or increased autonomy for the Air 
Corps. Too many of Foulois’ enemies sat on the Board for
^Shiner, pp. 94-99; Bri g a d i e r  General Kilbourne, 
"General Staff Supervision of the Air Corps," February 19, 
1934, Foulois Papers, Subject File, Box 16, Administration- 
C, General Staff Supervision of the Air Corps.
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him to have any influence. Furthermore, his trouble with 
the Rogers Subcommittee forced him to support the General 
Staff's proposal for the GHQ Air Force.?
The General Staff voiced legitimate complaints about 
the Air Corps to the Baker Board. While testifying on May 
22, General Kilbourne cited an air defense plan presented 
the day before as evidence of the problems caused by the Air 
Corps. Kilbourne complained that the plan was unrealist- 
ically expensive and tactically faulty. More importantly, 
it failed to provide “a defense dependable in all kinds of 
weather." Despite personal requests and warnings, he said, 
the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps submitted "over and 
over again" this type of unworkable plan. As a result, his 
small staff in the WPD was prevented from doing constructive 
work. He attributed the problems between the General Staff 
and the Air Corps to the influence of men like to Foulois 
and Fechet. The attitude of the Air Corps and its advo­
cates, "who write articles for the press indicating the Navy 
to be obsolescent," made it difficult for the General Staff 
to discuss controversial matters with the Navy. Further­
more, they indoctrinated the "rank and file of the Air 
Corps...with this idea of unfair treatment and soaked them 
with the idea of standing together against the Army instead 
of for the Army, as the Navy aviators stand together for the
^Shiner, pp. 94-100 and 193-198.
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Navy."® Kilbourne's testimony demonstrated how the continu­
ous attacks launched by the advocates of air power had 
embittered the General Staff. As a result, they refused to 
listen to any proposals coming from the Office of the Chief 
of the Air Corps. In turn, the fliers attacked the General 
Staff for not listening, further angering the G e n e r a l  
Staff. To break the cycle, Kilbourne wanted to foster an 
esprit de corps throughout the Army, but that sense of 
teamwork could grow only when men of a like mind took 
command of the Air Corps.
The final report of the Baker Board read like something 
written by the General Staff. Rejecting a separate air 
force, the report approved the General Staff's proposal for 
a GHQ Air Force. Armed with this report, the General Staff 
announced the creation of the GHQ Air Force on July 27. 
Just because the Baker Board supported the General Staff did 
not make its report worthless. Explaining why the Board 
rejected a separate air force, the report p r e s e n t e d  a 
realistic appraisal of the limitations and inherent weak­
nesses of air power: airplanes could not capture or hold 
territory; their bases needed protection from land, air and 
sea attacks; and airplanes depended "on at least fairly good 
weather" to conduct operations. Furthermore, the warnings 
of air attacks on America were unjustified because current
^Memorandum from Kilbourne to Foulois, "Remarks of 
General Kilbourne before Board Investigating Air Matters," 
F o u l o i s  Papers, S ubject File, Box 28, Statements and 
Recomendations, Baker Board, "Air Corps Relations with War 
Department General Staff," S & R-g.
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airplanes lacked the range to cross the ocean, successfully 
attack America's "vital areas," and return home. Most 
significantly, the report stated that: "Aviation is so 
expensive a weapon that no nation can afford to base its 
organization and supply thereof on visionary approaches but 
rather on proven facts and possibilities. "9
In explaining the reasons for rejecting an separate air 
force, the Baker Board clearly stated the prerequisites for 
independence. Fortunately, some Air Corps officers under­
stood that using negative publicity campaigns would not 
provide the "proven facts and possibilities" required by the 
Baker Board. They saw, as Frank Andrews did after the Mount 
Shasta fiasco, that the Air Corps had to demonstrate what it 
could do before people would accept the possibilities.
Public opinion also forced Roosevelt to start his own 
investigation of American aviation. In June he appointed 
Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution and a 
strong supporter of aviation, chairman of the F e d e r a l  
Aviation Commission. To prepare for the investigation, 
Howell crossed the Atlantic to study the administration of 
a v i a t i o n  in Europe, and the other four members of the
Commission gathered information in the United States and the
C a r i b b e a n . I® while the Commission made its preliminary
9New York Times, July 28, 1934. The text of the War
D e p a r t m e n t  Special Committee on Army Air Corps' (the 
official title of the Baker Board) final report is printed 
in the New York Times, July 23, 1934.
10Shiner, pp. 199-201.
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investigation, Foulois put the time to good use. He 
selected Hap Arnold to organize and command a flight of 
bombers from Washington, D.C., to Alaska and back. O ffi­
cially, Foulois said the flight would demonstrate how 
rapidly the Air Corps could move its units to remote areas. 
But in reality, he wanted to redeem his and the Air Corps' 
reputation with a spectacular flight.
At Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, Arnold received ten new 
Martin B-10 bombers for the 8,290 mile round trip. Major 
Hugh Knerr, normally in charge of developing bombardment, 
was assigned as his executive officer for the flight. With 
new planes and an experienced aide, Arnold began a month of 
careful preparation before leading the ten bombers from 
Wright Field to Washington, D.C., on July 17. During that 
month, Air Corps officers courted Congressional interest by 
boasting to investigating committees that the new bombers 
were faster than pursuit planes. Also, the Air Corps 
arranged for Arnold to address a national radio audience and 
for live radio reports covering the departure from Washing­
ton. When a flight of Navy patrol planes started a "rou­
tine" flight from San Diego to Alaska and back on the same 
day that Arnold left Dayton, the Air Corps heightened public 
interest by making the two flights seem like an off-field 
continuation of the Army-Navy football game.11
Arnold's bombers put on a colorful show for the
11Arnold, pp. 145-146; New York Times, July 18 and
August 21, 1934.
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residents of Washington, D.C. Instead of the olive drab 
f u s e l a g e  and y e l l o w  wings of the Air Corps' tactical 
aircraft, his planes sported light blue fuselages with 
y e l l o w  wings. Suitably impressed, the New York Times 
reported that the planes arrived in Washington with "their 
bodies and wings glistening in the sunshine.. .exactly on 
schedule. The flight had been made with the precision of a 
railroad train."12 After the air mail fiasco, this praise 
meant a great deal.
Soon, a flight of ten bombers to Alaska became so 
common that it received no notice outside air force reports; 
but, in 1934, that was not the case. Special enough to 
warrant nation-wide radio hook-ups, the flight to Alaska 
offered a golden opportunity for the Air Corps to redeem 
itself or dig a deeper grave if it failed. Fortunately, the 
flight was a great success. Only one mishap occurred during 
the entire trip. When one of his two engines failed, a 
pilot ditched his B-10 in Cook's Bay, Anchorage. But Air 
Corps mechanics recovered the plane from forty feet of 
water, repaired it and put it back into service in time to 
join the return flight to Washington, D.C. All ten of the 
B— 10s returned to Bolling Field on August 20 on schedule 
again. Climbing out of their planes, the fourteen officers
12In February, Foulois had approved the blue and yellow 
color scheme to simplify logistics. The repainting of all 
tactical aircraft took some time, and many Air Corps planes 
still carried the duller markings for months afterward. 
Dana Bell, Air Force Colors, 2 vols. (Carrollton, Texas; 
Squadron/Signal Publications, 1979), vol. 1, 1926-1942, 
p. 23; New York Times, July 19, 1934.
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and nineteen enlisted men were greeted by a large crowd. 
Secretary Dern congratulated Arnold for demonstrating "the 
skill and daring of our army and its fliers and the thor­
oughness of their training.h13
The Alaska flight recouped some of the Air Corps' lost 
prestige, but it did nothing to ease Foulois1 predicament. 
He had purchased the B-lOs through negotiated contracts, and 
he had hoped the flight would vindicate his actions. Unfor­
tunately, the Rogers Subcommittee wanted to oust him. 
Nothing changed their minds.14 For the Air Corps, however, 
the flight provided a guide to follow. In the years to 
come, they conducted a number of meticulously planned 
flights, proving the Air Corps' abilities and efficiency.
Meeting in late September, the Howell Commission took 
little notice of the Alaska flight. As with the Baker 
Board, the General Staff acted to insure the Howell Commis­
sion’s support for the GHQ Air Force. The General Staff 
gave the Commission a written statement strongly supporting 
the new organization, and it tried to control the testimony 
of the Air Corps officers by making them submit their 
statements for examination. Foulois' statement, actually 
written by his subordinates, proclaimed the decisiveness of 
air power and called for an autonomous air force. After the 
General Staff objected, he watered it down. Assistant Chief
^Arnold, p. 146; Shiner, pp. 216-217; New York Times, 
August 21, 1934.
14Foulois, pp. 270-271.
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of the Air Corps Westover also watered down his prepared 
statement. Yet, he denounced the claim of the Drum and 
Baker Boards that the United States was invulnerable to air 
attack. Other officers refused to submit; they continued to 
press the claims for air power. Officers from the Air Corps 
Tactical School, especially Major Donald Wilson and Captain 
Harold L. George, adamantly professed the ability of a i r ­
planes to crush the enemy's will to resist before the land 
armies came into contact. For the air force to be properly 
prepared for war, said Captain George, it had to be separat­
ed from the ground forces.
Free from any restrictions, the civilians testifying 
before the Howell Commission made Wilson and George sound 
tame. Billy Mitchell again called for an independent air 
force and told the Commission that he wanted the United 
States to acquire fifty airships to make possible the 
"annihilation of Japan." Igor Sikorsky claimed that warlike 
Japanese fliers would cheerfully make a one-way flight to 
get the chance to drop bombs on New York City...or more 
probably poison gas!1®
The remarks by Mitchell and Sikorsky angered the 
Japanese press and threatened the future of the Washington 
and London Treaties. The London Treaty would expire in 
December 1936, unless Great Britain, Japan, and the United 
States a g r e e d  to e x tend its provisions in 1935. The
•^Shiner, pp. 200-201.
1®New York Times, October 7 and 30, 1934.
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Washington Treaty would expire in 1936, if one of the three 
signatories repudiated it by the end of December 1934. 
Irreconcilable differences between the three signatories put 
the future of both treaties in doubt. Peeling slighted by 
the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio, Japan demanded parity. Great 
Britain wanted to keep the same ratio but cut back on 
battleships and heavy cruisers while increasing the allowed 
tonnage for light cruisers. American interests in the 
Pacific required the long-range capabilities of h e a v y  
cruisers, and the United States feared that giving the 
Japanese parity would spark a new arms race.1?
As the December deadline for the Washington Treaty 
approached, the United States, Great Britain and Japan sent 
negotiators to London to discuss the extension of the naval 
treaties. On October 5, Roosevelt told Norman H. Davis, the 
American negotiator, to extend the treaties and obtain 
further naval limitations if possible. The President 
emphasized that he would not approve a treaty allowing 
larger navies. Later that day, Roosevelt told reporters 
that the United States hoped to carry on the progressive 
reduction in naval armaments started in the Washington and 
London Treaties. Mitchell's talk of annihilating Japan had 
upset Roosevelt. He knew that Mitchell's volatile remarks 
would enable the Japanese to justify abandoning the treaty 
ratios, effectively ending any hope of arms reduction. "Of 
course," he complained, "things are not in the least bit
i^Dallek, pp. 87-88.
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helped— this is off the record entirely— by the kind of 
statement that was made by our old friend Billy Mitchell the 
other day....Billy Mitchell would be a much more useful 
person to this country if he would not talk that w a y . " 1 **
But Roosevelt soon discovered that the Japanese had 
already decided to end the treaties. Secretary of the Navy 
Claude A. Swanson informed him on November 28, 1934, that 
the Japanese Cabinet had recommended increased appropria­
tions for national defense. Realizing that any chance for 
reduction in naval armaments was gone, Roosevelt prepared 
for an arms race. In a December 17 memorandum, Roosevelt 
instructed Swanson to look confidentially into producing new 
long-range ships should the Washington and London Treaties 
be discarded. "At the same time," Roosevelt wrote, "I 
should like to have a study made of the possibility of 
establishing one or two very large air bases in the Philip­
pines, with a smaller base in Guam, and still smaller bases 
in the Midway-Hawaiian chain and in the Aleutian chain of 
I s l a n d s . " 1 ** R o o s e v e l t  w a n t e d  the capacity to extend 
American naval and air power across the Pacific Ocean.
While Roosevelt looked into trans-oceanic defenses, 
supporters of air power sought the construction of new air­
fields to guard America's borders. In November 1934,
^ R o o s e v e l t  to Norman H. Davis, October 5, 1934, and 
Press Conference on October 5, 1934, in Nixon, FDR and 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, March 1934-Auqust 1935, pp. 225-229.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Roosevelt to Swanson, December 17, 
1934, in Nixon, vol. 2, pp. 322-323.
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General Fechet and Florida Congressman James M. Wilcox 
created the National Air Frontier Defense Association to 
lobby for those air bases. On January 17, 1935, Wilcox 
introduced a bill for ten new air bases. The War Depart­
ment, fearing that Wilcox's bill would reduce appropriations 
for the rest of the Army, pro p o s e d  a less ambitious 
construction program of six air bases. Both Wilcox and the 
War Department agreed, however, that one air base had to be 
placed in Alaska. Wilcox told the House Military Affairs 
Committee that an "Oriental country" could seize mineral 
rich Alaska, and he warned the Committee that "Alaska is 
closer to Japan than it is to the United States."20
Billy Mitchell thought more along the lines of Presi­
dent Roosevelt. On February 11, he told the Committee on 
Patents that the Manufactures Aircraft Association had 
impeded progress in civil and military aviation through a 
monopoly over patents. Then, he took the opportunity to 
warn America once again about Japan. "If Japan seizes 
Alaska," he told the committee, "she can bomb New York in 
twenty hours. We know they have ships designed for that 
purpose. We have got to have planes that can fly to the 
Midway Islands, to Japan and back."21
The Army and civilian supporters of the air base
20New York Times, February 12, 1935; Shiner, pp. 250-
251.
21New York Times, February 12, 1935. For a full, if 
implausible, discussion of Mitchell's ideas about the patent 
monopoly, see Emile Gauvreau, The Wild Blue Yonder: Sons of 
the Prophet Carry On (New York: E.P. Dutton Co., Inc. 1944).
89
proposals thought of aircraft as merely an extension of 
coastal artillery. Besides embodying the current isolation­
ist view of remaining behind coastal defenses, their plans 
to build a number of air bases around the frontiers of the 
continental United States differed from nineteenth century 
harbor fortifications only in the range of the weapons. 
Basically, they saw the airplane as a long-range cannon. 
Unknowingly, they were attempting to make a new weapon fit 
old concepts instead of formulating new concepts to fully 
utilize the potential of the new weapon.
As Roosevelt's memorandum to Secretary Swanson and Mit­
chell's testimony before the Committee on Patents showed, 
both thought of air power as more than weapon for static de­
fense. They wanted to project American air power into the 
Pacific through Midway Island, even as others only sought to 
defend the United States with a ring of airfields. Realiz­
ing the mobile and destructive nature of modern warfare, 
Roosevelt saw the importance of taking the war to the enemy 
and not letting the enemy bring the war to the United 
States. Since Japan was the most likely enemy in a Pacific 
war, Roosevelt wanted the two weapons best s u ited for 
carrying a war to Japanese shores: long-range ships and 
airplanes.
Japan denounced the Washington Treaty in December, and 
rumors quickly spread that President Roosevelt had decided 
to ask Congress for increased national defense funds. He 
first tried to convince the world of America's peaceful
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intentions in his annual message to Congress on January 4,
1935. He said there was "no ground for apprehension that 
our relations with any nation will be o t h e r w i s e  than 
peaceful." Three days later, Roosevelt asked Congress to 
increase the Army's budget for military spending by more 
than $48 million, with almost half to go to the Air Corps. 
He also wanted the Navy to receive more than $16 million for 
aircraft.22
The Japanese objected to plans for placing an American 
air base in the Pacific. On February 8, the House Military 
A f f a i r s  considered the construction of an air base in 
Hawaii. Afterward, Chairman McSwain told the press that it 
was only a defensive measure, but the Japanese protested 
that a Hawaiian air base would be a direct threat to 
Japan.23 President Roosevelt knew that the Japanese would 
object strenuously if the United States put large air bases 
in the P h i l i p p i n e s ,  as he had suggested to Secretary 
Swanson.
The Japanese had good reason to worry about American 
air power in the Pacific. It threatened their sea communi­
cations. In 1930, Billy Mitchell had stated in his book. 
Skyways, that Great Britain and Japan depended upon overseas 
commerce. Any breakdown in their trade routes would be 
their downfall. "Air power," he wrote, "is entirely capable
22Roosevelt to the Congress, January 4, 1935, in Nixon, 
vol. 2, p. 334; New York Times, January 1 and 8, 1935.
23New York Times, February 9 and 10, 1935.
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of breaking down these lines of communications by sinking 
the ships and causing the evacuation of the ports...." On 
February 3, 1935, Edwin L. James refined Mitchell's argu­
ment. Writing about the post-Washington Treaty strengths of 
the British, Japanese and American fleets for the New York 
T i m e s , James pointed out that strategic parity did not 
necessarily mean parity in tonnage or guns. For Japan, 
parity depended on fuel rather than ships. In peacetime, 
the J a p a n e s e  home islands produced only half the oil 
consumed by the Navy. Wartime usage of oil would multiply, 
making the Japanese even more dependent upon imported oil. 
He suggested that Great Britain, the Dutch East Indies and 
the United States, the three countries most affected by 
Japanese expansion, could stop the Japanese by cutting off 
their foreign oil supply and waiting only six months for the 
Japanese Navy to run out of fuel. "It is this factor," 
wrote James, "which constitutes the weakest point in the 
naval strategy of the Japanese."24 Understandably, the 
proximity of American aircraft worried Japan. In early 
1935, American planes stationed in the Philippines, Guam, 
Midway, Hawaii and the Aleutians could have cut Japan's sea 
communications.
From Europe, Roosevelt received more distressing news. 
Hitler had made Anschluss with Austria his primary foreign
24M itchell, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics 
(Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott, 1930), pp. 257- 
258; Edwin L. James, "Oil Is the Weak Point in Tokyo's 
Strategy," New York Times, February 3, 1935, 4, p. 3.
92
policy, but Mussolini, fearing a powerful nation on his 
northern border, opposed the German unification. In January 
1935, he and the French signed a consultative pact, promis­
ing to d i s c u s s  joint action if Hitler threatened the 
independence of Austria. Hitler continued to push the 
issue, and on February 2, Mussolini told Ambassador Breckin­
ridge Long that war with G e r m a n y  a p p e a r e d  imminent. 
Reporting the conversation to President Roosevelt, Long 
suggested that:
you might consider giving instructions to somebody 
that a good equipment for your diplomatic and 
consular officers in Europe would be gas masks, 
because when it comes it will come over night and 
come from the air. There will be no long drawn 
out mobilization. I am serious about the gas 
masks.25
Like the Europeans, Long feared aerial gas attacks. Since 
the Germans were not supposed to have an air force, only 
American diplomats in Germany should have needed masks. 
However, the Germans secretly had kept a small air force 
disguised as flying clubs, and Long's warning suggests that 
he knew about the German air force. Soon, the Germans let 
the whole world know about its air force.
Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 
30, 1933, and three days later he put Herman Goering in 
charge of all civil aviation and air raid prote c t i o n .  
Goering, commander of the Richthofen Squadron at the end of
25Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939, The 
Rise of Modern Europe, ed. by William L. Langer, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 280-285; Breckinridge Long 
to Roosevelt, February 3, 1935, in Nixon, vol. 2, pp. 386- 
387.
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the First World War, placed all flying club members into 
uniform, and the German air force became an open secret. In 
March 1935, the Nazis threw off the mask and officially 
announced the existence of an air force, the Luftwaffe. 
Goering, its commander, publicly denounced the Versailles 
Treaty on March 16 and boasted that he would build the 
Luftwaffe into the world's strongest air force.2®
The announcement of the Luftwaffe coincided with the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the GHQ Air Force. When the Howell 
Commission submitted its final report to President R oose­
velt, it too supported the General Staff's plan for a GHQ 
Air Force. Armed with favorable reports from a military and 
a civilian investigation, the General Staff hammered out the 
details for the GHQ Air Force. Although people continued 
referring to all Army aviation as the Air Corps, the General 
Staff essentially split the Air Corps into two organiza­
tions: the Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force. Foulois, as 
Chief of the Air Corps, controlled supply, procurement and 
training at the Air Corps Schools. Lieutenant Colonel Frank 
M. Andrews, as commander of the GHQ Air Force, controlled 
the tactical units with the temporary rank of general. To 
maintain its control over the GHQ Air Force, the General 
Staff made Andrews report directly to the Chief of Staff 
rather than the Chief of the Air Corps. Emphasizing the 
separation, the General Staff physically separated the two 
branches. Andrews set up his administrative headquarters at
2®Craven and Cate, pp. 86-87; Arnold, p. 148.
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Langley Field, Virginia. The tactical units, divided into 
three wings, established headquarters at Langley Field, 
Barksdale Field (Bossier City, Louisiana), and March Field 
(Riverside, California). Looking on the GHQ Air Force as an 
experiment, the General Staff gave it a trial period of one 
year.
B e c o m i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  on March 1, 1935, this new
organizational scheme had a number of inherent flaws. The 
local ground commander retained control over the airfields. 
To get anything done at the airfield, the Air Corps needed 
the approval of the ground commander. Also, the split 
command fostered internal dissension within the Army Air 
Corps as each branch tried to impose its will upon the 
o t h e r . 27 Nevertheless, after more than fifteen years of 
acrimonious debate, advocates of a separate air arm and 
a d v o c a t e s  of ground-support aviation had compromised. 
Advocates of strategic air power finally had a strike force 
capable of carrying out strategic missions. Yet, that 
strike force remained under the General Staff's control. 
Despite giving neither group all that it wanted, the GHQ Air 
Force satisfied both enough to stop their vicious fighting. 
The airmen demonstrated their pleasure with the new organiz­
ation when Representative McSwain introduced another bill to 
create a Department of Aeronautics in April 1935. Telling
27shiner, pp. 203-207; Craven and Cate, pp. 31-32; New 
York Times, December 27, 1934. To avoid confusion, I shall 
try to refer to all Army aviation as the Army Air Corps, the 
combat section as the GHQ Air Force, and the supply and 
training section as the Air Corps.
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Congress that they opposed McSwain's bill, Westover, Arnold, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Follett Bradley expressed satisfac­
tion with the new arrangement.28
To mark the operational debut of the GHQ Air Force, the 
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps planned a spectacular, 
l o n g - d i s t a n c e  flight. On February 25, the Air Corps 
announced that ten bombers would demonstrate the mobility of 
Army planes and show the need for air defenses in the 
Pacific. The plans called for the planes to fly from March 
Field to Washington, D.C., and on to Miami. After refuel­
ing, the planes would then fly over 900 miles of water to 
Panama. All previous mass flights to Panama had taken the 
time consuming route along the Gulf of Mexico. A spokesman 
said that the 2,129 mile flight from Washington to Panama 
would take only eleven hours of flying time. The Air Corps 
had high hopes for the flight. "I believe it very essen­
tial," Major Carl Spaatz told Hap Arnold, "that a flight of 
this nature take place in order to bolster up the Air 
Corps.1,29
On March 1, the officers at Langley Field confidently 
told reporters that the GHQ Air Force would prove that 
coastal air defenses should be entrusted to the Army Air 
Corps. They also promised that the Panama flight would
28Arnold, pp. 148-149; Shiner, pp. 207-208; Craven and 
Cate believe the airmen compromised on the new organization 
for a long-range bomber program, pp. 66-67.
29New York T i m e s , February 26, 1935; Carl Spaatz to 
Arnold, February 5, 1935, Spaatz Papers, Diaries, Box 7, 
January 2-August 27, 1935.
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prove the ability of land planes to fly over water with the 
same precision as the Navy flying boats. General Andrews, 
however, decided to cancel the flight. After wresting 
control of the flight from Foulois, Andrews discovered that 
the pilots and planes were not prepared for such a flight. 
U ntil both were ready, he told Arnold, "the political 
effects of anything unfavorable happening now— not on our 
personal fortunes but on the future role of the GHQ Air 
Force in National Defense— are such that no chances must be 
taken on its happening."30
Finally, the A rmy Air Corps had an officer in a 
position of authority who realized that public and political 
support would not come from demonstrating the poor condition 
of the Air Corps. The cancellation of the Panama flight 
showed a knowledge of how to conduct a successful political 
and publicity campaign to win increased support for the air 
force. Andrews understood that support from the government, 
War Department and American people would come by proving 
that trust, and thereby funds, could be placed in the Army 
Air Corps. Furthermore, Andrews' careful check of the 
p r e p a r a t i o n s  and efforts to get control of the flight 
indicated that he did not trust Foulois' planning ability. 
After the air mail fiasco, Andrews had every reason to be 
wary.
Andrews recognized that the antagonistic attitude of
30New York T i m e s , March 2 and 3, 1935; Andrews to 
Arnold, March 23, 1935, Andrews Papers, General Correspond­
ence, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "A" 1935-1937.
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his men toward the General Staff had hurt the Air Corps. To 
remedy the problem, he started an education campaign within 
the GHQ Air Force. Telling his officers and men to submerge 
their personal feelings for the "good of the Air Corps," 
Andrews said that the War Department genuinely wanted the 
GHQ Air Force to succeed because it wanted to keep coastal 
air defense under Army control. Addressing the problem of 
niggardly Congressional funding, Andrews said that Congress 
had wanted to do something for air defense, but it had 
lacked confidence in the previous Air Corps set up. Now, he 
assured his men, Congress planned to appropriate money to 
see what the GHQ Air Force could do. Finally, Andrews 
emphasized the need for unified action and t h o r o u g h l y  
prepared maneuvers to get favorable publicity. He insisted 
that the public must not be confused with differing p r o ­
n o u n c e m e n t s .  To achieve this unified action, Andrews 
ordered the various units to share all information with each 
other.31
Andrews' education campaign worked. By submerging 
animosities and showing that the Army Air Corps c o u l d  
deliver what it promised, Andrews helped win the trust and 
support of the War Department, the President, the Congress 
and the American people. During the last six months before 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the confidence in the 
abilities of the Army Air Corps to deliver what it promised
31"Notes on Propaganda Talk," March 12, 1935, Andrews 
Papers, Official Papers, Box 9, GHQ Air Force Directives, 
1930-1937.
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greatly influenced America's military and civilian leaders.
By c a n c e l l i n g  the Panama flight. General Andrews 
deprived the GHQ Air Force of the opportunity to celebrate 
its creation with a publicity stunt. But Andrews planned on 
following his advice to Hap Arnold after the Mount Shasta 
farce. As commander of the GHQ Air Force, Andrews improved 
navigation and bombardment, procured better equipment, and 
kept the GHQ Air Force "out of the limelight" until he knew 
its limitations. When Andrews demonstrated his strike 
force, he left nothing to c h a n c e . 32
In March 1935, Pan American Air Lines announced its 
plans to establish a transpacific airline from San Francisco 
to Manila with stops at Honolulu, Midway, Wake and Guam. 
These plans to extend American commercial aviation across 
the Pacific dovetailed with the directions Roosevelt had 
given Secretary of the Navy Swanson three months earlier. 
Pan American had aided American foreign policy since its 
formation in 1922, and the Roosevelt Administration support­
ed the transpacific air route. Postmaster General Farley 
predicted that Congress would provide funds for companies 
making transoceanic flights. The United States Navy granted 
Pan American permission to use Wake Island for a landing 
field, and the Federal Communications Commission considered 
Pan American's request for radio stations along the Pacific 
air route.
32Andrews to Arnold, August 27, 1931, and March 23, 
1935, Andrews Papers, Ge n e r a l  C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  Box 1, 
Personal Correspondence, "A" 1930-42.
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To justify giving Pan American access to l a n d i n g  
facilities at Wake Island, the Navy stressed the commercial 
aspects of the transpacific air route. Secretary Swanson 
promised that Pan American had not received a monopoly on 
the landing facilities. However, the commercial aspects 
failed to disguise the military potential. The Washington 
Treaty prohibited the building of fortifications or naval 
bases at Midway, Wake or Guam, but Navy officials claimed 
that they were commercial landing fields. Not fooled, the 
Japanese Navy complained that the air bases could easily be 
transformed into naval air bases. As such, they threatened 
Japan's mandated islands. Admiral Nobsmasa Suetsugu, the 
former commander of the Japanese Fleet, explained that the 
mandated islands formed Japan's first line of marine de­
fense. "Should they be occupied by an enemy," he stated, 
"they would at once endanger our defense. The islands are 
natural aircraft 'carriers,' affording enemy squadrons ideal 
places from which to operate."33
The Japanese knew that air bases on these islands 
threatened sea communications with their mandated islands, 
but they harbored a deeper fear. "Most of All Japan Fears 
an Air Attack" proclaimed the title of an article published 
by the New York Times Magazine in August 1935. The author, 
Hugh Byas, recounted how fires had burned most of Tokyo and 
had killed over 71,000 people during the earthquake of
33New York T i m e s , March 12, 14 and 15, 1935. For
details of the formation of Pan American and its relation­
ship to American foreign policy, see Arnold, pp. 114-115.
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1923. Their homes constructed of wood and paper, the 
Japanese worried constantly about fire. They responded to 
shouts of "fire" more quickly than any other cry for help. 
Modern brick buildings and fire departments had reduced the 
threat from normal fires, Byas explained, but air attacks 
offered new threats. If, he wrote, "Japan is ever engaged 
in war with a power of any military standing the enemy will 
find in those cities a target such as no other country in 
the world offers." The Japanese realized that Soviet 
b o m b e r s  could reach Tokyo with ease. General Vassily 
Bluecher, the Soviet commander in the Far East, stated that 
"three tons of bombs can destroy Tokyo as completely as the 
earthquake did." American aircraft carriers presented an 
equal threat. A Japanese naval writer claimed that only ten 
per cent of the U.S.S. Saratoga's bombers could do as much 
damage to Tokyo as did the great earthquake.34
Six years before the Pearl Harbor a ttack c r e a t e d  
overwhelming hatred for the Japanese in the United States, 
soldiers and military write s described the fire bombing of 
Japanese cities. Although they grossly underestimated the 
number of aircraft needed to burn Tokyo, Russians, Japanese 
and Americans saw the Japanese cities as military targets. 
During the Second World War, racial hatred shaped American 
military policy toward Japan, but the idea of burning down 
Tokyo, a city like none in Europe, had entrenched itself
34Hugh Byas, "Most of All Japan Fears an Air Attack,"
New York Times Magazine, August 4, 1935, pp. 6-7.
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firmly in military thought before the Pearl Harbor attack 
created a desire for revenge.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt 
knew of Japan's fears, and they worried about the effect of 
the Pan American route on relations with Japan. On April 
16, Hull suggested that Juan T. Trippe, the president of Pan 
American, invite the Japanese to join the venture with their 
own air route from Japan to Guam. Hoping that the Japanese 
w o u l d  r e consider their denunciation of the Washington 
Treaty, Roosevelt told Hull that "this is a good sugges­
tion," and he a p p r o v e d  it the next day. Roosevelt's 
willingness to accommodate the Japanese influenced his 
policy toward the Philippines. On April 22, Secretary 
Swanson suggested designating naval reservations in the 
P h i l i p p i n e s  before they became i n d e p e n d e n t  in 1946. 
Roosevelt rejected the suggestion. The President believed 
that Japan would interpret such a move as contrary America's 
stated desire to extend the Washington Treaty. Roosevelt 
a lso r e j e c t e d  the p r o p o s a l  for military reasons. He 
considered a military-naval base in the Manila-Subic Bay 
area a liability. "It is well known" he told Swanson, "that 
this area could not be defended over a long period of time 
against an army attacking it from the land side."35
Nevertheless, President Roosevelt remained interested 
in establishing airfields across the Pacific. On April 2,
■^Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, April 16, 1935, 
and Memorandum from Roosevelt to Swanson, May 3, 193 5, in
Nixon, vol. 2, pp. 495-496.
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1935, a small party of soldiers and civilians secretly 
occupied Baker, Howland and Jarvis Islands in the central 
Pacific to gather information and prepare landing fields. 
As protection, the Roosevelt Administration prepared a cover 
story. If the press discovered the expeditions, the Post 
Office Department would claim that they were part of an 
effort to expand air mail service across the Pacific. The 
Commerce Department informed Roosevelt of the operation and 
the cover story on April 8, and Secretary Swanson gave him 
copies of the landing parties' log books on May 28. Two 
days later, Roosevelt told Swanson that he was "greatly 
interested" in the expeditions and instructed Swanson to 
keep him informed of the "progress of the men landed on 
these Islands." The President wanted to colonize those 
islands for at least a year, even if the personnel had to be 
replaced every three months.-*6
While Roosevelt quietly projected American aviation 
into the Pacific, the Army became involved in an interna­
tional incident. Through his involvement, the President 
demonstrated his support for General Andrews. At a secret 
session of the House Military Affairs Committee about the 
Army's air base bill, General Andrews warned that an enemy 
could use Newfoundland, St. Pierre, Niquelon, Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Honduras or the Lesser 
Antilles to launch air attacks on the United States. As a
^Memorandum from Roosevelt to Swanson, May 30, 1935, 
and footnote number 1 in Nixon, vol. 2, p. 523.
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precaution, Andrews recommended keeping these potential 
bases under surveillance. Should a base be discovered, 
Andrews recommended either bombing or occupying it. Whether 
he understood it or not, Andrews had advocated preemptive 
strikes on the territories of other nations. Much to the 
General's surprise, the Committee published his secret 
testimony. He quickly stated that he had spoken only of an 
"abstract military study with no concrete political thought 
or reference." Coming to Andrews' aid, President Roosevelt 
warned Chairman McSwain that any further publication of 
secret testimony would force him to allow future testimony 
"only after approval by me." McSwain listened to the 
President. Calling it a mistake, McSwain took full respon­
sibility for the publication. In a public apology, he 
praised Andrews as an efficient, patriotic and honorable 
officer.37
Saved from further e m b a r r a s s m e n t  by Roosevelt's 
intervention, General Andrews proceeded with his plans to 
prove the capabilities of the GHQ Air Force. His obsoles­
cent aircraft, however, limited Andrews' efforts. When 
asked to send bombers and attack planes to an Army demon­
stration, Andrews had to send old B-6s and A-8s. The slow 
B-6s worried him. "People," Andrews said sarcastically to 
Westover, "are getting so they laugh nowadays when a ship
37wew York Times, April 24, 28, 29, 30, and May 2,
1935.
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goes thundering by at 90 miles per hour."38 yet even as 
Andrews proceeded with obsolete airplanes, the first B-17 
neared completion at the Boeing plant in Seattle. With this 
plane, Andrews ended the laughter.
Despite tight security, the press learned that Boeing 
had built a new bomber. Newspapers carried reports of a 
giant "mystery" bomber with a non-stop range of 6000 miles, 
a two ton bomb load and a top speed of 230 miles per hour. 
Calling it the "deadliest air weapon in the world," the 
press mistakenly reported the still secret B-15. Pressed by 
reporters, War Department officials confirmed that Boeing 
had constructed an "aerial battle cruiser." They expected 
Boeing to enter the plane, designated the Boeing 299, in Air 
Corps' open competition in August. Excited about the new 
bomber, officials hailed it as the most formidable aerial 
defense weapon ever offered to the United States.
Boeing mechanics rolled the highly polished airplane 
out of its hanger for public view on July 17. Upon seeing 
the five gun turrets on the bomber, Dick Williams of the 
Seattle Times nicknamed it a "Flying Fortress." Boeing 
copyrighted the name, and it stuck with the bomber through­
out the Second World War. However, the Air Corps soon 
adapted the nickname to lessen opposition to the purchase of 
long-range bombers. The Air Corps referred to the plane as 
a mobile fort, capable of roaming the skies in defense of
rews to Westover, May 28, 1935, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 7, Personal Correspondence, 
Westover, 1935-1938.
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America's coasts.39
Prospects for the Army Air Corps appeared bright in the 
summer of 1935. In addition to the Flying F ortress, 
Congress and the President seemed ready to provide more 
funds. The House Military Affairs Committee and the General 
Staff asked Congress for an additional $40 million to 
purchase 600 to 800 new planes. Representative Rogers, who 
spoke to the President on July 24, announced that Roosevelt 
supported the increased purchases. Congress also passed the 
Wilcox air base bill, but FDR warned that few funds from the 
PWA would be provided to implement the bill.40
General Andrews boosted morale in the Army Air Corps on 
August 24. Using a B-12 with its wheels exchanged for 
pontoons, he broke three world seaplane records and almost 
broke a fourth. The Army Air Corps did not fly seaplanes, 
and the press wondered why Andrews wanted to break seaplane 
records. Because coastal air defense duties required flying 
considerable distances out to sea, explained a GHQ Air Force 
spokesman, Andrews' flight prepared Army fliers for that 
duty. The press saw through that weak excuse and reported 
that Andrews wanted to improve morale by setting an unusual
39peter M. Bowers, Fortress in the Sky (Granada Hills, 
California: Sentry Books, 1967), pp. 9-27; New York Times, 
July 6, 1935. To see how excited Air Corps flyers were 
about the new B-15 and B-17, see letters from Spaatz to 
Arnold, February 5, 1935, and McClelland to Spaatz, March 6, 
1935, Spaatz Papers, Diaries, Box 7, January 2-August 27, 
1935.
40The New York Times, June 6; July 17, 24, 25, 30, 31;
and August 10, 1935.
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aviation record.41
Since he had cancelled the Panama flight, Andrews felt 
obligated to do something spectacular, but he realized the 
need for success. He showed brilliance in choosing to set a 
seaplane record. First, Andrews knew that Charles Lindbergh 
owned the previous record, increasing the importance of a 
successful attempt. Second, he knew that his B-12 could fly 
more than forty miles per hour faster than Lindbergh's 
plane. Therefore, even with pontoons slowing him down, he 
had plenty of speed. Third, by flying the plane himself, 
Andrews drew attention to himself; not that he sought 
glory. Rather, Andrews realized that critics would blame 
him, not the GHQ Air Force, for failure.
Looking to Andrews' flight with pride, Army airmen 
waited for the results of the bomber competition with great 
anticipation. The four-engine Boeing bomber made its two 
competitors, twin engine bombers entered by the Martin and 
Douglas companies, appear archaic. The Boeing enhanced this 
appearance by flying from Seattle to Wright Field with an 
average ground speed of 233 miles per hour, a remarkable 
achievement for the time. After winning every phase of the 
competition, Boeing's luck ran out on October 30. The 
bomber crashed on take off and burned, killing two test 
pilots. Although clearly superior to its two competitors, 
the Air Corps judges disqualified the Boeing bomber for not 
completing the competition. On that technicality, Douglas
41New York Times, August 20 and 25, 1935.
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won the c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  an o r d e r  for o n e  h u n d r e d  
thirty-three Douglas B-18s. Development costs for the 
Boeing 299 came out of company pockets, and Boeing expected 
to recover its expenses with an Army contract. The loss of 
the plane almost ruined Boeing, but a small order from the 
Army Air Corps saved the company. Determined to purchase 
the bomber, the Air Corps ordered thirteen for test models. 
Boeing contracted to deliver the thirteen planes, redesig­
nated the YB-17, within ten months. Although small, the 
order kept Boeing in the bomber business.42
As he waited for the arrival of his new B-18s and 
YB-17s, Andrews used the planes on hand to impress the War 
Department and American public. At a demonstration for the 
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, he 
watched three B-6 bombers accurately hit a target from 8000 
feet. The demonstration impressed the ground officers. 
Andrews overheard one say, "You can't tell me that the Air 
Corps can't hit anything from bombers."42 Andrews knew that 
hitting an undefended target from 8000 feet was not diffi­
cult, but the ground officers seemed unconcerned by the 
altitude from which the bombs fell. The accuracy impressed 
the spectators. Andrews noted the importance of showing 
people accurate bombing, and he e m p l o y e d  it w h e n e v e r
42Bowers, Fortress in the Sky, pp. 10 and 31-37; New 
York Times, August 21, 1935.
42Andrews to Arnold, October 23, 1935, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "A" 
1935-1937.
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possible.
On November 7, Andrews' men impressed a much larger 
audience. Fourteen Army planes from Mitchel Field on Long 
Island flew down the Hudson River toward lower Manhattan. 
Continuing around the tip of Manhattan and up the East 
River, the planes filled the sky with a smoke screen. High 
winds quickly dissipated the smoke, but a GHQ Air Force 
spokesman claimed that the exercise had proved the feasibil­
ity of concealing other planes from the guns of ground 
forces. The exercise also served as a publicity stunt. To 
insure wide exposure, Army planes carried newsreel photo­
graphers to record the event. The newsreels played in movie 
theaters across the nation.44
On October 2, 1935, a major change occurred on the 
General Staff with important implications for the Army Air 
Corps. Malin Craig replaced MacArthur as the Chief of 
Staff. Feeling that the General Staff had been too concern­
ed with theory, Craig tried to make the Army a combat ready 
force. With his limited funds, Chief of Staff Craig empha­
s ized the replacement of the Army's World War vintage 
weapons. Research and development lost priority. He wanted 
to arm his troops with new, if not the most modern, weap­
ons. Craig's outlook put him at odds with the GHQ Air Force 
over aircraft procurement. As Chief of Staff, he wanted the 
most airplanes for the dollar, but the Air Corps sought the 
best airplanes for the dollar. Hence, Craig opposed the
44New York Times, November 7, 1935.
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purchase of one four-engined B-17 when two B-18s could be 
bought for the same price. To reach the authorized goal of 
2320 airplanes, Craig pressured the GHQ Air Force to accept 
more B-18s. Andrews opposed the purchase of anything but 
the best planes, and he believed the B-17 to be the best 
airplane available. In defiance of the Chief of Staff and 
the War Department, Andrews campaigned for more B-17s.45
General Craig supported the Army Air Corps, but he 
opposed the creation of a separate air force. He believed 
that the Army Air Corps, used as a strategic weapon, would 
influence national defense policies. Craig promised to 
provide enough aircraft to bring the Army Air Corps up to 
its a u t h o r i z e d  level. To fulfill his promise, Craig 
demanded of Oscar Westover the "loyal support and hearty 
cooperation," not only of "those in direct authority in the 
Air Corps and in the G.H.Q. Air Force," but the entire air 
arm. Since Westover would replace Foulois as the Chief of 
the Air Corps in December, Craig made Westover responsible 
for the "leadership and direction of the Air Corps." Craig 
wanted to see "constructive action," and he ordered Westover 
to proceed before Foulois retired.46
Himself a team player, Westover rejected the methods
45Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 415- 
416; Andrews to Arnold, November 23, 1935, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "A" 
1935-1937.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Craig to Westover, November 6, 
1935, Foulois Papers, Subject File, Box 16, Administration, 
Policy of Air Corps (General 0. Westover— 1935).
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used by Mitchell and Foulois. Westover wanted his subordin­
ates to stop attacking the opponents of air power. He also 
hoped to create a unified front that could successfully win 
the support of the G eneral Staff, War Department and 
Congress. Armed with C r a i g ' s  order to take command, 
Westover implemented his ideas on winning increased support 
for the Army Air Corps. In a directive, which he ordered 
disseminated throughout the Air Corps, Westover denounced 
the methods of confrontation and intrigue practiced by 
Mitchell and Foulois. Without mentioning Mitchell and 
Foulois by name, he said that most of the Air Corps' prob­
lems stemmed "from the aggressive and enthusiastic efforts 
of some of its personnel in seeking remedial measures" 
outside proper channels. He ordered the Air Corps to heed 
the wishes of the President and Congress and support the 
recommendations of the Drum and Baker Boards. Hopes for an 
independent air force would be forgotten. To insure that 
the A rmy Air Corps received the 800 airplanes a year 
authorized by Congress, Westover called for "effective 
teamwork" and "support and hearty cooperation" from the 
entire Air Corps. By cooperation, he meant sending criti­
cisms and recommendations through proper channels; not going 
to the press or Congress with complaints; presenting to 
Congress only properly prepared plans having the support of 
the War Department; and not expressing public opposition to 
measures recommended by the General Staff. These practices 
had angered the War Department and General Staff, making
Ill
them unreceptive to Air Corps proposals, and he wanted them 
stopped. Furthermore, he carried his ideas to the public. 
Westover ordered his officers, "particularly the senior 
grades," to participate in public speaking programs "to 
enlighten the public as to the part which the Air Corps and 
the G.H.Q. Air Force play in the Army team of national 
defense." Westover told them to inform the public about 
"the civic cooperation, if any, needed to assist the War 
Department in carrying out its Army program."47
Andrews took a d v a n t a g e  of his f r e e d o m  to report 
directly to the Chief of Staff. In a memorandum to Craig, 
Andrews warned that Chief of Naval Operations A d m i r a l  
Standley had ignored the MacArthur-Pratt agreement and 
organized a strike force of one t h o u s a n d  s h o r e - b a s e d  
aircraft. The Navy was "planning to usurp some of the 
functions now charged to the Army." Opposed to teaching 
over-water navigation to Army pilots, the Navy had offered 
to guide Army planes to their target and back. "Air 
navigation over water," explained Andrews, "is an essential 
part of our training in order to carry out our function of 
off shore reconnaissance and for off shore operations." The 
Army had to guard against Navy encroachments at all times. 
The only defense against Navy encroachment would be "an 
adequate Air Force actually in being, properly equipped, 
thoroughly trained and with sufficient bases to operate in
^ O s c a r  Westover, "Air Corps Policies," November 6, 
1935, Foulois Papers, Subject File, Box 16, Administration, 
Policy of Air Corps (Gen. 0. Westover— 1935).
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any possible theater."48
This memorandum appeared to be just another attack on 
the Navy. In reality it was skillful propaganda. By 
telling Craig that the Navy wanted one thousand airplanes, 
Andrews quietly presented proof of the need for more 
airplanes. After all, if the Navy needed that many planes, 
then the Army also needed that many. By relating King's 
remarks, Andrews tried to win support for more over-water 
navigation training. Although nothing came of his memoran­
dum, Andrews definitely projected an image of the GHQ Air 
Force as team players.
During the interwar years, air races attracted public 
attention, and the air services sent planes to capitalize on 
the free publicity. Andrews scheduled maneuvers in Florida 
for December 1935, to take advantage of the media coverage 
of the Miami air races. From across the nation, GHQ Air 
Force planes rushed to Florida, demonstrating the ability of 
the GHQ Air Force to meet an assault on either coast. Once 
his planes had gathered in Florida, Andrews exploited the 
press. The New York Times always devoted special coverage 
to the major air races. Sending to Miami one of its most 
respected aviation writers, Reginal M. Cleveland, the Times 
printed daily reports about the maneuvers and races. Fed 
stories by the Army fliers, Cleveland reported what the GHQ 
Air Force wanted known. Many of the Air Corps' problems
48Memorandum from Andrews to Craig, November 23, 1935, 
Andrews Papers, General Corresponence, Box 2, Personal 
Correspondence, Craig File.
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during the air mail fiasco had resulted from the lack of 
radios and navigation skills. The Army Air Corps had 
rectified the problems, and through Cleveland and the Mew 
York Times, the GHQ Air Force publicized the changes.
By December 1935, the GHQ Air Force, which had satis­
fied the Army fliers, threatened the cohesiveness of the 
Army Air Corps. A serious split arose between the Air Corps 
and the GHQ Air Force. Airmen in the Air Corps wanted the 
GHQ Air Force to report to the Chief of the Air Corps rather 
than the Chief of Staff. But those in the GHQ Air Force 
p r e f e r r e d  reporting dir e c t l y  to the Chief of Staff. 
Thinking he had found a solution, Westover decided to make 
an officer in the GHQ Air Force his Assistant Chief of the 
Air Corps. With Westover's approval, General Craig named 
Hap Arnold to the post in December.
After almost a decade of "exile," Arnold returned to 
Washington in January 1936. To his embarrassment, Arnold 
found himself "ranged with the Air Corps Headquarters, 
across the fence from the G.H.Q. Air Force, whose side of 
the intramural arguments had been my own enthusiastic side 
in California." Nevertheless, personal involvement in the 
affairs of the Army Air Corps gave Arnold "a new kind of 
sympathy" for the previous Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of 
the Air Corps, and he developed an ability to perceive the 
air force as a whole. "The ramifications of the job," he
4^Coffey, pp. 168-169; New York Times, December 12,
1935.
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later wrote, "spread far beyond any jurisdictional rivalry 
with the G.H.Q. Air Force."50
During his years away from Washington, Hap Arnold grew 
considerably in his political capabilities. Less than ten 
years after the War Department had exiled Arnold for 
supporting Billy Mitchell and attacking the General Staff, 
people recognized his ability to "sell" the air force to the 
General Staff. Colonel G.C. Brant, Commander of the Third 
Wing, GHQ Air Force, congratulated General Andrews for not 
being made the Chief of the Air Corps. Brant recognized the 
i m p o r t a n c e  of the Chief of the Air Corps in securing 
legislation and appropriations, but he also knew that the 
success of Army aviation depended upon the efficiency with 
which the tactical units were commanded. "If they fail to 
function," he told Andrews, "appropriations and legislation 
mean nothing." Brant saw Andrews as the best tactical 
commander. He believed the team of Westover and Arnold made 
a fine contribution to the Army Air Corps. "Westover can do 
all the detail work," Brant explained to Andrews, "and 
Arnold can sell our ideas to General Staff, Bureau of the 
Budget and Congress."51
As Brant realized, the three men best suited to lead 
the Army Air Corps took command in 1935. By rejecting the 
negative publicity campaigns employed by their predecessors,
50Arnold, pp. 150-153; Coffey, pp. 168-169.
S^Colonel G.C. Brant to Andrews, January 6, 1936,
Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 1, Personal 
Correspondence, "B" 1934-1936.
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Andrews, Westover and Arnold successfully promoted the cause 
of air power. They understood that success won support. 
Just as they came to power, the tool they used to promote 
air power arrived. Arnold later recalled that "almost at 
the same moment I arrived in Washington, the first real 
American Air Power appeared. Not just brilliant prophecies, 
good coastal defense airplanes, or promising techniques; 
but, for the first time in history, Air Power that you could 
put your hand on." He referred to the arrival of the Army 
Air Corps' first two Boeing B-17 bombers at Langley F i e l d . 52
52Arnold, pp. 153-154.
CHAPTER IV
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION
Events in Europe influenced President R o o s e v e l t ' s  
thinking about warfare. The military policies he followed 
after the Munich Crisis in 1938, blockading, increasing 
production of aircraft and using air power as a deterrent, 
had their roots in 1935.
In December 1935, the War Department announced plans to 
accelerate its purchase of aircraft. An Army Air Corps 
of f i c e r  told reporters that it would give, "with the 
possible exception of Germany," the United States the most 
modern air fleet in the world. His statement showed a high 
regard for the Luftwaffe. But in reality, the Luftwaffe was 
more powerful as a propaganda weapon than as a military 
weapon. When Hitler came to power in 1933, the German air 
force consisted of only four pursuit, three bomber and eight 
reconnaissance squadrons. Hitler gave the Luftwaffe a high 
priority, but it grew slowly. Yet, by the end of 1935, the 
Germans had convinced the world that they possessed a large 
and modern air force.1
1James Trapier Lowe, A Philosophy of Air Power (Lanham, 
New York and London: University Press of America, 1984), 
p. 112; New York Times 18, 22, and 26, 1935.
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Soon after he unveiled the Luftwaffe, Hitler announced 
plans to form a 550,000-man army. In response, President 
Roosevelt devised a plan to force the Germans to disarm. He 
suggested to Secretary Morgenthau that England, France, 
Italy, Belgium, Holland, Poland, and perhaps Russia sign an 
a g r e e m e n t  doing away with all armaments, except those 
carried by a soldier on his back or in his hand. Then, the 
Germans could be shown the agreement. Should Germany refuse 
to join, said Roosevelt, the signing nations could force 
German acquiescence with a total blockade. After receiving 
unenthusiastic replies from the State Department, Roosevelt 
d r o p p e d  the plan.2 Roosevelt remembered his plan and 
returned to it during the Munich Crisis in 1938.
Italian aggression caused President Roosevelt more 
immediate problems. Mussolini dreamed of rebuilding the 
Roman Empire through the military conquest of Ethiopia, but 
his ambitions clashed with British interests. A strong 
Italian presence in Ethiopia threated Great Britain's route 
from India to the Suez Canal, and a war between the two 
nations seemed likely. Fearing American involvement in 
another European war, isolationists in Congress passed the 
Neutrality Law of 1935. It placed a mandatory embargo upon 
all "instruments of war" to belligerents once the President 
declared a state of war existed, prohibited American ships 
from transporting m unitions to the b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  and 
empowered the President to withhold protection from Ameri-
2Dallek, pp. 101-102.
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cans traveling on ships of belligerent nations. President 
Roosevelt tried to keep control over arms exports in the 
hands of the Executive, but he failed.3
The possibility of a major war in Europe increased 
President Roosevelt's interest in American aircraft produc­
tion. Unlike Germany, Italy possessed a large number of 
combat aircraft in 1935. After the World War, the Italian 
air force had been allowed to disintegrate, but Mussolini 
rebuilt the air force. Naming himself Air Minister, 
Mussolini created a separate air force, the Regia Aeronauti- 
ca. Reflecting the inability of Italy to fight another war 
of attrition, the Regia A e r o n a u t i c a  a d o p t e d  D o u h e t ' s  
theories about bombing civilian populations to win a quick 
victory. Aware of the Regia Aeronautica, Roosevelt asked 
Secretary of War Dern for information on the production 
capabilities of the American aircraft industry. Dern 
reported that the industry lacked the capacity to meet 
wartime needs. But once the industry mobilized and expand­
ed, Dern promised, "the capacity to produce aircraft will be 
enormous."4 Italy and England avoided war in 1935, and FDR 
took no steps to increase aircraft production. But three 
years later, during the Munich Crisis, he responded differ­
ently to the threat of the Luftwaffe by increasing produc­
3Ibid., pp. 103-108.
4Craven and Cate, pp. 83-84; Memorandum from Dern to 
Roosevelt, August 22, 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, 
President's Secretary's File, Confidential File, Box 14, War 
Department, 1931-1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, New York.
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tion.
The Regia Aeronautica influenced Britain's decision to 
avoid war. From Italy, A m b a s s a d o r  B r e c k i n r i d g e  Long 
i nf o r m e d  Roosevelt that Italian air power could cause 
Britain an "enormous amount of trouble" in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. From Poland, Ambassador John Cudahy reported 
that the British recognized the vulnerability of the British 
Isles to air attacks and to an effective blockade. Having 
dispatched their entire home fleet and a quarter of the 
Royal Air Force to the Mediterranean, the British had left 
their home islands inadequately defended. When Italian 
troops attacked Ethiopia on October 11, 1935, President 
Roosevelt invoked the Neutrality Law. Choosing to avoid 
war, the British convinced the League of Nations to impose 
economic sanctions against Italy. However, the sanctions 
meant little because coal, steel and oil, the major imple­
ments of modern warfare, were left off the sanction list. 
Also, the British allowed the Italians to continue using the 
Suez Canal. More concerned about Germany and Japan, the 
British feared the Regia Aeronautica would cripple their 
fleet and backed off.® The Regia Aeronautica provided 
President Roosevelt with a concrete example of the impor­
tance of air power. The Royal Navy was superior to the 
Italian Navy, but just the threat of Italian planes causing
®Ambassador Breckinridge Long to Roosevelt, September 
6 , 1935, and Ambassador John Cudahy to Roosevelt, October 
11 , 1935, in Nixon, FDR and Foreign A f f a i r s , vol. 3,
September 1935-January 1 937, pp. 3-4 and 21-22; Raymond 
J. Sontag, A Broken World, pp. 287-290.
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widespread damage to their fleet had forced the British to 
back away from war. There were other influences behind the 
British decision, such as a lack of cooperation with the 
French, but the vulnerability of ships to air attack caught 
Roosevelt's attention. Over the next few years, he became 
interested in using air power to deter aggression.
Oscar Westover's first opportunity to shape public 
opinion came on January 1, 1936. Annually, the New York 
Times published articles written by the heads of federal 
agencies. These synopses of achievements gave the authors 
an opportunity to brag about their work. In his article, 
Westover broke away from the traditional argument that the 
lack of funds prevented the Army Air Corps from doing 
anything. After listing what the Army Air Corps had done on 
limited funding, the Chief of the Air Corps promised to do 
much more with enough money. "If sufficient funds are 
provided," he wrote, "for procurement of additional new 
aircraft and for the establishment of operating bases at 
strategic locations as provided in the Wilcox bill of the 
last Congressional session an adequate program of national 
defense will be well underway."®
®New York Times, January 1, 1936. For an example of 
the negative sort of article, see Major General Foulois' 
review in which he wrote, "Due to budgetary limitations, no 
combined Air Corps manoeuvres were held during the year." 
In contrast, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the 
Bureau of Aeronautics, wrote, "The successful participation 
of patrol squadrons in all fleet exercises demonstrated 
their value as a patrol and striking force, and in conse­
quence they are now considered to be an essential part of 
the United States fleet." New York Times, January 1, 1935.
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Adhering to Westover's directive to participate in 
speaking programs, Lieutenant Colonel Russell L. Maxwell, 
ordnance officer for the GHQ Air Force, spoke to the 
Engineer's Club of Philadelphia in January. With a degree 
of realism heretofore missing in statements by Army airmen, 
he explained that only airplanes launched from aircraft 
carriers or nearby air bases could reach the United States. 
But the GHQ Air Force lacked the men and weapons to destroy 
these "nests." To enable the GHQ Air Force to carry out its 
mission, he asked the engineers to support increased funding 
for weapons.7
Soon after speaking in Philadelphia, Colonel Maxwell 
received a more important assignment. He became the public 
relations officer for the GHQ Air Force's cold-weather 
maneuvers scheduled for January 27 to February 15 in the New 
England-New York area. Given few instructions and no staff, 
Maxwell initiated his own plan to insure that the press 
heard what the GHQ Air Force wanted it to hear. To guard 
against conflicting statements about the maneuvers, Maxwell 
forwarded a series of press releases to Boston, New York and 
Washington before the maneuvers started for release on 
simultaneous dates. He won the cooperation of the leading 
press, radio and newsreel services by giving them a general 
plan and outline of the maneuvers. Once the maneuvers 
began, Maxwell offered the reporters official Air Corps
7Maxwell rewrote his lecture as an article, and the New 
York Times published it on January 26, 1936.
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photographs. The reporters rejected the photographs, saying 
that they lacked the degree of professionalism required by 
editors of the day. So, Maxwell encouraged the news photo­
graphers to take their own pictures, and many of their 
photographs were published in daily and Sunday newspapers 
across the country. All of the major newsreel companies 
sent film crews to cover the events, and movie theaters 
around the nation carried their films for several weeks 
afterward. To provide correct information, Maxwell arranged 
for press conferences to be held at several locations.
Maxwell failed to get extensive radio coverage of the 
maneuvers because of the high cost of relaying the programs 
from Mitchel Field to the New York City radio stations. But 
Maxwell did convince NBC to air a live broadcast of pursuits 
intercepting a flight of bombers over New York City with the 
commentator on board one of the planes. Maxwell arranged 
for GHQ Air Force personnel to give radio interviews in 
Boston and New York City, and his persistance paid off. 
With the cooperation of the Gulf Refining Company and Major 
A1 Williams, CBS b r o a d c a s t  Williams' fi f t e e n  m i n u t e  
interview of Brigadier General H.C. Pratt and Maxwell. This 
program was so successful that Williams offered Maxwell the 
use of his regular Thursday night program and promised to 
publicize the maneuvers in his syndicated newspaper column, 
which had a circulation of about eight million.
After the maneu v e r s ,  Ma x w e l l  r e flected upon his 
experience as the public relations officer, and he concluded
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that the GHQ Air Force's preparations had been too haphaz­
ard. In his report to the General Staff, Maxwell recommend­
ed the creation of a permanent Public Relations Section at 
GHQ Air Force. He believed that at least one specially 
selected officer needed to gain the confidence of the 
press. He could insure that the press' "interpretation of 
events" would be what the Army wanted. Complying with 
Westover's demand for teamwork, Maxwell told the General 
Staff that the objective of GHQ Air Force publicity should 
be "the maintenance of friendly relations with all arms and 
services of the Army, the aviation industry, and the p u b ­
lic." Colonel Maxwell also presented his ideas to other 
Army Air Corps officers and asked for comments.8
The colorful aerial maneuvers over New England and New 
York won the GHQ Air Force a lot of publicity, but they had 
little impact on Congress. On Valentine's Day, the House 
p a s s e d  an Army appropriations bill without additional 
authorizations for aircraft. Hitler's reoccupation of the 
Rhineland in March had a greater impact on Congress. It 
responded to his action by authorizing an increase of the 
Army Air Corps to a maximum strength of 2230 airplanes, and 
Roosevelt signed the bill on June 25. However, Congress 
refused to provide the necessary funds.9
^Memorandum from Maxwell to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-2, March 27, 1936, and Maxwell to Ira Eaker, March 
28, 1936, Eaker Papers, Correspondence 1931, 1934-9 Box 3, 
1936 File.
9New York Times, February 15 and June 26, 1936.
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In January 1936, Japan withdrew from talks on extending 
the London Naval Treaty, and the decade old naval-limita- 
tions system died. Great Britain responded by stepping up 
its building program, and Roosevelt asked Congress for the 
largest peacetime naval appropriation in American history. 
When American pacifists denounced the large naval expendi­
tures, Roosevelt attempted to educate them about the need to 
extend America's defenses beyond the coastline. In the 
process, the President revealed his views about America's 
military needs. He told Reverend G. Ashton Oldham, Bishop 
of Albany, that William Jennings Bryan's belief that "a 
million men would spring to arms overnight" in case of an 
attack was too simplistic. A successful attack on Hawaii, 
Roosevelt pointed out, would leave the entire West Coast and 
the Panama Canal open to attack. For this reason, the 
United States needed its expensive naval and land defenses 
in Hawaii. Using an anecdote about a reassuring but useless 
harbor defense as an illustration, President Roosevelt told 
the representatives from the People's Mandate to End War 
C o m m i t t e e  that coastal defenses provided an illusory 
defense. Franklin Roosevelt had concluded by early 1936, 
that the threat of air attacks frightened Adolph Hitler. 
During his meeting with the People's Mandate to End War 
Committee, Roosevelt said that Hitler was giving tax breaks 
to Germans who built bomb shelters in their basements. 
Furthermore, Roosevelt recognized the weak condition of the 
Army Air Corps. "We," he said, "are way behind. The army
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has only eight hundred planes, England has twenty-five 
hundred, France four thousand, Germany is working up to five 
thousand and Russia has six thousand." Despite his efforts, 
pacifists continued to oppose increased military spending.10
The Royal Navy noted the importance of aircraft also. 
On March 22, 1936, "Augur," the New York Times' special 
correspondent in London, reported that the Regia Aeronautica 
had forced the Royal Navy to replace the Mediterranean with 
the Indian Ocean as the vital link of the Empire. The 
eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean were secure because 
no nation had bases on the African continent to threaten 
them. But Augur concluded that Singapore alone could not 
protect the Indian Ocean from the east. Singapore needed an 
advanced base, but Japanese aircraft and submarines had 
rendered Hong Kong ineffective. After surveying the area, 
Augur chose Camranh Bay as the best forward base.11
There is no way of knowing whether Augur's article 
influenced Roosevelt, or even whether he read it. Neverthe­
less, the President had become interested in the effective­
ness of modern bombers against ships, and he asked General 
Westover for information about tactics and the accuracy of 
air attacks on ships. Westover sent the request to the GHQ 
Air Force. Knowing that it had been requested by the
^ D a l l e k ,  pp. 89-90; Roosevelt to Reverend G. Ashton 
Oldham, March 3, 1936, and Roosevelt to the People's Mandate 
to End War Committee, March 12, 1936, in Nixon, vol. 3, 
pp. 228-229 and 248-251.
i;LAugur, "British Navy Looks to a Wider Domain," New 
York Times, March 22, 1936, 4, p. 5.
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President, General Andrews presented the information in a 
way that would convince Roosevelt of the need for more 
B-17s. Listing the ranges and bomb loads of the bombers 
flown by the GHQ Air Force, General Andrews emphasized that 
the greater range and bomb load of a B-17 allowed it to do 
the work of two B-18s. After describing the number of hits 
on a target from different heights and with various sizes of 
bombs, Andrews claimed that a ship could not move fast 
enough to avoid all the bombs. He also boasted that hitting 
targets accurately from as high as 18,000 feet would be 
"merely a matter of training."12
Alerted to the President's interest, Andrews realized 
that the GHQ Air Force might be called upon to demonstrate 
its a b i l i t y  to bomb ships from high altitudes. As a 
precaution, he ordered his bomber units to intensify their 
training in high altitude bombing and search and location 
techniques. Andrews made the right decision. Unaware that 
Andrews had begun preparations, Westover warned him of 
rumors that the President wanted a test of the GHQ Air 
Force's efficiency in attacking naval vessels. Mindful of 
the air mail fiasco, Westover suggested he make a prelimi­
nary study to select the needed personnel, increase training 
in ship recognition, and gain familiarity with the charac­
teristics of Navy smoke screens. "The main thing," explain­
ed Westover, "is that we must not fail in the test for
^Memorandum from Andrews to Westover, April 18, 1936, 
Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 7, Personal 
Correspondence, Westover 1935-1938.
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reasons well known to both of us."13 Not only would their 
personal futures ride on this test, but the future of the 
Army Air Corps was at risk. If Andrews' men failed to 
demonstrate their efficiency at bombing naval targets, the 
Army Air Corps could lose its coastal defense mission.
The possibility of the GHQ Air Force p r o v i n g  its 
ability to repel a naval assault worried the Navy. Before 
the House Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations, Assistant 
Chief of Naval O p e r a t i o n s  Rear Admiral J.K. Taussing 
complained about Army plans to patrol the Panama-Hawaii- 
Alaska triangle. He said it was "none of their business" 
because the Joint Army and Navy Board had assigned that duty 
to the Navy. "If you let those army air fellows go," 
Taussig added, "they will take up the whole business, of 
course." Instead of answering the Navy's attack in kind, 
General Andrews told the Associated Press only that no plans 
for the GHQ Air Force to patrol that area had been "perfect­
ed." If an enemy did enter that triangle, Andrews explain­
ed, "it might be necessary for the army to make sure that 
there would be no attack on land d e f e n s e s  under army 
control."14 In his answer, Andrews did two things. First, 
he justified having Army Air Corps planes in the area by 
presenting them as a backup should an enemy get by the
13Andrews to Brigadier General Harry B. Clagett, April 
29, 1936, Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 2, 
Personal Correspondence, "C" 1934-1937; Westover to Andrews, 
May 12, 1936, Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 7, 
Personal Correspondence, Westover 1935-1938.
14New York Times, May 6, 1936.
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Navy. Second, he furthered the idea of teamwork within the 
Army by stating that the Army, not just the Army Air Corps, 
might need to protect the land defenses.
Rather than publicly attack the Navy, Andrews preferred 
to show what the GHQ Air Force could do by making a non-stop 
flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Langley Field. Boake 
Carter of station WCAU in Philadelphia described the flight 
on his radio broadcast, and Andrews sent him a thank-you 
note. Emphasizing that the GHQ Air Force had done something 
spectacular, while making it appear routine, Andrews told 
Carter that this flight was "the fore-runner of flights 
which will become more or less routine when we get our new 
long-range equipment in the GHQ Air Force." By implying 
that the flight was made with inadequate equipment, Andrews 
suggested that the GHQ Air Force would do really spectacular 
things once its new, long-range airplanes arrived. Andrews 
praised the skill of his navigators on the flight to point 
out that the men of the GHQ Air Force were trained well and 
awaited the new airplanes.15
By now, the Army fliers had learned to lodge complaints 
about the Navy with their superiors instead of the press. 
M a j o r  Robert Olds, the GHQ Air Force Inspector, heard 
numerous complaints about the Navy practicing unfair methods 
to build up naval aviation. Although the complaints were 
unsubstantiated, Olds heard so many that he felt the matter
^ A n d r e w s  to B o a k e  Carter, July 7, 1935, Andrews
Papers, General Correspondence, Box 2, Personal Corres­
pondence, "C" 1934-1937.
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required investigation. The most frequent complaints dealt 
with the Navy's use of higher pay and privileges to lure 
pilots and mechanics away from the Army Air Corps. He also 
heard complaints about a Navy campaign to convince the 
American people that the GHQ Air Force, by c o n d u c t i n g  
over-water flights, was usurping the Navy's responsibilities 
for national defense. Instead of going public with the 
complaints, Olds passed them on to Andrews with the observa­
tion that there were too many complaints to not have some 
validity. Unless the War Department took remedial action, 
he warned, the morale of the Army Air Corps w o u l d  be 
undermined. Andrews relayed the information to Westover in 
memorandum, but he advised moderation in reacting to the 
problem. Referring to an article Westover recently had 
published in National Aeronautic Magazine, Andrews praised 
Westover for "very properly" not pointing to the Navy as one 
of the main reasons for the decline in students at the Air 
Corps Training Center. Unlike Billy Mitchell, who would 
have gone to the press, Andrews suggested seeking redress 
through proper channels. To handle the problem of unfair 
practices, Andrews recommended the securing of "legislation 
or regulations to permit us to compete on an equal footing 
with the Navy." Like Westover, Andrews also wanted to get 
the support of the War Department for corrective legisla­
tion.1^
^Memorandum from Major Robert Olds to Andrews, August
5, 1936, and Memorandum from Andrews to Westover, August 14, 
1936, A n d r e w s  Papers, General Correspondence, Box 7,
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Although many GHQ Air Force officers had become team 
players of the kind that Chief of Staff Craig and Westover 
wanted, they still stated publicly that air power would play 
the decisive role in warfare. But they were careful not to 
antagonize the ground officers. In his critique of war 
games held around Camp Custer, Michigan, Lieutenant Colonel 
Follett Bradley, Acting Chief of Staff of the GHQ Air Force, 
explained that the bomber units had only hinted at their 
capabilities during the maneuvers because of the time and 
space limitations. After making the standard disclaimer 
that the GHQ Air Force did not want war and that the policy 
of the United States was one of defense only, Bradley 
claimed that bombers could destroy nearly anything built by 
man. "It can destroy ships easily," he said, "and an enemy 
must come to us in ships." In closing, however, Bradley 
assured the ground officers that the Army Air Corps no 
longer sought independence from the Army:
We of the Air Corps often speak of independent 
air operations and are occasionally misunderstood 
in our use of the term. We refer to the 
unquestioned tactical independence of Bombardment 
Aviation from ground troops. Strategically, there 
is the greatest of interdependence under one 
commander, the Chief of Staff in peace and the 
commander of the field forces in war. We are 
proud to be a member of the Army team, and we 
expect, should war come to this country, to acquit 
ourselves well of the responsibility which will 
inevitably be reposed in us.1?
Personal Correspondence, Westover 1935-1938.
i^Air Corps News Letter, September 1, 1936, pp. 12-13. 
Published by the Air Corps Information Division, the Air 
Corps News Letter disseminated official information to the 
A rmy fliers. The foreign policy of the United States
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When not around ground officers, the GHQ Air Force 
officers made less reserved comments, At the Air Corps 
Tactical School, General Andrews told the Class of 1936-1937 
that it was the only school where an officer learned how to 
use an arm "which is more and more dominating warfare in all 
its p hases both land and sea." Pointing to Ethiopia, 
Andrews said that the preponderance of Italian air power in 
the Mediterranean "made it much easier" for Britain to 
decide against going to war with Italy. "Russian bombers at 
Vladivostok capable of bombing Japanese cities," he added, 
"are certainly contributing toward Japanese expansion in 
China rather than in the eastern provinces of Siberia." 
Noting the expansion of air forces around the world, Andrews 
prophesied that the Army Air Corps and its defense responsi­
bilities would be expanded. Despite making bold claims for 
the future of air power, Andrews did so out of any ground 
officer's earshot. His methods differed from those of his 
predecessors, but his ideas did not.18
As the summer of 1936 passed away, the Navy made plans 
for the GHQ Air Force to simulate an air attack on destroy­
ers. Knowing that his B-lOs and their bomb sights were
contemplated defense only, stated the Air Corps News Letter, 
and the policy of the Army Air Corps was "to organize, 
train, and equip military aviation in time of peace as to 
permit it in time of war to be employed immediately in 
defense of our territory." Air Corps News Letter, July 15, 
1936, p. 19.
18Speech written by George C. Kenney for Andrews to 
deliver to the Air Corps Tactical School, dated August 25, 
1936, A n d r e w s  Papers, General Correspondence, Box 5, 
Personal Correspondence, "K" 1929-1941.
132
inadequate, General Andrews faced a dilemma. If the bombers 
failed the test, President Roosevelt might conclude that the 
Army Air Force could not defend the coasts. But he feared 
the unfavorable reaction if he refused to go through with 
the tests. Believing the latter situation to be the less 
damaging, Andrews postponed the tests. He explained to 
General Craig that he preferred to wait until the new B-18s 
and B-17s arrived. Andrews added that a new bomb sight 
undergoing testing promised better results. The commander 
of the GHQ Air Force also refused to participate in tests 
with destroyers because battleships, not destroyers, would 
attack America's coasts. He told Craig that the loss of a 
destroyer would not stop an attack, but the destruction of 
one battleship would affect the outcome of the battle. 
Furthermore, he knew that a destroyer offered a poor target 
from any height because it was more maneuverable than a 
battleship and had only one seventh the vulnerable area of a 
battleship. "When we do agree to attack," he said, "the 
naval target should be a battleship." Andrews refused to 
let the Navy pull any fast ones on him.19
Frank Andrews envisioned an Army Air Corps equipped 
with long-range bombers capable of delivering bombs far from 
American shores. Like General Foulois, Andrews knew that he 
had to emphasize the defensive role of bombers to receive 
the support of the General Staff. However, Andrews realized
19Memorandum from Andrews to Craig, September 29, 1936, 
Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 2, Personal 
Correspondence, Craig File.
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that winning control over coastal air defenses would not be 
enough. An arbitrary boundary could be placed on the Army 
Air Corps' jurisdiction, and the General Staff might limit 
the purchase of aircraft to those capable of reaching the 
boundary. The possibility of an arbitrary boundary materi­
alized during the Joint Coastal Defense Air Exercise Number 
1, which was held off the East Coast in the middle of 
October 1936. The B-lOs used by the GHQ Air Force during 
the exercise had a radius of only 3 36 miles, and Andrews 
feared that the Joint Army and Navy Board would adopt it as 
the line separating Army and Navy jurisdiction. General 
Andrews used his critique of the exercise to discredit 
arbitrary boundaries. Pointing out that the B-18 and the 
B-17 possessed greater range than the B-10, he said that "no 
one can now predict the radii of land based bombers of the 
future." He proposed assigning jurisdiction by the type of 
target. The Navy would have responsibility for enemy naval 
forces intending to raid shipping, and the Army would have 
responsibility for enemy forces threatening to invade the 
United States. In the spirit of team play, Andrews said 
that either service should feel free to request the assis­
tance of the other. General Andrews realized that the 
General Staff, unhindered by limits on range, would be 
compelled to purchase even longer-ranged airplanes.
Joint Coastal Defense Air Exercise Number 1 did not 
provide the bombing test President Roosevelt wanted, but he 
was interested in it. When the last two days of the
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exercise were cancelled, some newspapers reported that the 
weather had been too bad for the Army's planes to operate. 
To prevent "incorrect conclusions from being drawn by higher 
authorities," Andrews stated in his critique that the Army 
planes had been ready to fly in any weather. Only inade­
quate facilities at the Norfolk Naval Base and the Navy's
decision to cancel the exercises scheduled for the last day
■)
kept the Army planes on the ground. Remembering the air 
mail fiasco, Andrews made certain that President Roosevelt 
knew of the Army Air Corps' ability to fly through bad 
weather.20
Andrews believed that nobody could predict the radius 
of land-based bombers of the future, but he wanted to arm 
the GHQ Air Force with as many of the currently available 
B-17s as possible. To win the General Staff's approval, 
Andrews tried to elicit the support of Major General Hugh 
A. Drum. Made the commander of the Hawaiian Department of 
the U n i t e d  States Army after chairing the Drum Board, 
General Drum believed that Hawaii would become the center of 
commercial air traffic in the Pacific, and he thought the 
Islands had inadequate air defenses. Hoping to get a 
recommendation for a specific number of B-17s, Andrews 
requested Drum's views on the GHQ Air Force's requirements 
in the Western Pacific. Instead of giving Andrews a number,
2^And rews, "Critique— Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Air Exercise No. 1," October 21, 1936, Record Group 18, Army 
Air Forces, Box 24, 354.2, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C.
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Drum objected to plans for flying bombers to the Hawaiian 
Islands in time of emergency. He wanted bombers stationed 
there permanently. Since the Army Air Corps had justified 
the need for the B-17 with the argument that it could 
reinforce Hawaii, Andrews had to look for other ways to 
prove the need for more B-17s.21
The reports about air power that Roosevelt saw in 1936 
came from civilians. William C. Bullitt warned him that 
everybody in Europe, including the British Ambassador to 
France, expected a war by the spring or summer of 1938. The 
French Government had considered providing gas masks for the 
entire population of Paris until they d i s c o v e r e d  the 
prohibitive cost. "It was decided," Bullitt explained, "to 
let the population take its chances." Bullitt told Roose­
velt that the "airplane has made Europe an absurdity." The 
speed of airplanes meant that the "dinky little European 
states can not live in an airplane civilization." Either 
Europeans had to submerge their national pride and unify the 
continent, or destroy themselves and hand Europe "over to 
the Bolsheviks." Agreeing with Bullitt about the importance 
of airplanes, Acting Secretary of State R. Walton Moore said 
that every month of delay by "leaders who have the warlike 
inclination" afforded "Great Britain the opportunity to 
build up her Air Force and strengthen her Navy." President
21Andrews to Major General Hugh A. Drum, September 12, 
1936, Drum to Andrews, December 14, 1936, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 3, Personal Correspondence, "D" 
1930-1942. For Drum's views on Hawaii, see his interview 
with Lauren D. Lyman, New York Times, October 25, 1936.
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Roosevelt already understood what air power meant to modern 
warfare. At Buenos Aires, he told the Inter-American 
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace that modern warfare 
meant more than the clash of armies. It meant the destruc­
tion of cities and farms, poverty, and the threat of broken 
societies and constitutional governments.22 When Franklin 
D. Roosevelt supported the expansion of the Army Air Forces 
in World War II, he did so with a full knowledge of the 
horrors that total war brought with it. The claims that air 
power would bring a quick victory did not blind him to the 
devastation that would accompany aerial bombardment. As 
demonstrated by his address to the Inter-American Confer­
ence, Roosevelt foresaw the horror. That explains why he 
vacillated about measures which could have brought war 
between the United States and German and Japan.
A l t h o u g h  p r e o c c u p i e d  with Europe, the Roosevelt 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  remained i n terested in the Far East. 
Throughout 1936, the United States continued to expand and 
improve its air links with the Philippines. On November 14, 
Major General Edward M. Markham, Chief of the Army Engi­
neers, asked Congress for improvements in the seaplane 
facilities at Midway and Wake Islands to insure regular 
schedules for Pan American Airways' trans-Pacific service. 
Afterward, rumors circulated around Washington that Guam
22William Bullitt to Roosevelt, November 24, 1936, 
R. Walton Moore to Roosevelt, November 27, 1936, and Speech 
by R o o s e v e l t  to the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace, December 1, 1936, in Nixon, vol. 3, 
pp. 499-502, 512, and 517.
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would be fortified. R. Walton Moore denied the rumors, 
saying that the improvements were intended to aid commercial 
planes. But Japanese naval authorities complained that the 
bases would increase the striking power of the United States 
in Asian waters. Pointing out that Midway was only 2000 
miles from their mainland, the Japanese said that the United 
States threatened them from the Philippines, the Aleutians 
and Midway Island.
The Japanese had reason to worry about a seaplane base 
at Midway Island. C o n s o l i d a t e d  A i r c r a f t  had s t a r t e d  
producing flying boats with a radius of 1500 miles and a 
large load capacity. The Navy called them scout planes, but 
some Navy officials regarded them as a strike force. Since 
the future seemed to promise airplanes of even greater 
range, the 2000 miles between Midway and Japan did not seem 
insurmountable. Speaking to the National Aeronautical 
Association on November 30, General Westover announced that 
the day of the 3000-mile bomber had arrived. On December 2, 
Boeing conducted a successful test flight of its second 
B-17. The New York Times ran the story on page one with the 
headline: "Army Bomber, Called World's Largest, Soars Over 
Seattle in Test; Can Cruise 3,000 M i l e s . "23 Because of 
pronouncements like these, Japan seemed to be more accessi­
ble to American bombers with each passing year.
Despite the interest of the press, the War Department
23Lauren D. Lyman, "Huge Boats for Defense," New York 
Times, November 15, 1936; New York Times, December 1 and 3,
1936.
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refused to purchase more B-17s. In May 1936, Westover and 
Arnold asked the General Staff for fifty more B-17s and 
eleven more Project "A" long-range bombers. The General 
Staff concluded that the international situation did not 
indicate a need for more long-range bombers. Explaining 
that the B-18 met the Army's military and cost requirements, 
the General Staff rejected the request. Secretary of War 
Harry Woodring, who replaced Dern after his death, instruct­
ed Westover to order no more B-17s until the thirteen on 
order had been delivered and tested. Like General Craig, 
Woodring wanted to purchase the maximum number of bombers. 
Boeing delivered the thirteen YB-17s on order over the first 
eight months of 1937.24 With these thirteen YB-17s, the 
Army Air Corps conducted a p u b l i c i t y  c a m p a i g n  to win 
appropriations for more Flying Fortresses. In the process, 
Andrews, Westover and Arnold won converts to the cause of 
strategic bombing.
24Coffey, pp. 174-175; Bowers, pp. 39-40.
CHAPTER V
ARRIVAL OF THE FLYING FORTRESS
In July 1936, Generals Andrews, Westover and Arnold 
told a Congressional committee of their opposition to 
separating the Army Air Corps from the Army. They under­
stood that a separate air force needed its own medical, 
police, quartermaster, signal, and even food se r v i c e  
personnel; the Army Air Corps lacked all of these. Until 
the vast expansion of the Army Air Forces during World War 
II, the Army provided all these personnel and everything 
else needed. Outside of the Army Air Corps, however, 
efforts to separate the air arm from the General Staff 
continued. On January 18, 1937, Representative Wilcox 
introduced another bill in Congress calling for a separate 
air force.1
Frustrated at not being given more B-17s, General 
Andrews started looking toward a separate air force once 
again. He and Hugh Knerr had secretly written the Wilcox 
bill. When General Craig sent him a copy of the bill, 
Andrews wrote a critique supporting it. He later told Craig 
that he had not read the bill. Andrews lied to the Chief of
^Arnold, pp. 161-162; New York Times, January 19, 1937.
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Staff to avoid antagonizing him.2
With their criticism of the General Staff, the civilian 
supporters of air power often antagonized the General Staff 
more than the airmen did. Since Andrews, Westover and 
Arnold wanted to promote good relations with the General 
Staff, they had to muzzle the more outspoken critics. The 
trick was to quiet the criticism without alienating their 
civilian supporters. Arnold often used a third party to 
approach the critic. When Swanee Taylor, the vice-president 
of Popular Aviation magazine, made slanderous remarks about 
Army and Navy procurement officers, Arnold asked John Jouett 
of Fairchild Aviation to intercede, which he did. "There 
are times," Arnold told Jouett, "when we of the Military 
Service are at a distinct disadvantage and the Swanee Taylor 
case at hand is one of them."3
Although the Army Air Corps officers hoped to avoid 
public controversy, there were times when it could not be 
helped. But even then, they tried to separate themselves 
f rom the controversy. For example, when the Saturday 
Evening Post ran an article entitled "Airplanes Can't Sink 
Battleships," the Army Air Corps could not let such pro­
2DeWitt S. Copp, "Frank M. Andrews: Marshall's Airman," 
in Makers of the United States Air Force, ed. John L. Fris- 
bee (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United 
States Air Force, 1987), pp. 56-57. Copp attributes 
Andrews' actions to a desire for a better air force and for 
his personal career.
3john Jouett to Swanee Taylor, March 30, 1937, and 
Arnold to Jouett, April 1, 1937, Arnold Papers, Box 15, File 
234, General Correspondence, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
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nouncements go unchallenged. Instead of answering the 
article himself, Ira Eaker decided to write a rebuttal and 
ask General Fechet to sign it. Having second thoughts about 
acting on his own, Eaker asked Arnold if he thought the 
article was a good idea. "The reason I thought of General 
F echet for the article," Eaker explained, "was that I 
thought it impolitic for you to sign it at this time. The 
proper answer would undoubtedly be slightly controversial." 
Arnold gave Eaker his permission.4
Pressure groups like the Air De f e n s e  L eague also 
threatened relations between the General Staff and the Army 
Air Corps. The General Staff could interpret criticisms 
from the ADL as originating from the Army Air Corps. Harvey 
L. Williams, chairman of the northeastern branch of the ADL, 
increased the danger by claiming that the League cooperated 
with "the best informed air officers" in the Army and Navy. 
Again, a third party acted for Arnold. Stating that "a very 
hearty spirit of co-operation now exists between the General 
Staff and the Army Air Corps," Reed G. Landis asked a member 
of the ADL to avoid jeopardizing that spirit by pursuing a 
separate air force. Landis' efforts failed, and the ADL 
proceeded with its plans to support the W i l c o x  bill. 
Concerned, Landis asked Arnold for instructions. In his 
reply, Arnold offered no specific directions. Instead, he
4Ira Eaker to Arnold, April 7, 1937, Arnold to Eaker, 
April 13, 1937, Arnold Papers, Box 12, File 152, General 
Correspondence. Before the Second World War, Eaker and 
Arnold coauthored books and articles.
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related a story about an injured mule with the "blind 
staggers" he had seen in the Philippines. No matter what, 
the mule always walked in a straight line. It made no 
difference if the "mess tent or the cook's fire" were in the 
way because the mule walked right through them. "That in 
short," Arnold explained, "is my opinion of the Defense 
League— I think they have blind staggers
Arnold gave Landis no instructions because the General 
Staff already had become quite distressed about the Wilcox 
bill. Chief of Staff Craig told Secretary Woodring that the 
supporters of the Wilcox bill were confined to Wilcox and a 
"small group of dissatisfied Air Corps officers who were 
adherents of former Brigadier General William Mitchell." 
Craig informed Woodring that these dissatisfied officers 
planned to use the Congressional hearings on the Wilcox bill 
"as a forum for the airing of opinions and charges in the 
sensational manner of those that occurred under the leader­
ship of General Mitchell."® With the damage done, Arnold 
did not want to anger the ADL too.
While Arnold tried to maintain friendly relations with
5Reed G. Landis to Arnold, March 29, 1937, Arnold to 
Landis, April 1, 1937, Landis to Arnold, April 16, 1937, and 
Arnold to Landis, April 24, 1937, Arnold Papers, General 
Correspondence, Box 16, File 261.
^Memorandum from Woodring to Roosevelt, June 9, 1937, 
FDR Papers, Official File, War Department, Box 32, OF 25u, 
Chief of Air Corps, 1937-1939. By then, General Westover 
had convinced Craig of his loyalty because Craig specifical­
ly excluded him from the group of dissatisfied officers. By 
not mentioning Andrews, Craig implied that he was one of the 
dissatisfied officers.
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the General Staff, General Andrews demonstrated that his 
fliers had sharpened their navigation skills. By 1937, 
Andrews felt secure enough with their skills to allow the 
first mass flight of land planes across the Caribbean. On 
February 6, nine B-lOs flew eleven hundred miles non-stop 
from Miami to Albrook Field, Panama Canal Zone. Two days 
later, they completed the return trip. The flight impressed 
General Craig. Congratulating Andrews, Craig said the 
flight "was well planned and has demonstrated that our Army 
navigators are thoroughly capable of navigating our air­
planes over extensive stretches of water." The Army fliers 
continued to make spectacular flights over water, and with 
each success, the General Staff became increasingly certain 
that the fliers could fulfill all their promises.
The Panama flight marked the last time that Andrews had
to depend on the old B-lOs for demonstrations. On March 4, 
the 2nd Bombardment Group received the first YB-17. After 
flying by in review twice, the big bomber landed on a snow 
covered Langley Field. Showing the importance of the event, 
the officers and men of the 2nd Bombardment Group lined up 
in parade formation to greet that lone airplane. The 
group's second airplane arrived a week later, along with 
four navigators fresh from the new course taught at the
Navigation Unit at Langley Field. However, Andrews did not
wait for the second plane to advertize the delivery. The 
2nd Bombardment Group flew its first YB-17 to Bolling Field 
on March 9. Over the next four days, crowds and newspaper­
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men from Washington viewed the plane. On April 4, the 2nd 
Bombardment Group showed off its new planes to the whole 
nation. The National Broadcasting Company aired a live, 
six-minute broadcast from one of the new YB-17s flying over 
Washington, D.C. After interviewing General Gerald C.
Brant, commander of the 2nd Bombardment Group, the announcer 
gave an account of the crew going t h r o u g h  its c o m b a t  
drills.?
Enthusiastic about the YB-17s, General Andrews adamant- 
ly opposed the purchase of more B-18s. On June 16, Andrews 
spent half an hour complaining to Arnold about the Army's 
mistake in purchasing B-18s instead of B-17s. H a v i n g  
learned the supply officer's problems, Arnold explained that 
the Air Corps needed a balanced program which did not lean 
too much on four-engine bombers. Arnold had a responsibili­
ty to consider the evaluation of two-engine bombers for 
possible tactical needs. He also reminded Andrews that the 
"General Staff, Secretary of War and possibly The President" 
had opposed the purchase of more B-17s. But Arnold was 
wasting his time. Andrews refused to listen.**
Andrews and Colonel Hugh Knerr, chief of staff of the 
GHQ Air Force, became impatient with anyone who gave less 
than total support to purchasing more B-17s. Knerr credited
?Air Corps News Letter, March 15, 1937, pp. 4 and 7-8; 
April 1, 1937, pp. 8-9; May 15, 1937, p. 13; April 15, 1937, 
p. 9.
^Arnold's entry for June 16, 1937. Arnold Papers, 
Official File 1932-1946, Box 55, Daily Record of Events 
1932-1939.
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Arnold's less-than-vigorous support for more B -17s to 
personal ambitions. When Arnold refused to speak up for 
more Flying Fortresses, Knerr thought that Arnold remained 
silent because he "didn't want to get in the wrong" with the 
General Staff. However, Arnold was only adhering to what he 
had told Reed Landis: "When things are rolling along toward 
your goal, a little encouragement does more good than 
criticism and a fight." Also, Hap Arnold hesitated to put 
too much faith in one type of airplane. In 1923, Billy 
Mitchell had purchased an experimental, long-range bomber 
named the Barling. Since the Barling had cost the Army Air 
Service $500,000 dollars, an astounding figure at the time, 
it had aroused public interest. But it proved to be a 
dismal failure and was placed in storage at the air depot at 
Fairfield, Ohio. The Barling sat as a reminder of M i t c h ­
ell's failure. Arnold, stationed at the air depot five 
years later, found the old Barling in a dilapidated condi­
tion, but the Army refused to destroy the worthless plane. 
The great expense of the plane had made it a matter of 
continued interest in Congress. So, every time a request 
for permission to destroy the plane had been sent to 
Washington, the answer was no. To get around that problem, 
Arnold requested permission to dispose of an experimental 
plane, without mentioning the Barling by name. As soon as 
he received approval, Arnold had the plane burned. Like the 
Barling, the Flying Fortress was expensive, which drew the 
attention of critical Congressmen and generals. Arnold
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worried that the B-17s might use up too much of the Air 
Corps' meager funds. As he later recalled, Arnold feared 
that entrusting the future of the Army Air Corps to the B-17 
might put "too many eggs in one basket."9
Arnold was looking beyond the B-17. Like everybody in 
the A r m y  Air Corps, he knew that Boeing was about to 
complete the XB-15. Back in 1935, Arnold had expressed his 
enthusiasm about the plane. Then on April 17, 1937, the New 
York Times carried a front-page story on the new plane based 
on information released by Army Air Corps officers in Wash­
ington, D.C. Refusing to give any specific details about 
the plane, the officers said that the new plane would 
"startle the world" with its capabilities. Two weeks later, 
the Air Corps News Letter repeated verbatim parts of the 
Times story, and both articles referred to the new bomber as 
the "natural successor" to the "compromise type" B-17. 
Moreover, the News Letter called the plane "an indication of 
the constant desire of the Army Air Corps to explore every 
potentiality of the airplane in National Defense." Arnold 
had influenced the author of the News Letter article, as 
shown by the author's description of the provision for a
^Arnold, pp. 110, 128-129; Coffey, pp. 175-176; Arnold 
to Reed Landis, April 24, 1937, Arnold Papers, General 
Correspondence, Box 16, File 261. After their flight to 
Alaska, Knerr mistakenly believed that Arnold had tried to 
take all the credit for himself, and for years afterward, 
Knerr believed that Arnold was motivated by self interest. 
Not until many years latter did Knerr discover his error. 
For further information, see Murry Green, "Major General 
Hugh J. Knerr, Hard Campaigner for Air Power," Air Force 
Magazine, October 1978, pp. 90-92.
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five-lens aerial camera on the XB-15. The author noted that 
the potential for aerial photography had been demonstrated 
by the Army flight to Alaska in 1934. He neglected to 
mention that Arnold had led that flight, but then, few Army 
airmen would have forgotten. Since the projected range of 
the XB-15 was 5000 miles, Arnold did not want the Army Air 
Corps saddled with a lot of B-17s if the new bomber proved 
better.10
Andrews, on the other hand, did not have the luxury of 
time. It could have been several years before the XB-15 
reached production, and as the commander of tactical units, 
General Andrews needed the best, c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  
planes. Believing that an aggressive publicity campaign 
would overcome resistance to i n creased C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
appropriations, on March 9, he proposed sending three of his 
new B-17s on an around-the-world flight. Brigadier General 
W. Kruger, Assistant Chief of Staff WPD, rejected the flight 
because it would not be a pioneering flight. Also, Kruger 
preferred special long-distance flights within the Western 
Hemisphere or to and from American overseas possessions.11
Andrews soon discovered that the GHQ Air Force had a
^ S p a a t z  to Arnold, February 5, 1935, H.M. McClelland 
to Spaatz, March 6, 1935, Spaatz Papers, Diaries, Box 7, 
January 2-August 27, 1935; New York Times, April 17, 1937; 
"Purchase of New Experimental Boeing Bombardment Plane," Air 
Corps News Letter, May 1, 1937, pp. 5-6.
^Memorandum from Andrews to Adjutant General, May 1, 
1937, HG 165, WPD, 3774-11; Memorandum from B r i g a d i e r  
General George P. Tyner to Assistant Chief of Staff WPD, May 
13, 1937, and Memorandum from Brigadier General W. Kruger to 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, June 8, 1937, RG 165, WPD, 4002.
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more important task than an around-the-world flight. On May 
17, Roosevelt's Naval Aid requested a report on bombing 
exercises from the Secretary of the Navy. The service given 
control over costal defenses had to be able to hit its 
targets. Upon learning about the request, Andrews began 
searching for a radio controlled boat to give his men 
practice in hitting a moving target. When he failed to 
locate one, Andrews desperately looked for anything, even a 
radio controlled automobile for use on Muroc Lake. In the 
end, his men had to practice on outlines of capital ships 
drawn on the desert, but the Chief of the Air Corps Materiel 
Division told him about a new bomb sight being used by the 
Navy. General Andrews looked at the Norden bomb sight and 
d e c i d e d  that he wanted it for his planes. "We cannot 
afford," he told Westover, "to have our bombing records 
unfavorably compared with those of the Navy."12
Made suspicious of the airmen by the Wilcox bill, Chief 
of Staff Craig refused to let the adherents of Billy 
Mitchell turn Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise
12Reference to memorandum from the President's Naval 
Aid to Secretary of the Navy on May 17, 1937, in a joint 
memorandum from Secretary of War Woodring and Secretary of 
the Navy Swanson, October 19, 1937, RG 18, Army Air Forces, 
Box 26, 354.2 Maneuvers (Joint Army and Navy); Andrews to 
Brigadier General A.W. Robins, June 1 and 22, 1937, Robins 
to Andrews, July 10, 1937, and Andrews to Robins, July 13, 
1937, Andrews Papers, General C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  Box 6, 
Personal Correspondence, File "R" 1937-1939; Curtis E. LeMay 
with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with Lemay: My Story (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 142-143; Andrews to 
Westover, July 30, 1937, Andrews Papers, General Correspond­
ence, Box 7, Personal C o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  Oscar W e s t o v e r  
1935-1938.
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No. 4, as the tests were designated, into another Ostfries- 
land show. Craig personally ordered Andrews to avoid 
publicity about the bombing tests. Explaining that "the 
President stated the exercise was for the information of 
himself and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 
Navy only," Craig instructed Andrews to say only that it 
would be a routine training exercise in conjunction with the 
Navy.
Starting at noon on August 13 and ending at noon the 
following day, Joint Air Exercise No. 4 simulated an attack 
on the West Coast by a "Black" aggressor force of two 
battleships, one aircraft carrier and nine destroyers. 
Three squadrons of B-lOs, with nine to twelve planes per 
squadron, and eight YB-17s gathered in California to defend 
the coast. The exercise took on an unrealistic atmosphere 
from the start because the entire Black force was represent­
ed by one ship, the overaged battleship Utah. Efforts at 
Army-Navy cooperation soon fell apart. The Navy provided 
the practice bombs, which were a type unfamiliar to the Army 
fliers, and Navy spotters gave the Army incorrect informa­
tion about the location of the U t a h . The GHQ Air Force 
fliers countered by unexpectedly using civilian airfields 
and taking off before the Navy expected.
Despite the Navy's efforts to mislead them, the Army 
fliers found the Utah in heavy fog on the second day. Only 
the YB-17s reached the ship in time, but the fliers success­
fully "bombed" it. The Navy observers complained afterward
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that the bad weather had prevented sailors on the Utah from 
seeing the YB-17s in time to take evasive action. So, the 
Army fliers offered to attack the ship in clear weather. On 
the third day of the exercise, the fliers attacked the Utah 
with all their bombers. They systematically bombed the 
battleship from different altitudes ranging from eight to 
eighteen thousand feet. The Army fliers registered hits 
with 11.9 percent of their bombs, a higher percentage than 
the Navy had made in tests made from a lower altitude. The 
results of the test pleased the Army fliers and the rest of 
the Army. After reading the final report on Joint Air 
Exercise No. 4, General Craig expressed "high satisfaction 
and gratification" about "the efficiency and dependability 
of the G.H.Q. Air Force." Winning the approval of the Chief 
of Staff was very important to the future of the GHQ Air 
Force, but the approval of the President was critical.1^
Unfortunately, the sense of jubilation felt by Craig 
was never expressed to the President. In their joint 
report, Secretaries Woodring and Swanson left out a number 
of important facts. Neglecting to mention that the Navy had 
reported the wrong location, they said that the Army fliers 
had failed to find their target on the first day. The 
report also down played the what happened when the fliers 
found the Utah by stating that they scored only three hits
^ c r a i g  to Andrews, August 4, 1937, Andrews to Craig, 
August 6, 1937, and Memorandum from Craig to Andrews, August 
27, 1937, Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 2, 
Personal Correspondence, Craig File; LeMay, Mission with 
LeMay, pp. 142-152.
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out of ninety-eight bombs dropped. Even a near miss would 
have damaged a battleship in combat, but the Secretaries 
made no mention of how close the other ninety-five bombs had 
come. Clear weather on the third day of the exercise had 
allowed photographs to be taken of the bombs crashing all 
around the ship, and those photographs were included with 
the report. Still, the Secretaries waffled, claiming that 
the "artificialities" involved in peacetime exercises meant 
that "definite conclusions as to the potentialities of Army 
and Navy forces to attack and/or defend in this sort can not 
be drawn." They only admitted that the Army fliers could 
hit the target "under unfavorable visibility conditions."14
Secretaries Woodring and Swanson made no comment about 
the ability of the GHQ Air Force to navigate in bad weath­
er. Since their report stated that the Navy found and 
tracked the Utah, the GHQ Air Force had little to show for 
its efforts. The service responsible for aerial defense of 
the United States had to demonstrate its ability to seek out 
an attacking force in any weather. Otherwise, an enemy 
could simply wait for bad weather and approach the coast un­
detected and unscathed by the defending planes. Unaware of 
the "mistakes" made by the Navy in reporting the location of 
the Utah, all Roosevelt could have inferred from this report 
was that Navy planes had shown the Army the way to their 
target as in the Mount Shasta exercise years earlier.
14Joint m e m o r a n d u m  from W o o d r i n g  and Swanson to 
Roosevelt, October 19, 1937, RG 18, A A F , Box 26, 354.2
Maneuvers (Joint Army and Navy).
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Although the photographs clearly demonstrated that the Army 
bombers could hit a moving target, Andrews and his men had a 
long way to go to win the unqualified support of the Presi­
dent .
Sometimes, Arnold had trouble remembering to put aside 
his personal emotions for the good of the Army Air Corps,
and Andrews had to remind him of their ultimate goal. Such
an occasion arose after the Cleveland National Air Races of
1937. The Air Corps personnel participating in the air race 
felt that the sponsors had provided inadequate housing and 
other facilities. To make matters worse, some of the local 
papers reported that the Army fliers had t h r e a t e n e d  a 
"fly-away-strike" until they each received ten dollars. 
Incensed and feeling that the Army fliers were being taken
for granted, Arnold suggested that the Army Air Corps never
send planes to the Cleveland races again. "Everyone who 
attends these races," he complained to Andrews, "cannot help 
but see that if the Army and Navy p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w ere 
eliminated there would be little attraction for the crowd." 
Andrews calmed Arnold by explaining that the president of 
the Cleveland Air Race Association and the editor of the 
Cleveland News had apologized. Andrews had been upset also, 
until he spoke to fliers who had been at Cleveland. They 
reported that 160,000 people had attended the last day of 
the races, and the cars in the airport parking lot had 
license tags from every state in the Union. Furthermore, 
most of the spectators had come to see the exhibitions by
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the two services. "I am inclined to think that we don't do 
enough advertising with the taxpayer," Andrews reasoned, "so 
I don't think that we should pass up this opportunity to 
sell o u r s e l v e s  to a pretty good cross section of the 
country." Andrews' cooler head prevailed, and Arnold forgot 
his suggestion. But the Army Air Corps was a small organi­
zation, and word of the poor treatment received at the 
Cleveland Air Races would have spread quickly. To counter 
any bad feelings among Army Air Corps personnel, Ira Eaker 
wrote an article for the Air Corps News Letter about the 
problems encountered in Cleveland. Announcing that the 
sponsors of the air race had apologized, Eaker informed the 
Army Air Corps that the matter was closed.15
Andrews' readiness to accept the apologies made sense. 
The free publicity afforded by the air races outweighed the 
poor treatment, and denied the opportunity to publicize the 
Joint Air Exercises, he refused to throw away an annual 
opportunity to impress so many people. Arnold's willingness 
to forget the matter demonstrated his ability to put aside 
personal feelings for the good of the Army Air Corps. 
However, Andrews and Arnold's discussion of the problem 
indicated a important point. The General Staff's efforts to 
maintain control over the Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force by 
physically splitting them had failed. Officers of the Air
15Arnold to Andrews, September 8, 1937, Andrews to 
Arnold, September 13, 1937, Andrews Papers, General Corre­
spondence, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "A" 1935-1937; 
Air Corps News Letter, September 15, 1937, pp. 1-2.
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Corps and the GHQ Air Force maintained contact with each 
other. As a result, they were able to meet challenges to 
the Army Air Corps and air power with coordinated efforts. 
One of their greatest challenges came from the reactions to 
the wars in Spain and China. Since the World War, fliers 
had argued that aviation would be the decisive factor in any 
future war, but their contention had not been proved in 
Ethiopia, Spain or China. The poor results achieved by 
aviation in those wars gave the War Department evidence that 
air power was not the decisive factor claimed by the fliers, 
threatening future appropriations for the Army Air Corps.1® 
In response, the officers in the Air Corps and the GHQ Air 
Force discussed the situation and worked together to remedy 
the problem.
In mid-September 1937, General Arnold asked Colonel 
Hugh Knerr for his recommendations on how to counter the 
adverse publicity coming out of Spain and China. Putting 
aside his personal hatred for Arnold, Knerr asserted his 
absolute confidence in both the ability of air power to
1®Captain Wendell G. Johnson expressed this view in the 
Infantry Journal. In the Spanish Civil War, aviation had 
"only contributed to successes, as one of the combined 
arms." "Men, Mot Machines, Win Wars," XLV Infantry Journal 
(January-February 1938): 59. In a review of books and 
articles by European military writers, Johnson quoted Dr. 
Helmut Klotz as saying "The Spanish civil war has conclu­
sively shown that the final decision of the war takes place 
on the ground and not in the s k y ....Aviation, and even 
bombing aviation must be associated (with infantry) as an 
auxiliary and subordinate arm. An arm, important, irre­
placeable, extremely efficacious, but nevertheless, an 
auxiliary arm and nothing more." "The Spanish War: A Review 
of the Best Foreign Opinion," XLV Infantry Journal (July- 
August 1938): 353.
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dominate the battlefield and the technological superiority 
of the United States over the rest of the world. He 
recommended convincing the War Department that the failures 
experienced overseas resulted from a lack of bomb sights, 
and he suggested that Arnold should mention "this fact" in 
any public statements. Knerr offered the same recommenda­
tions to Andrews to forestall the agitation against air 
power "before it gains any more headway.m17
General Westover addressed the problem of Ethiopia, 
Spain and China in a different manner. Speaking to a 
Reserve Officers convention, he stated that military teams 
in all three wars had proved successful, but he emphasized 
"that there have been no modern Air Force o p e r a t i o n s  
attempted in either of these three theaters." By "Air Force 
operations," the Chief of the Air Corps meant large units of 
bombers "employed far beyond the influence of ground arms 
against strategic centers such as great cities, important 
commercial arteries, manufacturing centers and fleets of 
surface craft." He asked the audience to prevent the 
drawing of false conclusions about air power, but he warned 
them against criticizing the War Department. Pointing to 
orders for over one thousand new planes as proof, Westover 
said that Secretary of War Woodring and Assistant Secretary 
Louis Johnson had "the interest of military aviation close
^Memorandum from Knerr to Andrews, September 20, 1937, 
Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 5, Personal 
Correspondence, "K" 1929-1941.
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at heart."18
Arnold, addressing an audience composed of officers 
from all branches of the Army, argued that the war in Spain 
offered no real lessons about air power. The heterogeneous 
foreign legionary pilots flying in Spain did not make up a 
true air force, and the other nations involved in Spain were 
only testing tactics and weapons. In the Far East, the 
Chinese lacked the long-range bombers, like the Flying 
Fortress or the Russian four-engine bombers, needed to carry 
the war to Japan's industrial centers. Ineffective Chinese 
air operations proved nothing because all Chinese military 
operations were ineffective. If the Chinese had possessed 
an air force as well trained as the GHQ Air Force, the 
Japanese probably would not have attempted to land troops. 
The Japanese air force offered a stark contrast to the 
Chinese. While they unwisely terrorized civilians with 
their long-range bombers, the Japanese also attacked "proper 
air force objectives": shipping, aviation factories and 
airfields. "It is important," said Arnold prophetically, 
"and it must never be forgotten. There is a first rate air 
power which knows how to use its air strength." Ground 
officers, citing the overseas conflicts as evidence, had 
told Arnold that airplanes were only useful for bombing area 
targets. Because the Army Air Corps had adopted a doctrine
18Speech by Westover to the Reserve Officers convention 
at Oakland, California, titled "An Adequate Air Arm for the 
Nation's Defense," in Air Corps News Letter, October 15, 
1937, pp. 7-10.
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of precision bombing, Arnold had to rebut those claims. 
Following Colonel Knerr's advice, Arnold demonstrated with a 
slide presentation that American bomber crews could hit 
targets accurately.19
The efforts of Westover and Arnold to dispel doubts 
about the importance of air power went for naught. The War 
Department put more credence in reports coming from overseas 
than the arguments of the Army Air Corps. In his annual 
report for 1937, General Craig said that events in Spain and 
the Far East had proved that infantrymen still achieved the 
decisive results in warfare. Referring to airplanes and 
tanks, Craig reported that the "new arms can aid him; they 
cannot replace him." More important, Secretary of War 
Woodring stated in his annual report that, once the Army Air 
Corps reached its authorized level of 2320 airplanes, only 
500 replacements would be purchased each year. His an­
nouncement exacerbated the split within the Army Air Corps 
over the long-range bombers. Westover and Arnold wanted to 
work within the system to form a balanced program of air 
power, but the other side, represented by Andrews and Knerr, 
wanted to commit the Army Air Corps to a long-range bomber 
program. This small number of 500 planes a year left little 
room for compromise between the two factions, and the New
19Johnson quoted Dr. Klotz as saying that "because 
modern planes go so fast, bombing small objectives, such as 
bridges and cross-roads, is largely a matter of chance," in 
"The Spainish War," p. 352. Speech titled "The Air Corps" 
by Arnold, October 7, 1937, Foulois Papers, Subject File, 
Box 37, General Reports and Papers, 4-B.
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York Times reported that the two "schools" differed widely 
on the question.
The differences between Andrews and Westover were more 
apparent than real. Reviewing the GHQ Air Force's activi­
ties in 1937 for the Air Corps News Letter, both Andrews and 
Westover praised the capabilities of long-range bombers in 
separate articles. But neither mentioned the twin-engine 
B-18s that would soon make up the bulk of the Army Air 
Corps' bombers. Westover gave further evidence of his 
agreement with Andrews in a speech to the first National 
Aviation Planning Conference meeting at Cleveland, Ohio, on 
January 11, 1938. After calling for a balanced program of 
aircraft purchases, Westover demanded that a large "propor­
tion of these must be the best Bombing planes obtainable," 
and he named the Flying Fortress as the best bomber avail­
able. Where Andrews and Westover differed was over the 
method of obtaining more Flying Fortresses. Westover wanted 
to work within the War Department, but Andrews was impa­
tient. Willing to do whatever it took to get his planes, 
Andrews went outside the regular military channels and made 
an indirect appeal to President Roosevelt.21
2QNew York T i m e s , December 6, 1937; Charles McLean, 
"Big Planes in Air Corps," New York Times, December 5,
1937, Section 13, p. 9.
2lAndrews, "The General Headquarters Air Force: A 
Review of 1937 and New Year's Message," and Westover, "Army 
Air Corps Accomplishments for 1937 and Plans for 1938," Air 
Corp News Letter, January 1, 1938, pp. 3-4 and 12-13; Speech 
by Westover to the National Aviation Planning Conference, 
January 11, 1938, the Air Corps News Letter, January 15,
1938, pp. 3-5.
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On November 2, 1937/ the GHQ Air Force and the Navy 
held a minor, joint exercise off the Virginia Capes. As 
with the Utah exercise, four YB-17s attacked Navy target 
v e s s e l s  with great success. To insure that Roosevelt 
learned of these results, Andrews bypassed the War Depart­
ment and sent a memorandum to Colonel Edwin "Pa" M. Watson, 
President Roosevelt's military advisor. Somehow, Andrews 
o b t a i n e d  copies of confidential Navy memorandums that 
detailed the accuracy with which the YB-17s had bombed the 
target vessels. Passing them on to Watson, Andrews comment­
ed that the exercise was "a further illustration of the 
tremendous power of the GHQ Air Force in national de­
fense. "22 while there is no guarantee that Watson passed 
Andrews' memorandum on to the President, it is h i g h l y  
likely. Roosevelt had expressed interest in every other 
Navy maneuver, so it is probable that Watson told him about 
the memorandum.
A d m i r a l  Harry E. Yarnell, commander of the United 
States Asiatic Fleet, definitely infl u e n c e d  P r e s i d e n t  
Roosevelt's strategy for the Far East. Two weeks before the 
Virginia Capes exercises, Admiral Yarnell sent Chief of 
Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy a letter that had 
a great impact on future American responses to Japanese 
e x p a n s i o n  in the Far East. After reading the letter, 
Admiral Leahy presented a copy to President Roosevelt with
22Memorandum from Andrews to Colonel Edwin M. Watson, 
January 4, 1938, RG 18, AAF, Box 27, 354.2, Joint Army and 
Navy Exercises (General), Folder No. 2.
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the comment that both "the Navy and the Army are already 
th i n k i n g  along some of the lines indicated by Admiral 
Yarnell."
Yarnell believed that the United States might be forced 
into a general war with Great Britain and France against 
Germany, Italy and Japan. While Britain and France held 
Germany and Italy in Europe, the United States would play a 
predominant role in the Pacific, with the tacit support of 
Russia and Holland. To avoid another economic dislocation 
like the one following the World War, the United States had 
to fight an economic war against Japan. Because the United 
States and her allies controlled ninety percent of the 
world's iron, coal and oil reserves, and a major portion of 
the other raw war materials, the United States could wage an 
economic war with a "reasonably early" victory. "Such an 
economic, and therefore economical war, must be one of 
strangulation, in short, an almost purely naval war in the 
Pacific as far as we are concerned," wrote Yarnell. With 
the British and French fleets controlling the Atlantic, the 
United States Navy could concentrate its forces in the 
Pacific. Together with the Dutch East Indian forces and the 
Russian submarine and air forces at Vladivostok, the United 
States Navy would outnumber the Japanese Navy. Japanese 
communications could be cut by forces operating from Dutch 
Harbor, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Java, and Singapore. 
Envisioning an inexpensive war, Yarnell said that the only 
reason for sending the Battle Fleet west of the Hawaiian
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Islands would be to recapture Manila or Guam. He saw no 
reason for sending American troops to stop Japanese expan­
sion. He preferred sending American officers and equipment 
to China and letting the Chinese be cannon fodder. To fight 
his "naval war of strangulation," the Navy needed to build 
vessels for destroying enemy commerce and retaining command 
of the air along the line of bases. "Naval air force, 
submarines and light forces with cruising endurance and dual 
purpose batteries," he suggested, "should be concentrated 
upon at the expense of increasing the battle- 
line." In addition, anti-aircraft equipment would be 
"vital."
Yarnell worried about how the American people would 
react to his economic war. Naval wars of strangulation had 
few spectacular naval battles and took time. The people 
might become frustrated and lose interest. But by showing 
that the conflict was waged economically and with few 
American casualties, the American people could be dissuaded 
from sending a large expeditionary force to achieve a quick 
victory. To prepare for this type of war, the State, War 
and Navy Departments had to work together. The State 
Department needed to insure that the United States would not 
be left "to fight such a war alone." The War Department had 
to give up its plans for mobilizing millions of men and 
build a small force capable of being deployed rapidly. And 
the Navy Department had to provide the "necessary means and 
training" to carry out such a war, "keeping clearly in mind
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the part that aviation and submarines will play in future 
naval operations."
Yarnell's ideas about military strategy for the Far 
East matched the President's ideas about projecting American 
air power into the Pacific. Writing to Admiral Leahy on 
November 10, Roosevelt said that Yarnell "talks a lot of 
sense" and was expressing the same views he had held since 
the early 1920s. Moreover, R o o s e v e l t  e x p l a i n e d  that 
Y a r n e l l 's suggestions went "along with that word 'quaran­
tine' which I used in the Chicago speech last month." On 
October 5, 1937, Roosevelt had said that peace loving people 
had to make an concerted effort to "quarantine" those 
"creating a state of international anarchy and instabili­
ty." Afterward, Cardinal Mundelein claimed that Roosevelt 
did not have a military or naval plan or a plan to impose 
sanctions, but rather a policy of severing ordinary communi­
cations with an aggressor nation. When asked to explain the 
meaning of his speech, Roosevelt told reporters that he had 
no specific plan but was looking for one. In Yarnell's 
letter, FDR found the program he was seeking. It was a 
program similar to his earlier plan for blockading Germany. 
The President knew a blockade would work as he showed by 
reminding Admiral Leahy of "an example of successful strang- 
ulation--when the United States, without declaring war, 
strangled Tripoli." Roosevelt remembered his blockade or 
"quarantine" when faced by German aggression in 1938 and 
Japanese aggression in 1941. Furthermore, Roosevelt was in
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earnest during the 1940 presidential campaign when he told 
audiences that their sons would not be sent into foreign 
wars.
By the end of 1937, President Roosevelt wanted to find 
a way by which large areas in the Pacific could be p a ­
trolled. Taking notice of Yarnell's emphasis upon air­
planes, Roosevelt asked Leahy if anything had been done 
about preparing merchant ships for remaining stationary at 
sea for a long period of time with eight or ten scouting 
planes. In addition, Roosevelt wanted to know whether the 
merchant ships could be armed for warding off small air 
attacks and sinking lightly armed merchant ships. He had 
something in mind similar to the German trans-Atlantic 
flying boat service. Their Dornier flying boats lacked the 
range to fly the Atlantic non-stop. So, the G e r m a n s  
stationed supply ships at fixed points in the Atlantic, 
where the Dornier flying boats would land for refueling. 
This method enabled the Germans to fly across large tracts 
of water with short-range airplanes. During the following 
year. General Andrews' men demonstrated that the B-17 had 
the potential to patrol large a r e a s . 23
The influence of Yarnell's letter on Roosevelt was
23Admiral Harry E. Yarnell to Admiral William D. Leahy, 
October 15, 1937, Memorandum from Leahy to R o o s e v e l t ,  
November 8, 1937, and Memorandum from Roosevelt to Leahy, 
N o v e m b e r  10, 1937, in Donald B. Schewe, e d . , Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs 10 vols. (New York and 
London: Garland, 1979), vol. 3, August 1937-November 1937; 
For a discussion of responses and interpretations of the 
President's Quarantine Address, see Dallek, pp. 148-151.
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demonstrated after Japanese planes sank the American gunboat 
Panay on December 12, 1937. FDR sent the Japanese a strong 
protest. To insure that the Japanese paid full compensa­
tion, he instructed Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to 
look into seizing all Japanese assets in the United States. 
Roosevelt also considered taking military action against 
Japan. On the sixteenth, he told the British Ambassador, 
Sir Ronald Lindsay, that he wanted the United States Navy 
and the Royal Navy to begin a "systematic exchange of secret 
information" and to draw up plans for a joint blockade of 
Japan after the "next grave outrage."
At a Cabinet meeting the next day, Secretary of the 
Navy Swanson called for firm action toward Japan. Swanson 
urged a declaration of war against Japan, or at least 
sending the Fleet to Hawaii. Less bellicose, Roosevelt told 
the Cabinet that he had the power to place an embargo upon 
Japan. Demonstrating the influence of Yarnell, the Presi­
dent explained that the United States and Great Britain 
could blockade Japan along a line from the Aleutians to 
Singapore and force Japan to capitulate within a year. 
Mentioning staff talks between the United States Navy and 
the Royal Navy, he announced plans to offer Congress a naval 
budget larger than originally thought necessary. Reminding 
the Cabinet how Japan and Italy fought undeclared wars to 
achieve their goals, Roosevelt suggested doing the same 
thing by using economic sanctions without declaring war. 
"We don't call them economic sanctions," he said, "but call
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them quarantines. We want to develop a technique which will 
not lead to war. We want to be as smart as Japan and 
Italy. We want to do it in a modern way." FDR saw a naval 
blockade as the modern way to stop Japanese aggression while 
avoiding a declaration of war. After the Cabinet meeting, 
Roosevelt backed away from his aggressive posture, and he 
decided not to impose sanctions. He also chose to send a 
naval officer to London for technical discussions only. 
After the Japanese apologized, offered to pay for all 
damages, and promised to protect the rights and interests of 
Americans in China, the Panay incident ended peacefully.24
A naval b l o c k a d e  of Japan would have resulted in 
shooting on the high seas. When Roosevelt reminded Leahy 
that "the United States, without declaring war, strangled 
Tripoli," he knew that the United States Navy and Marines 
had fought the Tripolitan pirates. But if he had to fight, 
the President preferred a cheap naval blockade. When he 
said that Japan would collapse after a year of blockade, 
Roosevelt showed his belief that Japan's economy was fragile 
and dependant upon its sea communications, as Billy Mitchell 
had claimed. Acting on that belief, Roosevelt proceeded 
with his plans to expand the Navy. At a press conference on 
December 28, Roosevelt announced that he would ask Congress 
for additional ships. Asked if additional funds would be 
asked for the Army, Army Air Corps or Naval Air Service,
24Dallek, pp. 153-155; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret 
D i a r y  of Harold L. Ickes; vol. 2; The Inside Struggle,
1936-1939 (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1954) pp. 274-275.
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Roosevelt said no. Given no specifics, the nation waited 
t h roughout the month of January to see what armaments 
Roosevelt would seek. In the meantime, the press learned of 
Roosevelt's plans to blockade Japan and to send a naval 
officer to London. Captain R.E. Ingersoll, Chief of the War 
Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Intelli­
gence, went to London for ten days, and reporters asked 
Chief of Naval Operations Leahy and the State Department 
about the purpose for Ingersoll's trip. Leahy claimed that 
Ingersoll was ascertaining how the British figured tonnages 
in building their new ships, and State Department officials 
denied the rumors of Anglo-American naval cooperation in the 
Far East. "We are not that crazy," they said. Secretary of 
War Woodring, upon learning of the larger naval budget, 
tried to get increased fund for the Arniy, but Roosevelt 
refused to spend much on the Army. In his national defense 
message, Roosevelt requested a large sum for the Navy, but 
little for the Army.25
The President's defense program caused consternation 
among the advocates of air power. Representative Wilcox 
publicly announced his full support for the President's 
program. But privately, he told Colonel Knerr that, if 
Hoover had advocated such a program, he would have "run out 
of names to call him." Wilcox suggested to Knerr that a 
public exposition of how the War Department had neglected 
the Army Air Corps would get wide support in Congress.
25wew York Times, December 29, 1937, and January 28, 1938.
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Impressed by what Wilcox had told him, Knerr sent notes of 
their conversation to Andrews. Quoting Wilcox, Knerr said 
that opposition to a big Navy program only needed "some 
nucleus" and a "convincing argument in favor of Air Forces" 
to insure the growth of a more reasonable Navy program. 
"However," Knerr continued, "somebody will get hurt if 
handled by the Air Corps, because it will make the President 
mad." Knowing what had happened to Billy Mitchell, Knerr 
did not want Andrews to be the one to get hurt.2®
The national defense budget of f e r e d  by P r e s i d e n t  
Roosevelt frustrated the supporters of air power. Another 
year had passed, and nothing had seemed to change. Funding 
for the Army Air Corps remained small, and it seemed that 
the Navy got everything. Their growing frustration mani­
fested itself in new movements to separate the Army Air 
Corps from the Army. As Wilcox's conversation with Colonel 
Knerr demonstrated, a number of the supporters of air power 
were ready to return to the methods employed by B illy 
Mitchell. However, they were not aware that President 
Roosevelt had found a program whereby he could stop Japanese 
aggression: the joint air-sea blockade proposed by Yarnell. 
It remained for the commanders of the Army Air Corps to 
prove that their men and planes possessed the capability to 
carry out the aerial half of the blockade. General Frank 
Andrews grew frustrated at the War Department's refusal to
26Knerr to Andrews, undated but probably from early 
February 1938, Andrews Papers, Official Papers, Box 9, 
Organization and Operation of G.H.Q. Air Force, 1938.
purchase more B-17s, but he never lost sight of what he had 
to do. Throughout 1938, he, Westover and Arnold continued 
their efforts to win the support of their superiors.
CHAPTER VI
THE WINGS OF DEMOCRACY
The GHQ Air Force had proved that it could quickly 
reinforce either coast in an emergency. The range of the 
Boeing B-17 gave it the capacity to quickly reach points in 
Latin America or reinforce Hawaii. However, the first 
service performed by the Flying Fortress for the Roosevelt 
Administration was in countering German and Italian politi­
cal and economic threats in Latin America. While meeting 
these menaces, the GHQ Air Force proved that it could meet 
distant military threats.
The Panay bombing plagued President Roosevelt even 
after the crisis had passed. From the Ambassador to Costa 
Rica, William H. Hornibrook, Roosevelt received a disturbing 
report about reactions to the bombing. Latin Americans 
appeared unable to understand the patience of the Americans 
and B r i t i s h  to Japanese aggression. For that reason, 
Hornibrook applauded the President's firm demand for an 
apology and compensation from the Japanese. Hornibrook 
feared that the perception of a weak United States would 
allow German and Italian propaganda to "obtain political, 
cultural and economic domination in this section of the 
world." Hornibrook had reason to be worried. By 1938, the
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Italians were spreading their propaganda throughout Latin 
America with free news service to newspapers, daily radio 
broadcasts from Rome, and frequent visits of prominent 
Italians. To win the popular support of the South Ameri­
cans, a squadron of Italian aerobatic fliers attended the 
Pan-American Aviation Conference at Lima, Peru, in 1937. 
After the conference, the fliers toured Chile, Argentina and 
Brazil. Everywhere, they won the favor of the crowds. Few 
South Americans knew of the conference, but most heard about 
the Italian fliers. Impressed by the Italian fliers, the 
Peruvian Army hired Italian pilots to train its fliers on 
Italian-made planes.1
I t alian aerial successes in South America created 
consternation in the United States. When Bruno Mussolini 
led a flight of three Italian bombers from Rome to Rio de 
Janeiro across Africa and the Atlantic in late January, 
Americans responded. Probably acting at the suggestion of 
General Andrews, William A. Wieland of the Associated Press' 
Latin American Section spoke with Assistant Secretary of War 
Louis Johnson on January 24. To foster good will in Latin 
A m e r i c a  and counteract Italian and German propaganda, 
Wieland proposed dispatching a flight of Army bombers to 
Buenos Aires for the inauguration of President Roberto 
M. Ortiz. Besides offsetting Mussolini's flight, the flight
^•■William H. Hornibrook to Roosevelt, January 4, 1938, 
in Schewe, FDR and F oreign A f f a i r s , vol. 4, December
1 9 3 7 - F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 8 ; John W. White, "Italy Sways South 
America," New York Times, January 30, 1938, 8, p. 5.
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would increase the sales of American aircraft in Latin 
America by displaying the high quality of American military 
aircraft. Furthermore, it would demonstrate that the United 
States had the means to back up the Monroe Doctrine. 
Assistant Secretary Johnson asked Weiland to put his ideas 
into a letter. With a contrived statement that it had too 
many ramifications for him to understand, Johnson sent 
Weiland's letter to Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the 
President.2
Johnson's contrived statement resulted from his sharp 
disagreement with Secretary Woodring over the role of 
aviation in the military. Woodring saw long-range bombers 
as "aggressive" weapons and believed they had no place in 
the Army Air Corps. Woodring wanted to purchase fighters 
and light bombers for ground support and coastal defense. 
Furthermore, he opposed the purchase of a few B-17s when 
more twin engine planes could be bought with the same 
money. Arnold later said that "the superiority of one B-17 
to two B-10's...was a mystery to Secretary Woodring and his 
people." Johnson, on the other hand, strongly advocated the 
purchase of more B-17s, and he openly criticized Woodring's 
refusal to p rocure more heavy bombers. Knowing that 
Woodring would reject the proposal, Johnson went over his
2LeMay,p. 153; William A. Wieland to Louis Johnson, 
January 25, 1938, and Memorandum from Johnson to Stephen 
T. Early, January 25, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 4.
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head when he sent the letter to Early.3
Early discussed the idea with Roosevelt and Marvin 
H. McIntyre, Secretary to the President. Both Early and 
McIntyre approved of the proposal. On February 4, McIntyre 
informed Roosevelt that Sumner Welles had requested three of 
the new Army bombers to be sent to the inauguration. The 
Argentine government had expressed a keen interest in the 
idea, and the State Department believed it would offset 
Italian propaganda in Argentina. Complaining about Wood­
ring 's opposition to it, Welles wanted Roosevelt to order 
the flight. Roosevelt consented, and the next day Chief of 
Staff Craig told Andrews to make prepartions. But he 
ordered Andrews to keep all plans and preparations secret 
with "no publicity whatever." Denied the opportunity to 
release any information beforehand, Colonel W.H. Franks, 
chief of staff of the GHQ Air Force, knew that the press 
would give considerable coverage to the flight. He told the 
GHQ Air Force personnel involved to stress "the accomplish­
ments of a typical unit of the GHQ Air Force...rather than 
the accomplishments of individuals...." Franks wanted to 
the American people believe that any unit of the GHQ Air 
Force could make the flight, if it had the equipment.4
3K eith McFarland, Harry H. Woodring; A Political 
Biography of FDR's Controversial Secretary of War (Law- 
rence/Manhattan/Wichita, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 
1975), pp. 160-163; Arnold, p. 167.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Marvin H. McIntyre to Roosevelt, 
February 4, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 4; Memorandum from Craig 
to Andrews, February 5, 1938, and Memorandum from Colonel 
W.H. Franks to the Commanding General, Second Wing, GHQ Air
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The State Department announced the flight on February 
9, calling it a gesture of good will. Six days later, six 
YB-17s under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Olds 
flew from Langley Field to Miami. From there, the Army 
fliers made a non-stop, 2844 mile flight to Lima, Peru, in 
fourteen hours and thirty-five minutes. The following day, 
they crossed over the high Andes to Santiago and on to 
Buenos Aires. After participating in the inauguration, the 
Army fliers returned to the United States. On the last leg 
of the journey, they flew non-stop from Albrook Field, 
Panama, to Langley Field.5
Everywhere Olds and his fliers landed in Latin America, 
they were greeted by large, enthusiastic crowds. The flight 
succeeded in the United States as fully as in South Ameri­
ca. A New York Times editorial quoted a Latin American 
newspaper to show how much the people of South America 
appreciated the good will flight. This newspaper, said the 
Times, "summed up the spirit of the flight very appropriate­
ly in an eight-column headline reading 'Welcome to the Wings 
of Democracy.'" Impressed by the "feat of these flying 
monsters," the Times noted that the six bombers made the 
5225 mile trip from Miami to Buenos Aires in only twenty- 
four hours and four minutes flying time at an average speed 
of more than 185 miles per hour. Recognizing the speed and
Force, February 9, 1938, RG 18, AAF, Secret Correspondence, 
373, "Airplane Flights, Buenos Aires."
5LeMay, pp. 152-166. Also see Roosevelt to Roberto 
Ortiz, February 15, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 4.
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range of the Flying Fortresses, the editorial stated that 
"It is plain that these 'wings of democracy' bear their 
twenty-ton loads lightly."** In the guise of good will, 
Andrews had demonstrated the performance capabilities of the 
B-17 and how rapidly they could reach a distant trouble 
spot.
Congressman Dow W. Barter sent his congratulations to 
General Andrews, who used the opportunity to advertise the 
B-17. Writing back, Andrews explained that the flight 
illustrated the "effectiveness of our training and demon­
strates the value of the type of bombardment airplane which 
the GHQ Air Force has advocated for its equipment." To show 
the B-17's greater flexibility for defensive air operations, 
Andrews told Barter that the 31st Bombardment Squadron had 
r e c e n t l y  been d i s p a t c h e d  to Hawaii by ship. If that 
squadron had been equipped with B-17s, he said, "it could 
have been flown to Hawaii and then when required elsewhere, 
flown there also." The larger bombers were "more economical 
per ton of bombs delivered" than small bombers.?
Forced to allow the Argentina flight, the War Depart­
ment opposed making further long-distance flights with the 
B-17s. Hoping to include them in maneuvers scheduled for 
March, the commander of the Hawaiian Department asked the
**New York Times, February 22, 1938.
?Dow W. Barter to Andrews, February 19, 1938, and
Andrews to Barter, February 21, 1938, Andrews Papers,
General Correspondence, Box 4, Personal Correspondence, "H" 
1929-1940.
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General Staff to fly some of the B-17s to the Islands. The 
Army fliers welcomed the chance, but the Chief of Staff 
turned down the request. Only intervention from higher 
civilian authorities had made possible the flight to Buenos 
Aires. Disappointed at being denied the opportunity to 
prove that his B-17s could reinforce Hawaii, General Andrews 
found the Argentina flight an adequate substitute. He told 
General Delos C. Emmons that it proved anything that a 
flight to Hawaii would have proved.8
The General Staff refused to let the Army Air Corps 
capitalize on the publicity surrounding the flight. Besides 
ordering Andrews to keep the preparations secret. General 
Craig refused to let General Westover hold a big reception 
for the returning airmen. Craig told Andrews that the 
returning airmen would "get a more favorable reaction if 
they return to their station and the country gets the 
impression that this is a normal routine flight which our 
Air Corps is prepared to put on without any hullabaloo at 
any instant." Agreeing with Craig, Andrews said that "the 
impression we want to leave with the country is that the 
flight was not a stunt..." He wanted to convince the 
American people, as did Colonel Franks, that the GHQ Air 
Force could repeat the flight, with B-17s, whenever circum­
stances required it. Despite the cancellation of formal 
festivities, five thousand spectators welcomed the Army
^Andrews to Brigadier General Delos C. Emmons, February
9 and 21, 1938, Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 
3, Personal Correspondence, "E" 1930-1943.
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fliers back to Langley Field. General Andrews told the 
crowd that the flight was not a stunt flight performed by 
specially selected crews. Each plane was manned by its 
regular crew, and any "Flying Fortress" crew in the GHQ Air 
Force could have done the job. By treating this spectacular 
feat as an everyday occurrence, Andrews quietly built trust 
in the Army Air Corps and added validity to the spectacular 
claims about air power.9
After receiving a letter of congratulations from the 
Secretary of State, General Andrews believed that the GHQ 
Air Force would receive more B-17s. Thinking that the 
flight would silence all opposition to the purchase of more 
F l y i n g  Fortr e s s e s ,  A n d r e w s  told another officer that 
"everybody is climbing aboard the band wagon." Comments by 
President Roosevelt before the Argentina flight had bolster­
ed Andrews' confidence. Asked about his increase in the 
Navy, Roosevelt had told reporters that the consensus among 
those who knew the most about national defense was "that we 
cannot rely on the single defense in one ocean, that there 
must be more defensive possibilities than mere defense in 
one ocean." "We," said the President, "have to consider the 
possibility of defense on both sides." Andrews believed 
that the B-17s could defend either coast, and his expecta-
^Craig to Andrews, February 23, 1938, and Andrews to 
Craig, February 24, 1938, Andrews Papers, General Corre­
spondence, Box 2, Personal Correspondence, "Craig, Malin 
File;" "The Argentine Flight" and "Argentine Flight Proves 
Excellent State of Training in the GHQ Air Force," Air Corps 
News Letter, March 1, 1938, pp. 1 and 4.
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tion of recieving more B-17s was reinforced by Colonel Olds' 
visit to the White House upon returning from Buenos Aires. 
Delivering a message of friendship from President Ortiz, 
Olds told FDR that the six B-17s had proved themselves 
superior to any other airplane for defending the United 
States. After the meeting, Olds informed reporters that 
Roosevelt had been unusually familiar with the details of 
the flight and the country over which the flight was made. 
Olds' surprise at the President's knowledge was under­
standable. Because Roosevelt loved ships, most people 
assumed that he had little knowledge of airplanes.
Andrews confused the President's knowledge of airplanes 
with support for airplanes. Although interested in the 
Argentina flight, President Roosevelt remained unconvinced 
that airplanes alone could control the seas or defend one of 
the coasts. Asked by reporters whether the battleship had 
lost any of its effectiveness, Roosevelt said his recent 
decision to add two new battleships to the Navy showed his 
faith in them. To clarify his meaning, Roosevelt pointed 
out that people had called torpedo boats, submarines and 
Civil War Monitors supreme naval weapons, but an "antidote" 
for each had been found. The same held true for airplanes
^ A n d r e w s  to George Brett, March 17, 1938, Andrews 
Papers, General Correspondence, Box 1, Personal Corres­
pondence, "B" 1924-1939; White House Press Conference, 
February 15, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 4; New York Times, March 
1, 1938. For an example of the assumptions most airmen held 
about Roosevelt, see the comments made by Mitchell just 
before his death in Emile Gauvreau, The Wild Blue Yonder: 
Sons of the Prophet Carry On (New York: E.P. Dutton and 
Co., 1944), pp. 169-171.
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because anti-aircraft guns and d e f e n s i v e  p l a n e s  were 
antidotes for air attack. Roosevelt emphasized that no one 
weapon was supreme. By avoiding a simple yes or no answer 
to the battleship question, he demonstrated a concern that 
airplanes might be the antidote to battleships. Roosevelt 
had held this concern since 1919, when he told the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee that "aviation might make surface 
ships practically impossible to be used as an A r m . 1,11 
Saying that no one weapon was supreme, the President dis­
played flexibility and a broad grasp of the changing world. 
Roosevelt loved the sea, but his ability to draw on the past 
to put the present into perspective allowed him to see the 
potentialities of naval and air power working in conjunction 
as Admiral Yarnell had suggested. Soon, Roosevelt demon­
strated his appreciation of air power as a military and 
naval weapon.
During a War Department meeting about aircraft pur­
chases for the 1939 fiscal year, Andrews discovered that 
Secretary Woodring had not climbed aboard the B-17's "band 
wagon." Woodring announced that only enough planes would be 
purchased over the next three years to bring the Army Air 
Corps up to its authorized level of 2320 planes, including 
only twelve B-17s. Ignoring objections from Assistant 
Secretary Johnson and General Andrews, Woodring refused to 
alter his plan. Before Woodring could submit his proposal 
to the White House, Johnson made a personal appeal to
1]-New York Times, February 26, 1938; Arnold, p. 97.
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Roosevelt. The President informed Johnson that the neither 
the Army nor the Army Air Corps would receive increased 
funding at that time. R o osevelt a p p r o v e d  W o o d r i n g ' s  
proposal, referred to as the Woodring Program, and Congress 
appropriated $37 million that spring for the purchase of 450 
planes. Johnson acquiesced to the President's wishes, and 
he publicly supported the Woodring Program in a series of 
speeches. Questioning the soundness of Woodring's program, 
Time magazine quoted Eddie Rickenbacker as saying that the 
United States needed 100,000 pilots and 30,000 airplanes 
immediately and another 500,000 pilots and 100,000 airplanes 
within five years.
The Air Corps wanted a balanced air force, which 
included B-17s. Arnold did not want a lopsided ratio of 
pilots to planes. Fearing that Assistant Secretary Johnson 
might support Rickenbacker's plan, General Arnold protested 
that it was unrealistically expensive. He referred Johnson 
to an Air Corps study calling for 3627 officers, 24,988 
enlisted men, and 740 flying cadets "to provide a balanced 
personnel organization for the 2320 airplanes." Arnold 
w o u l d  have liked a larger number of airplanes, but he 
thought it "wise" to remember that an air force must be a 
balance of airplanes, personnel, and ground facilities.12 
Both Arnold and Westover advocated this goal publicly. In
12McFarland, Woodring, pp. 160-163; T i m e , March 7, 
1938, pp. 44-45; Memorandum from Arnold to Johnson (original 
draft by Eaker also in files), March 9, 1938, Arnold Papers, 
Box 15, File 228, General Correspondence.
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the spring of 1938, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer released the movie 
Test Pilot with Clark Gable, Myrna Loy and Spencer Tracy. 
As part of the ceremonies for the Hollywood premier showing, 
Arnold promoted the movie with a radio address. Noting that 
the Flying Fortresses used for the movie were identical to 
the planes used on the Argentina flight, he quietly educated 
the public about the superiority of one expensive B-17 to 
two cheaper B-18s. Repeating what he had told Assistant 
Secretary Johnson, Arnold supported the Woodring Program 
because it provided the three essential ingredients of a 
"successful, modern air force— Airplanes, Airmen, and Air 
Bases." General Westover stated the same ideas a few days 
earlier in a speech to the Southeastern Aviation Conference 
at Montgomery, Alabama. Like Arnold, Westover praised the 
Woodring Program, saying that "the only thing that now 
stands in the way of providing an adequate air component for 
the Army is shortage of funds." Since Ira Eaker wrote the 
public addresses made by Westover and Arnold, the commanders 
of the Air Corps had adopted a single plan of action. They 
would support the Woodring Program and avoid antagonizing 
the President, the Congress or the War Department.13
In March 1938, Adolph Hitler achieved his first foreign
1 3 "Address of Brigadier General H.H. Arnold, over 
Station KFI, Los Angeles, April 21st, 1938," Eaker Papers, 
Speech, Book, Article File 1934-1954 + Undated, Box 38, 
Speeches— Gen. Arnold [prepared by I.C.E] 1937-1939; "Speech 
for General Westover for Delivery at Montgomery, Alabama 
Before the Southeastern Aviation Conference on April 15, 
1938," Eaker Papers, Speech, Article, and Book File, Box 39, 
Speeches— General Westover [prepared by I.C.E.?] 1937-1938.
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policy success: the Anschuluss with Austria. Before then, 
Charles Lindbergh had warned the War Department and Presi­
dent Roosevelt about the Luftwaffe. On his trips to Germany 
in 1936 and 1937, the Nazis convinced Lindbergh, who was 
widely regarded as an expert on aviation, that they had 
built the Luftwaffe into a very powerful air force. The 
Lone Eagle told British and French leaders that their air 
forces were no match for the Luftwaffe, and they believed 
him. Together with Major Truman Smith, the A m e r i c a n  
military attache in Berlin, Lindbergh prepared a report for 
the War Department warning of the Luftwaffe. Through Joseph 
P. Kennedy, he warned President Roosevelt that the Germans 
had the capacity to produce more airplanes that the United 
States. Impressed, Roosevelt sent copies of Lindbergh's 
warning to General Craig and Admiral Leahy.14
Following the Anschluss, President Roosevelt received 
the first of many requests for American-built planes. On 
April 15, George Norton Northrop, headmaster of the Roxbury 
Latin School in West Roxbury, Massachusetts, sent Roosevelt 
a letter from an Englishman, who wanted the President to 
give Great Britain five hundred bombers. By making them a 
gift, Hitler could be bluffed into thinking that the United 
S tates and Great B r i t a i n  had an alliance. Roosevelt
14Telford Taylor, Munich; The Price of Peace (Garden 
City, New York: DoubledayT 1979), pp. 754-764; Major Truman 
Smith, "An American Estimate of the German Air Force, 
November 1, 1937," reprinted in The Airpower Historian, 
vol. 10, no. 2, April 1963, pp. 54-56; Joseph P. Kennedy to 
Roosevelt, February 9, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 4.
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rejected the suggestion, but unknown to him, the British 
government was considering the United States as a source of 
bomberso On May 1, Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister of Defense, 
asked Lindbergh about the production potential of the United 
States' aircraft industry. Apparently impressed by the 
Argentina flight, Inskip also asked if the large bombers 
could be flown across the Atlantic in an emergency.15
In the spring of 1938, expanding the Navy concerned 
President Roosevelt more than getting bombers to England. 
At a press conference, he stated that the Navy needed to be 
large e n o u g h  to defend America's Pacific possessions, 
including the Philippines. But the Navy also had to be 
large enough to prevent a European power from sending arms 
and airplanes to a fascist revolution in Latin America. 
Because of the speed and range of modern aircraft, Venezue­
la, although four hundred miles from the United States, was 
only "an hour and a half by some of these modern planes, an 
hour and a half further than Cuba." Emphasizing that 
airplanes had made everybody a potential target, he told a 
story about a Chinese village far from the fighting. 
Calling it the "Iowa of China," he said that Japanese planes 
killed three hundred people there "and two minutes later 
they were gone." Then, he referred to documents captured 
after the World War which indicated that the Germans "were
15George Norton Northrop to Roosevelt, April 15, 1938, 
and Roosevelt to Northrop, April 20, 1938, in Schewe, 
vol. 5, March 1938-April 1938; Charles A Lindbergh, The 
Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1970), pp. 25-26.
183
building a Zeppelin with the perfectly definite objective of 
sending her out in the spring of 1919 by way of the Great 
Circle Route, over Iceland, Greenland and down to New York, 
to drop a cargo of bombs on New York City." Since German 
Zeppelins had been flying that route commercially, he was 
implying that Germany might try to do it again. Asked how 
the United States could defend itself from Maine to the 
Philippines, Roosevelt said that one enemy would be no 
problem. But two enemies in different places required 
Americans "to be a bit shifty" and defeat one first, then 
the o t h e r . 16 Roosevelt's answer later emerged as the 
"Germany First" strategy adopted by the United States and 
Great Britain.
Even as President Roosevelt discussed the possibility, 
the Army Air Corps was preparing to test the ability of the 
armed forces to meet simultaneous attacks on both coasts. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ira Eaker played a key role in publi­
cizing the maneuvers. With a Bachelor of Arts in journalism 
from the University of Southern California, he had served as 
the Assistant Chief of the Information Division and had been 
promoted to chief of the Air Corps' P u b l i c  R e l a t i o n s  
Section. In April, he attended a short course in news 
photography at the University of Oklahoma. Upon his return 
from Norman, Oklahoma, Eaker used his training as a journal­
16White House Press Conference, April 20, 1938, in 
Schewe, vol. 5.
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ist to publicize the upcoming maneuvers.^
Colonel Eaker believed that publicity should establish 
cordial relations with the public, Most of all, the Army 
Air Corps had to impress upon the;, public the importance of 
the GHQ Air Force to each American. Eaker told the Chief of 
Staff of the GHQ Air Force to send B-17s, which had not lost 
their "sex appeal with the public," to out of the way 
places. More Americans could see the planes and would be 
more w i l l i n g  to spend their tax dollars on them. By 
deliberately using phrases like "'skeletonized* squadrons" 
in press releases, the public would be gently reminded that 
the Army Air Corps needed more planes. For the upcoming 
maneuvers, he suggested the exploitation of personalities, 
greater coordination be t w e e n  staff o f f i c e r s  on p ress 
releases, and the use of a final review on the last day of 
the exercises.1®
The scenario for the May maneuvers supposed that the 
United States was at war with a Black Force, a coalition of 
European and Asiatic powers. While an Asiatic fleet held 
the Navy in the Pacific, a European fleet of aircraft 
carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyer-escorted troop
^ F l i n t  0. DuPre, U.S. Air Force Biographical Diction­
ary, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965), pp. 61-62; Lieutenant 
Colonel H.H.C. Richards, Chief of the Information Division, 
to Professor Albert A. Sutton, April 4, 1938, and Westover 
to W.B. Bizzell, President of the University of Oklahoma, 
April 4, 1938, Eaker Papers, Correspondence, Box 3, 1938 File.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Eaker to Chief of Staff, GHQ Air 
Force, April 20, 1938, Eaker Papers, Subject File, Miscella­
neous 1929-1939, Box 36, GHQ Air Force Maneuvers, May 1938.
transports attacked New England. To meet the second Black 
fleet, all three Wings of the GHQ Air Force gathered at 
temporary bases in New York, New Jersey, C o n n e c t i c u t ,  
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Maryland. Since the Navy 
had not assigned ships to cooperate with the GHQ Air Force, 
General Andrews made no plans for the B-17s to participate 
in the exercises. The maneuvers would have taken on an 
unrealistic atmosphere as planes searched for nonexistent 
ships. Eaker added a note of realism and showed the range 
of the B-17 in a very flashy exercise. He publicized a real 
search for a real ship by a flight of B-17s. Knowing that 
the New York-bound Italian liner Rex would be about 700 
miles out when the maneuvers started on May 12, Eaker asked 
the ship's owners to participate. They quickly agreed 
because of the free publicity. Eaker had the three YB-17s 
assigned for the flight stationed at Mitchel Field on Long 
Island, where the New York City reporters had easy access to 
them. To record the interception, the bombers carried Major 
George Goddard, who was the Air Corps' best photographer; an 
NBC radio announcer, who gave a live broadcast from one of 
the bombers; and other reporters, including Hanson Baldwin. 
Heading out to sea, they encountered thunderstorms and 
turbulence which slowed them down, but the Army fliers 
spotted the Rex right on time for the scheduled broadcast. 
The NBC commentator described the interception for his 
audience, and Goddard took pictures which were distributed
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across the country.19
Hanson Baldwin was impressed. He reported that the 
three Plying Fortresses "reared through line squalls, hail 
rain and s u n s h i n e ... in a 1,300-mile overwater flight, 
unprecedented in the history of the Army Air Corps." Many 
people, he wrote, believed that the flight showed "the 
utility of aviation in the defense of our coasts and it also 
proved, the army air force believes, that army fliers as 
well as navy fliers can navigate over water out of sight of 
land." Baldwin was not totally convinced that airplanes 
could defend the coasts, but he grudgingly admitted that "a 
nice problem in navigation was solved." The GHQ Air Force 
pilots had proved they could navigate over water and in 
rough weather. Never again could the Navy claim other­
wise. 20
The maneuvers continued with simulated bombing raids on 
New York City, attacks on simulated aircraft carriers and 
mock air battles. Claiming that most nations recognized the 
vulnerability of aircraft carriers, Andrews announced that 
the GHQ Air Force had put five of the Black Fleet's carriers 
"out of action." General Andrews also told the press that 
the GHQ Air Force had demonstrated a great improvement in
19LeMay, pp. 183-193; George W. Goddard with Dewitt 
S. Copp, Overview: A Life-Long Adventure in Aerial Photogra­
phy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 254-260; 
New York T i m e s , May 12 and 13, 1938; "The GHQ Air Force 
Maneuvers," and Harris B. Hull, "The GHQ Air Force Maneu­
vers," Air Corps News Letter, June 1, 1938, pp. 3 and 9-11.
2^Hanson W. Baldwin "'Flying Fortresses' Meet Liner at 
Sea," New York Times, May 13, 1938, p. 3.
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its efficiency. F o l l o w i n g  Eaker's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  to 
publicize the "skeletonized" condition of the GHQ Air Force, 
other officers pointed out that only 222 airplanes had been 
available for the maneuvers. They stressed that the Army 
did not have a real air force, only the beginnings of one. 
The attack on New York City reminded Americans that they 
needed more planes to adequately defend their cities.21
On the night of May 16, Black bombers r aided the 
Seversky and Grumman aircraft factories at Farmingdale, Long 
Island, in a test of blackout procedures. The GHQ Air Force 
asked for voluntary participation in the blackout, and the 
residents of the area cooperated. The bombers never found 
their targets. NBC carried live reports of the blackout, 
and Arnold addressed the radio audience afterward. As Eaker 
had suggested, Arnold stressed the importance of the GHQ Air 
Force to the American people. "These national defense 
exercises demonstrated in a manner quite realistic," he 
said, "just what we might expect if invaders came within 
striking distance of our shores. They have brought home 
with a bang the terrifying roar of hostile planes... the 
thrilling sight of aerial combats...and the deafening crack 
of our anti-aircraft guns. But, fortunately we have been 
spared the sickening whine of dropping bombs, with the 
death-dealing crash of their explosions." For a n y o n e  
remembering the German bombing of Guernica a year earlier, 
Arnold's comments held a poignant message. Without the Army
21New York Times, May 14 and 15, 1938.
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Air Corps' protection, Farmingdale or any other American 
city could be another Guernica. Statements such as Arnold's 
did not result in a public outcry for more airplanes because 
Americans still felt secure. But when they recognized a 
threat, the American people had been conditioned to respond 
to it by supporting the purchase of more airplanes.
The day following the Farmingdale raid, the GHQ Air 
Force held a final review. The planes assembled over West 
Point and flew to Mitchel Field, where General Andrews and 
his staff watched them fly overhead. From there, the planes 
dispersed to their permanent stations. After the aerial 
review ended and the skies were cleared of any distractions, 
the Army Air Corps put its new Boeing XB-15 bomber on 
display. For the officers gathered at Mitchel Field, 
spokesmen described the plane as the latest development in 
long-range bombardment, and they promised it would have an 
even greater range of reconnaissance than the YB-17s had 
achieved on the Rex flight.22
Eaker pulled a fast one on the Navy by arranging to 
intercept the Rex while it was still 600 miles out to sea. 
For years, the Navy had argued that ships were necessary 
because airplanes could not find enemy ships in bad weather, 
and with Congress discussing the President's naval expansion 
bill the Navy could not afford any adverse publicity. The
22Hull, "The GHQ Air Force Maneuvers," p. 10-11; Radio 
address by Arnold, May 16, 1938, Eaker Papers, Subject File, 
Miscellaneous 1929-1939, Box 36, GHQ Air Force Maneuvers, 
May 1938.
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Rex flight embarrassed the Navy, but they responded quick­
ly. Somebody spoke to General Craig, and the next day, he 
verbally ordered the Army Air Corps to stay within one 
hundred miles of the coast.22
Nevertheless, Eaker's carefully orchestrated publicity 
campaign documented the Army Air Corps' dependability. 
During the 1930s, Americans suspected newspapers as being 
servants of special interests, but they trusted radio 
broadcasts and photographs. Radio broadcasts made listeners 
feel as if they had witnessed an event firsthand, giving it 
added reality and plausibility. Largely through the efforts 
of the Farm Security Administration's photographs and books 
like Erskine Caldwell and Margaret Bourke-White's You Have 
Seen Their F a c e s , photographs had become a valid type of 
documentary evidence for Americans. Seemingly, NBC's radio 
program gave listeners the feeling that they were on board 
the YB-17s intercepting the Rex, and Goddard's photographs 
of the Army bombers flying over the Italian liner gave 
viewers undeniable proof that the Army Air Corps could 
fulfill its promises.24 When Andrews told the press that
^Representative Maury Maverick of Texas had announced 
his opposition to the naval expansion bill. He had threat­
ened to use information, given to him by "regular and
retired flying officers," about bombing tests that had 
proved the vulnerablity of ships to air attack. Hanson 
W. Baldwin, "Naval Plans Spur Army Air Backers," New York 
Times, March 14, 1938, p. 6; Arnold, pp. 176-177; LeMay, 
pp. 192-193; Coffey, p. 177.
24For a discussion of the importance of radio and 
photography in America, see William Stott, Documentary 
Expression and Thirties America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973); New York Times, May 14, 1938. The hysterical
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the GHQ Air Force had "theoretically" put five Black Force 
aircraft carriers out of commission, people believed that 
the GHQ Air Force could do it. The Army Air Corps had just 
proven itself by sending six bombers on a spectacular flight 
to South America and followed up that feat with the inter­
ception of the Rex.
Prevented from sending his planes out to sea, Andrews 
still could send them on flights to celebrate the inaugura­
tion of South American presidents. The GHQ Air Force 
planned to follow the Argentina flight with one to Bogota, 
Colombia, for the inauguration of President-Elect Eduardo 
Santos, but a disaster almost forced Andrews to cancel the 
trip. On July 24, 1938, the one hundred and fifty-fifth 
anniversary of Simon Bolivar's birthday, the Colombian Air 
Force dedicated a new airfield near Bogota, and over 50,000 
visitors swarmed to the field. As part of the festivities, 
a military pilot put on an aerobatics exhibition, but he 
lost control of his plane. Smashing into the crowd, the 
plane killed over sixty people plane and barely missed 
Santos in the reviewing stand. When the GHQ Air Force 
fliers heard of the accident, they expected the flight to be 
cancelled, but the trip went on as planned. Flying from 
Miami to Bogota, on August 3, three YB-17s made the flight 
in eight and a half hours. U n d e t e r r e d  by the recent 
tragedy, enthusiastic crowds met the American bombers.
response to Orson Welles' broadcast of H.G. Wells' The War 
of the Worlds that Halloween also suggests the influence of 
radio.
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Presenting a wreath paid for out of their own pockets, the 
airmen took part in the memorial service held for those 
killed on the twenty-fourth. After Santos' inauguration, 
the three bombers returned to the United States by way of 
Panama. Once again, the Army fliers had demonstrated the 
remarkable range of the B-17, and the Navy could do nothing 
to prevent it.2^
Ira Eaker wanted to make the entire Array Air Corps 
conscious of public relations. Throughout the summer of 
1938, Eaker used his position as chief of the Air Corps' 
Public Relation Section to advocate the establishment of 
p e r s o n a l  contacts with the press and other ideas. In 
addition to warning other officers about the dangers of 
giving personal interviews, he advised the timely release of 
photographs and stories to local newspapers f rom A rmy 
airfields. Before submitting an article for publication, 
General Andrews asked Eaker to critique an outline he had 
written, and Eaker used the opportunity to influence the 
general. Rather than attracting readers with a controver­
sial article, Eaker suggested he use an informative and 
entertaining style. He recommended that George Kenney and 
Beirne Lay write the article, emphasizing Lay's personal 
connections with the Saturday Evening Post. To let more 
people see what they were paying taxes for, Eaker arranged 
for a YB-17 to be displayed at the San Francisco Fair. At 
the 1938 Cleveland Air Races, he gave photographs of the
25LeMay, pp. 169-173.
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participating planes and pilots to the press. Insuring that 
he had an experienced staff acquainted with the press, Eaker 
arranged for Beirne Lay to accompany him to Cleveland.2®
As part of his duties, Eaker dealt with the unfavorable 
reports about air power coming from Spain and China. From 
the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, 
Colonel Lewis Brereton asked him in October for information 
on air operations in Spain and China to show "the value of 
air force operations— as opposed to tactical." Eaker sent 
Brereton some speeches containing the requested data, and he 
asked the General Staff for any pertinent information. The 
General Staff did not respond until March 1939. Rather than 
getting mad, Eaker recommended to Brereton that he send an 
Air Corps officer stationed at Fort Leavenworth to get the 
necessary information from the General Staff's files. Eaker 
suspected the General Staff of trying to keep Brereton from 
receiving any useful information, but he refrained from 
making accusations.2?
The General Staff's reluctance to provide information 
which supported the claims of the advocates of air power was
2®Eaker to Colonel Walter H. Frank, July 11, 1938, 
Eaker to Andrews, July 20, 1938, Eaker to Frank, July 21, 
1938, and Eaker to Colonel W.G. Kilner, August 25, 1938, 
Eaker Papers, Correspondence, Box 3, 1938. Eaker had good 
reason to recommend Beirne Lay. He had already won a 
reputation as a writer with his book I Wanted Wings, about 
his experiences during flight training at Randolph Field. 
After World War II, Lay became better known as the writer of 
Twelve O'clock High, a classic aviation movie.
2^Colonel Lewis Brereton to Eaker, October 4, 1938, 
and Eaker to Brereton, March 16, 1939, Eaker Papers,
Correspondence, Box 3, 1939 File.
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matched by its reluctance to p r o v i d e  m ore l o n g - r a n g e  
bombers. In May, the Deputy Chief of Staff Stanley D. Em- 
bick rejected an Air Corps request for more long-range 
bombers. Embick cited four reasons: the policy of the 
United States was defense, not aggression; defense of the 
seas, except for the coastal zone, was the Navy's duty; the 
B-17 had not proved itself superior to the three smaller 
planes that could be purchased for the same money; and there 
appeared "to be no need for a plane larger than the B-17. A 
month later, the Assistant Secretary of War announced that 
the funds allocated to purchase two B-15s and a n o t h e r  
experimental, long-range bomber would be spent on twin 
engine bombers. In July, the Secretary of War told General 
Westover that no B-17s would be purchased during the 1940 
fiscal year. To control the B-17's supporters in the GHQ 
Air Force, General Craig informed Andrews in February that 
the General Staff would chose his staff members.2**
By the end of summer, the Army Air Corps' hopes for 
obtaining more B-17s appeared crushed, but by Christmas, the 
outlook had improved after a change on the General Staff. 
In May, Brigadier General George C. Marshall became the new 
Chief of the War Plans Division. Everybody in the War 
Department knew that Marshall would soon receive a more 
important position. After serving as the Chief of the War 
Plans Division for only three months, Marshall was promoted
2®Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and 
P r e p a r a t i o n s  (W a s h i n g t o n , D .C .: H i s t o r i c a l  D i v i s i o n , 
Department of the Army, 1950), pp. 35-36; Coffey, pp. 177-178.
194
to Deputy Chief of Staff. At his new position, Marshall was 
groomed to replace Craig as the Chief of Staff.
Marshall's selection as the future Chief of Staff was 
most fortunate for the Army Air Corps. Marshall had been no 
stranger to the development of airplanes as weapons of war. 
While at the General Staff School in 1908, Major George 
O. Squier, the head of the Signal Corps, had s t a r t l e d  
Marshall by stating that the Wright brothers had built a 
successful airplane. Marshall had seen nothing about the 
W r i g h t s  in the newspapers, and Squire's comment had a 
profound impact on him. A year later, Marshall stopped at 
Fort Meyer to spend the night with a friend, Lieutenant 
Benjamin Foulois. While there, he watched the W r i g h t  
brothers demonstrate their airplane to the Army, President 
Taft and thousands of onlookers. In March 1911, the Army 
held maneuvers on the Mexican border and Marshall served 
under Major Squier. All of the Army's planes and pilots 
were there too. After seeing one plane crash into a horse 
and buggy, Marshall got out of bed before the planes took 
off at 5:30 each morning. The planes barely cleared his 
tent on take off, and he took no chances. Marshall survived 
the harsh Texas winter and primitive airplanes. Over the 
following twenty-five years, he continued his steady climb 
in the Army, but his connections with aviation differed 
little from any other ground officer until 1937. On June
29Fo rrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a 
General, 1880-1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 314-319.
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17, three Russian fliers left Moscow on a non-stop flight 
o v e r  the North Pole to Oakland, C a l i f o r n i a .  A fter 
sixty-three hours in the air, the Soviet plane had engine 
trouble and made an emergency landing at the CCC camp at 
Vancouver Barracks, Washington. As the camp commander, 
Marshall found himself responsible for the Russians, who had 
flown over 5,000 miles but could not speak English. When 
Marshall put them up in his own home, the press and other 
dignitaries invaded his house. To top things off, a radio 
broadcast was made from the Marshall home. Only after the 
Russian fliers left did the general and his wife return to 
their normal routine.30 But Marshall had learned that 
airplanes could span vast distances.
Marshall's promotion to Chief of the War Plans Division 
did not go unnoticed in the Army Air Corps, but Marshall had 
already caught Hap Arnold's attention in 1914. On maneuvers 
in the Philippines, Marshall and Arnold were assigned to the 
same side. Marshall, made the chief of staff, impressed 
Arnold. Afterward, Arnold told his wife that, one day, 
Marshall would be the Chief of Staff of the United States 
Army. When Marshall joined the General Staff, General 
Arnold already knew the man had great capabilites. In his 
memoirs, however, Arnold explained that Marshall still had
SOLarry I. Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour, eds., The 
Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 2 vols., (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), vol. 1: "The 
Soldierly Spirit," December 1880-June 1939, pp. 50, 53-54 
and 545-547; Anderton, History of the U.S. Air Force (New 
York: Crescent Books, 1981), pp. 15-17.
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to be won over to the side of air power. He wrote that:
The best efforts of Malin Craig, when he was 
Chief of Staff, the ups and downs of Secretary 
Woodring's understanding, never changed the basic 
conviction of the [War] Department that allocation 
of the skimpy funds it had for the purchase of 
airplanes should be put into medium bombers and 
other ground-support planes. Even when George 
Marshall first took over in 1937 [sic], he needed 
plenty of indoctrination about the air facts of 
life. The difference in George, who presently was 
to become one of the most potent forces behind the 
development of a real American air power, was his 
ability to digest what he saw and make it part of 
as strong a body of military genius as I have ever
known.31
The "indoctrination" started as soon as Marshall arrived in 
Washington, D.C.
General Andrews asked the new Chief of WPD to accompany 
him on an inspection tour. Ignoring opposition to the trip 
within the War Department, Marshal and Andrews visited Army 
Air Corps facilities across the nation and aircraft factor­
ies along the West Coast. General Westover carefully 
arranged the ten day trip. Given guided tours at the
aircraft factories by the chief engineers, Marshall learned 
a great deal about the problems encountered in the construc­
tion of aircraft. At the Army airfields, Marshall discover­
ed that the airmen needed better representation on the 
General Staff because they were starting to take their 
complaints to Congress again. Westover had coordinated the 
trip so well that Marshall did not have time to contact 
friends at the places he visited, but Marshall later told
•^Arnold, p. 44 and 163-164; Coffey, pp. 77-80; Pogue, 
Marshall: Education of a General, pp. 119-124.
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General Pershing that it was "a very interesting trip 
professionally and a most magnificent one p e r s o n a l l y . "32
Besides exhibiting some of the Army Air Corps' prob­
lems, Andrews tutored Marshall on the advantages of long- 
range airplanes. To avoid the expense of garrisoning Hawaii 
and Panama with enough planes to meet any situation, Andrews 
proposed the building of air bases there. Then, long-range 
b o m b e r s  stationed in the United States could be flown 
overseas in case of attack. Marshall listened carefully, 
and Andrews discovered one of Marshall's strengths: his 
desire to make decisions based upon all the e vidence. 
Afterward, he told Claire Egtvedt, president of the Boeing 
Aircraft Corporation, that Mar s h a l l  w o u l d  " occupy an 
important position in Washington and I am sure that with the 
first hand knowledge he gained, this trip will be of value 
to him in future War Department decisions in which he will 
have a h a n d . "33 in Marshall, Andrews found a potential 
friend of air power.
The trip a f f e c t e d  Marshall. Upon his return to 
Washington, Marshall took steps to remove one of the major 
difficulties he had seen. Too many trained specialists like 
weathermen or mechanics, who were trained at great expense,
32Marshall to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, August 
8, 1938, Marshall to General John J. Pershing, August 22, 
1938, Marshall to Major General Ewing E. Booth, August 26, 
1938, and Interview with Marshall, January 22, 1957, in 
Bland and Ritenour, "The Soldierly Spirit," pp. 616-619.
^^Andrews to George Brett, August 19, 1938, and Andrews 
to Claire Egtvedt, August 22, 1938, Andrews Papers, General 
Correspondence, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, "B" 1924-1939.
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chose not to reenlist or purchased their discharge to take a 
m ore lucr a t i v e  civilian job. Marshall wanted the men 
reporting for special training to be discharged and immedi­
ately reenlisted for three years. That way, they would 
still have two years of service left after completing their 
training, but by that time they would have reached a 
sufficient rank to keep them from wanting to buy their 
discharges. General Craig thought Marshall had a good idea, 
but he never carried it out. Nevertheless, Marshall had 
shown a greater interest in the condition of the Army Air 
Corps than any other member of the General S t a f f . 34
At the state convention of the West Virginia chapter of 
the American Legion Marshall demonstrated that he understood 
the problems involved in aircraft production. He told the 
legionnaires that aviation had "progressed with such leaps 
and bounds, such unbelievable advances in speed and d is­
tance, in altitude, and in size, that it staggers the 
imagination...." This rapid advancement, however, had made 
it difficult to chose the type of planes needed. The design 
and building of a prototype took five years, and it took 
another year to put the plane into production. By that time 
the airplane’s "obsolescence is becoming apparent." But 
M a r s h a l l  still failed to see the superiority of large 
bombers over smaller ones. A d d r e s s i n g  the Air C orps 
Tactical School at Maxwell Field, he said that pilots flying
3 4 m t e r v i e w  w ith Marshall, January 22, 1957, and 
Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff General Embick, August 
22, 1938, in Bland and Ritenour, pp. 617-618.
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smaller planes required less training than those flying 
large planes. He also believed that smaller planes would be 
better in a theater of operation lacking modern airfields. 
Marshall asked the Army fliers to become acquainted with the 
needs of the entire Army because the "War Department needs 
Air experts who understand the Army, for we must have a 
t e a m . "35 His desire to foster team spirit matched that of 
Andrews, Westover and Arnold.
As Arnold noted after the Second World War, Marshall 
"needed plenty of indoctrination about the air facts of 
life." However, Andrews had shown Marshall the realities 
involved in aircraft production and made him aware of many 
of the difficulties faced by the Army Air Corps. Unlike 
other ground officers, Marshall actually listened to the 
fliers and was able to change his mind if the evidence 
warranted a change. His willingness to listen to the airmen 
played an important role in shaping America's military 
planning for the Second World War. By the time the United 
States entered the war, Marshall had been convinced that 
strategic bombing played an important role in the Army team.
35p0gue, Education of a General, pp. 319-320; Speech by 
Marshall to the American Legion Convention at Clarksburg, 
West Virginia, September 4, 1938, and Speech by Marshall to 
the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, 
September 19, 1938, in Bland and Ritenour, pp. 620-626 and 
631-635.
CHAPTER VII
ROOSEVELT AND THE MUNICH CRISIS
When the Second World War began in September 1939, 
President Roosevelt told the American people that he could 
not ask them to "remain neutral in thought." In December 
1940, he stated that the United States "must be the great 
arsenal of democracy."1 These policies had their founda­
tions in the Munich Crisis of 1938.
T h r o u g h o u t  the spring and summer of 1938, Hitler 
pressured Czechoslovakia to surrender the Sudetenland, but 
the Czechs refused to succumb. A war seemed likely because 
France was willing to fight if Germany invaded Czechoslova­
kia, but the French, overestimating the Luftwaffe, feared 
the Germans would control the skies. To remedy the situa­
tion, the French government embarked upon a aerial rearm­
ament program in early 1938. The Neutrality Act of 1937 
r e q u i r e d  shipments of American-built planes to France 
stopped if a war broke out, but the French, encouraged by a 
movement in Congress to repeal or amend the law, believed 
the United States would be another source for combat 
planes.
By January 1938, many Americans recognized that the
iDallek, pp. 199 and 256-257.
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Neutrality Law treated aggressors the same as victims in 
China and Spain. Bills were introduced in Congress to 
repeal the act or allow the President to apply discrimina­
tory embargoes against aggressors. In March, Roosevelt gave 
his unofficial support for revision, but when the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee voiced unanimous opposition to 
revision, he withdrew his support. Legislation to repeal 
the embargo on arms shipments to the Spanish Republicans 
received more support. Most Americans realized that the 
embargo hurt the Republicans more than the Fascists. Others 
wanted the United States to follow its traditional policy of 
supporting the established governments, in this case the 
Spanish Republicans. Still others, disgusted by the Fascist 
air raids on R e p u b l i c a n - h e l d  towns, feared a Fascist 
victory. President Roosevelt favored the Spanish Repub­
licans, but he refused to intercede. The recent economic 
backslide absorbed his attention, and the failed attempt at 
packing the Supreme Court had weakened him politically. FDR 
contemplated lifting the embargo but decided against it. 
After a meeting with congressional Democrats, he told Harold 
Ickes that lifting the embargo would lose every Catholic 
vote in the fall elections because the Spanish Republicans 
opposed the Catholic Church.2
Congressional reconsideration of the Neutrality Law 
convinced the French that Americans would not remain idle in
2Dallek, pp. 158-161; Burns, Lion and the Fox, pp. 
352-357.
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case of a war with Germany, and President Roosevelt 
strengthened their misconception. On January 12, 1938, 
French Senator Amaury de la Grange, an old friend of the 
President, asked him to sell France one thousand planes like 
those flown by the Army Air Corps. Roosevelt said that the 
Neutrality Law would "hinder" French purchases in wartime, 
but he expressed a desire to help. Senator de la Grange 
left the White House believing that Roosevelt had offered to 
help the France reinforce its air force during peace or 
war. Uncertain of Roosevelt's ability to help, the French 
Minister of Defense, Edouard Daladier, asked Ambassador 
William Bullitt to make further inquiries. In February, 
Bullitt and Jean Monnet, a French industrialist, visited 
Roosevelt in Washington. Roosevelt explained that he had 
been trying to change to Neutrality Law to allow discrimina­
tory embargoes, and he promised to push the necessary 
legislation through Congress if war broke out. In any 
event, he would get around the Neutrality Law by sending 
planes through Canada. With this assurance, the French 
initiated efforts to buy planes from the United States, but 
neither Secretary of State Hull nor S e c r e t a r y  of War 
W o o d r i n g  knew what R o osevelt had pledged. In March, 
Daladier, now Premier, and his Minister for Air, Guy La 
Chambre, sent Jean Monnet back to Washington to discuss 
aircraft purchases with Roosevelt. At that time, Roosevelt 
still intended to have the arms embargo removed and said so 
to Monnet. Roosevelt later changed his mind about the
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embargo and thought better of circumventing the Neutrality 
Law, but the French never took notice. They only remembered 
the President's willingness to lift the embargo.
After i n s p e c t i n g  America's aircraft industry and 
planes, the French decided to purchase the Curtiss-Wright 
P-36, but Curtiss-Wright could supply only one hundred 
planes during the upcoming year. Monnet wanted to buy the 
plane, despite the small number; but the Air Ministry 
questioned the P-36's ability to stand up to the German 
planes. The French sent a test pilot to fly the plane and 
make the decision, but the War Department refused to let him 
fly the plane. Two years earlier, Roosevelt had approved an 
anti-espionage policy that prohibited representatives of a 
foreign power from flying an American military plane until a 
year after the second production plane had been received. 
Ignoring his own order, on March 10, Roosevelt gave the 
French test pilot permission to fly the P-36 with "utmost 
secrecy." The President also instructed the Air Corps to 
remove anything secret from the plane before the flight.3
On May 11, La Chambre told Ambassador Bullitt that the 
Armee de l'Air, the French air force, required at least 2600 
first-line airplanes to fight Germany, but it only had 
1500. Although French aircraft manufacturers could produce 
only forty-five planes a month, La Chambre had promised the 
French General Staff that he would make up the 1100 plane
3john McVickar Haight, Jr., "France's First War Mission 
to the United States," Air Power Historian 11 (January 
1964): ll; McFarland, pp. 182-184.
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deficit by the following spring. Bullitt was shocked to 
learn that the French still believed Roosevelt would find a 
way to circumvent the Neutrality Law, and he could not 
convince them otherwise. Ignoring his protests, La Chambre 
asked Bullitt to arrange for two of the Army Air Corps' 
P-36s to be sent to France for inspection before the others 
arrived, Bullitt reported his conversation to the Presi­
dent, but Roosevelt seemed unconcerned about the French 
shortages. In a reply drafted by the State Department, he 
said that, even with the forty-five planes produced each 
month and the 100 P-36s on order, the French would be 750 
planes short. Roosevelt wanted to know where the French 
thought they would get them. Unless the French immediately 
placed more orders, the American aircraft factories, "which 
already have almost as many orders as they can handle," 
could not deliver that many planes in time. Roosevelt 
rejected the request for two of the Army's P-36s because of 
the political risk involved. If the French were upset about 
the slow delivery of planes, it was the result of their 
"dilatory methods of doing business and not to any lack of 
reasonable cooperation on our own part." Furthermore, 
Roosevelt assured Bullitt that he would not violate the 
Neutrality Law.4 Since they had ordered only one hundred 
planes while professing to be short 750, Roosevelt believed 
that the French were not too worried. They could have been
4William C. Bullitt to Roosevelt, May 12, 1938, and 
Roosevelt to Bullitt, June 5, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 6, May 
1938-Auqust 1938.
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trying to involve America in another war. By the end of the 
Munich Crisis, however, Roosevelt knew that the French were 
truly worried, and he increased the productive capacity of 
the American aircraft industry.
As the possibility of war in Europe grew, Roosevelt 
received alarming reports from his ambassadors. Bullitt 
informed him that the French General Staff believed the 
Germans would hold the Seigfried Line with one-third of 
their army, overwhelm the Czechs with the other two-thirds, 
and destroy Paris with the Luftwaffe. A n t i c i p a t i n g  a 
repetition of the World War, they planned to hold the 
Germans with the Maginot Line while a British naval blockade 
strangled them. General Gustave Gamelin, the French Chief 
of Staff, thought that two years of blockading would deplete 
Germany's oil supplies. With the German airplanes and 
mechanized units paralyzed by a lack of fuel, the Allied 
armies would march into Germany as easily as they had in 
1918. Despite Bullitt's protests, the French thought that 
the United States would enter the war as it had in 1917. 
Bullitt told FDR that the war would destroy Europe, and the 
United States had to stay out of the war. Somebody had to 
remain strong enough to pick up the pieces and "keep alive 
whatever human beings may remain alive in Europe." Roose­
velt could only reply: "May God in His infinite wisdom prove 
that you are wrong." Hugh R. Wilson, the Ambassador to 
Germany, became interested in the German productive capacity 
after speaking to his military and air attaches and American
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aircraft manufacturers visiting Europe that summer. They 
convinced Wilson that the Germans were producing six or 
seven thousand planes annually, giving them the best and 
largest air force in the world. His attaches complained 
that Washington ignored their reports, and Wilson turned to 
Roosevelt. Unaware that the Germans had shown the attaches 
selected units of the Luftwaffe to intimidate them, Wilson 
told Roosevelt that the Germans had been "consistently 
willing to show our people about and give them the widest 
kind of knowledge." He asked the President to send someone 
to Germany with "sufficient influence to carry conviction" 
to learn their production methods.5
Roosevelt's main concern that summer was purging the 
Democratic party of its conservative members. By the middle 
of August, however, he wanted the European democracies to 
take a firmer stand toward Hitler. Learning that Hitler 
would use the Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress in September to 
rally G e r m a n  support for an attack on Czechoslovakia, 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull indicated publicly 
that America would support the democracies in case of war. 
Roosevelt hoped to intimidate Hitler and M u s s o l i n i  by 
allowing France and Great Britain to deposit gold in the 
United States for purchasing war materiel. Secretary of the 
Treasury Morgenthau opposed the idea, and Secretary Hull 
advised Roosevelt that he was taking steps the American
5W i l l i a m  C. Bullitt to Roosevelt, June 13, 1938,
Roosevelt to Bullitt, June 25, 1938, and Hugh R. Wilson to 
Roosevelt, July 11, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 6.
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people would not support. Roosevelt dropped the plan, but 
he continued his efforts to embolden the French and Brit­
ish. The English Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, told 
London that Washington supported a strong stand toward the 
Germans, and Roosevelt told a French visitor that France 
could count on the United States for everything but "troops 
and loans."6
President Roosevelt took concrete steps to meet the 
German menace after hearing Hitler's Nuremberg speech on 
September 12. He sent Harry Hopkins to the West Coast to 
survey the aircraft industry with a view toward expanding 
the production of military aircraft. FDR had decided that 
war would inevitably come within five years. E c h o i n g  
Bullitt's belief, he told William Phillips, the American 
Ambassador to Italy, that the United States had to be in a 
position to pick up the pieces of European civilization and 
save the "remains of the wreck." If the American people 
thought the European dictators were threatening America, the 
United States might "wade in with everything we have" to 
support the Allies. Unlike 1914, when Americans tried to be 
neutral in thought, ninety percent of Americans were anti- 
German and anti-Italian. "I would strongly encourage their 
natural sympathy while at the same time avoiding any thought 
of sending troops to Europe," Roosevelt said.? This is what
6Dallek, pp. 162-165.
?Roosevelt to William Phillips, September 15, 1938, in 
Schewe, vol. 7, September 1938-November 1938.
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Roosevelt did in September 1939, when World War II started.
The submission of France and Great Britain disgusted 
President Roosevelt. On Friday, September 16, Chamberlain 
flew to Berchtesgaden to discuss the surrender of the 
Sudetenland to Germany. Roosevelt told his Cabinet that 
Chamberlain was for peace at any price and the French and 
British would sell the Czechs out to the Germans then "wash 
the blood from their Judas Iscariot hands." The following 
day, Roosevelt told Harold Ickes that the French could not 
penetrate the German frontier, and the attempt would cost 
France over a million men. But the Germans could not breach 
the Maginot Line either. Totally discounting the British 
army, he believed the Russian army could not strike Germany 
effectively through Romania. Then, Roosevelt explained that 
he would fight a defensive war. First, he would inform the 
G e r m a n  p eople that there were no de s i g n s  on G e r m a n  
territory, to calm their fears and undermine their morale. 
Second, he would blockade Germany. Third, Roosevelt would 
make it principally an airwar. With Great Britain, France 
and Russia pounding Germany from the air, Germany would be 
unable to defend itself, and the German civilians would 
crack before the French and British. Roosevelt said that an 
airwar would cost less, have comparatively fewer casualties, 
and be more likely to succeed than a traditional land and 
sea war. Conveniently, Roosevelt left Italy out of his 
strategy, but Mussolini still had a stake in keeping Germany
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from getting too powerful.**
The French General Staff had influenced President 
Roosevelt. His comments to Ickes echoed William Bullitt's 
reports of a stalemate on the Franco-German boarder and a 
naval blockade. However, Roosevelt's ideas about the 
results of an airwar did not come from the French General 
Staff. Like the Luftwaffe, the Armee de l'Air was designed 
for ground support, not strategic bombing. Roosevelt's 
assumptions about civilian morale and the low cost of an 
airwar came from the advocates of strategic bombing like 
Billy Mitchell. In Skyways, Mitchell had written:
Should a war take place on the ground between 
two industrial nations in the future, it can only 
end in absolute ruin, if the same methods that the 
ground armies have followed before should be 
resorted to. Fortunately, an entirely new element 
has come into being, that of air power. Air power 
can attack the vital centers [population and 
production centers] of the opp o s i n g  c o u n t r y  
directly, completely destroying or paralyzing 
them. Very little of a great nation's strength 
has to be expended in conducting air operations.
A few men and comparatively few dollars can be 
used for bringing about the most terrific effect 
ever known against opposing vital centers.9
Roosevelt knew that a blockade and an airwar would bring
starvation and death to German civilians, but the bombing of
Germany would not be in retaliation for the bombing of Paris
and London. The prophecies of millions of casualties and
the complete destruction of European civilization in a
**New York T i m e s , September 17, 1938; Ickes, Secret 
Diary, vol. 2, pp. 467-469.
^Mitchell, Skyways, pp. 255-256; Weigley, American Way 
of War, pp. 233-235; Craven and Cate, pp. 41-42.
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repetition of the World War made Roosevelt's p l a n  for 
defeating Germany the more humane approach.
When the Czechs agreed, under Anglo-French pressure, to 
s u r r e n d e r  the S u d e t e n l a n d  on September 21, Roosevelt 
believed war might be averted. But fresh demands from 
Hitler once again increased the chances of war. The French 
continued mobilizing, prepared to evacuate Paris, and packed 
up the art treasures of the Louvre for safe storage against 
German bombs. The British issued gas masks to civilians and 
dug air raid trenches in London's parks. At a Cabinet 
meeting, Roosevelt repeated his ideas on fighting a defen­
sive war, but he still hoped to prevent the conflict. On 
September 26, FDR appealed to the Europeans to avoid a war 
in which "the lives of millions of men, women and children 
in every country involved will most certainly be lost under 
circumstances of unspeakable horror." Hitler remained 
unmoved. The next day, Roosevelt asked Mussolini to help 
n e g o t i a t e  a peace. Then, Hitler changed his mind and 
invited the leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy to 
Munich, where they worked out a settlement. Hitler signed a 
joint declaration that Great Britain and Germany mutually 
desired to never go to war, and Chamberlain returned to 
England to proclaim "that it is peace for our time." During 
the crisis, Bullitt explained the situation: "If you have 
enough airplanes you don't have to go to Berchtesgaden.m10
^-Olckes, pp. 472-476; Dallek, pp. 164-166; Bullitt to 
Roosevelt, September 20, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 7.
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It was a moral that Roosevelt remembered.
Before learning that Hitler had invited Chamberlain, 
Daladier and Mussolini to Munich, Bullitt prepared for 
Roosevelt an estimate of the European air forces. France 
had six hundred combat planes, to be supplemented by two 
h u n d r e d  forty British light bombers. French Military 
Intelligence mistakenly estimated that the Germans had six 
thousand five hundred combat planes with two-thirds of them 
bombers and that the Italians had eight hundred pursuit and 
twelve hundred bombers. To overcome the German and Italian 
superiority, Minister for Air La Chambre suggested bypassing 
the Neutrality Law by the building of aircraft factories in 
Canada and letting Americans work there. He also asked for 
airplane parts, motors and machine tools. Bullitt believed 
that the American people would be willing to send the French 
airplanes after the Luftwaffe destroyed Paris, and he wanted 
to let the Allies purchase anything they could pay for. 
After learning of the Munich conference, Bullitt begged 
Roosevelt for a quick reply about exporting planes, motors 
and machine tools. "Unless France and England can manufac­
ture in this way and on this scale," he warned, "the time 
will come again when Hitler will issue a ukase, and make war 
when it is not obeyed by France and England."11 Through 
Bullitt's warnings, Roosevelt learned that an increase in 
the French air force was vital.
11Bullitt to Roosevelt, September 28, 1938, in Schewe, 
vol. 7.
Even though the Czechoslovakia crisis had been resolved 
at Munich and the threat of war abated, Roosevelt went out 
of his way to facilitate French purchases of A m e r i c a n  
planes. On September 26, a French air mission requested 
permission to inspect the various planes being built for the 
United States Navy. Discovering that the Navy prohibited 
trial flights of its airplanes without presidential approv­
al, they sought the aid of Cordell Hull. He assured the 
President that the planes carried no secret devices and 
asked him to approve the flights. Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Leahy suggested the President withhold his official 
approval because it would form a precedent. If the Presi­
dent wanted to let the French fly the planes, Admiral Leahy 
recommended giving informal approval to avoid the risk of 
another nation demanding the same privilege. President 
Roosevelt faced a greater risk of antagonizing the isola­
tionists in Congress should they learn that he had allowed 
the French to fly Navy planes. By October 1938, President 
Roosevelt's conviction that the democracies needed more 
p l a n e s  to halt Hitler outweighed his misgivings about 
antagonizing Congress. On October 4, Roosevelt gave his 
approval.12
Throughout the Munich Crisis, Harry Hopkins had toured 
of the West Coast aircraft factories, accompanied by Colonel
■^Memorandum from Cordell Hull to Roosevelt, September 
27, 1938, Memorandum from Admiral William D. L e a h y  to 
Roosevelt, September 29, 1938, and Memorandum from Hull to 
Leahy, October 8, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 7.
Arthur R. Wilson, the liaison officer between the Army and 
the Works Progress Administration. Hopkins told Wilson that 
the Army and Navy were "sitting pretty to get a lot of money 
in the next relief bill for the national defense if they can 
sell the idea to the President." Hopkins wanted the War 
Department to present a big program for modern armaments and 
airplanes. This program would create full employment and 
get the arsenals going at top speed. Saying that Hopkins 
"has the ear of the President," Wilson reported Hopkins' 
remarks to the General Staff with a recommendation that the 
Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief meet with Hopkins to 
formulate a plan. Seldom aggressive in seeking funds beyond 
those appropriated by Congress, the War Department hesitated 
to seek funds from the WPA, and Hopkins criticized their 
lackadaisical efforts. Informing Marshall of Hopkins' 
comment, Wilson suggested that Marshall see Hopkins him­
self. After Christmas, Marshall told Hopkins about the weak 
condition of the Army and the Army Air Corps. Shocked by 
the information, Hopkins recommended that Marshall visit 
Roosevelt personally, but Marshall refused, not wanting to 
go outside the proper channels. However, he convinced 
H o p k i n s  to spend several million dollars of WPA funds 
secretly on machine tools for the manufacture of small arms 
ammunition. When the British ammunition shortages became 
desperate in 1940, the production of ammunition had been 
gearing up for almost a full year. A year delay then would 
have been disastrous for the British. But more importantly.
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Marshall started seeking funds in a more aggressive manner. 
This meeting with Hopkins proved very important to Marsh­
all's career. They became close friends, and Hopkins helped 
persuade Roosevelt to name Marshall the Chief of Staff in 
1939.13
On September 21, General Oscar Westover died in an 
airplane crash, and Hap Arnold became the Chief of the Air 
Corps. Returning to Washington from his tour of the West 
Coast factories, Hopkins met with Arnold to discuss aircraft 
production. In Harry Hopkins, Arnold also found a friend. 
Concluding that productive capacity needed to be greatly 
expanded, Hopkins suggested using WPA funds to build more 
aircraft factories. Watching the events in Europe, Arnold 
realized that the Army Air Corps might have to expand 
rapidly. He remembered how foreign and domestic orders for 
aircraft had swamped the American aviation industry in 1917, 
and decided on a plan. By enlarging the American aircraft 
industry to supply the needs of Great Britain and France, 
the factories needed to expand the Army Air Corps would 
already be in place. One difficulty, however, was that the 
aircraft manufacturers would not want to invest capital into 
expanding their factories only to have them sit idle after 
the government orders were completed. Arnold called a 
meeting with representatives from all the aircraft manufac­
tures in the United States, and he persuaded them to expand
13Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948; revised ed. 1950), 
pp. 99-102; Pogue, pp. 325-326.
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their factories.
On September 2, Roosevelt showed Ambassador Wilson's 
letter of July 11 to Secretary of War Woodring, and he 
became increasingly worried about Germany's growing aerial 
powers. In early October, Woodring directed Arnold to 
prepare a plan for expanding the Army Air Corps by 4000 
planes. Calling together his staff, Arnold went around the 
table and had each officer write on an easel his estimate of 
the number of planes needed to meet America's world-wide 
requirements. Accustomed to thinking in terms of only a few 
planes, they estimated a total of only 1500 airplanes. 
Dismayed, Arnold asked them to reconsider and named each 
area they might have to defend. Still, they came up with a 
total of only 7500 airplanes. Thinking in terms of tens of 
thousands of planes, Arnold realized how difficult it would 
be to sell his vast expansion scheme if his own staff had 
such a narrow view. He left the easel in the conference 
room, and during the Second World War he would point to it 
as an example of small thinking.
Soon after meeting with his staff, Arnold spoke with 
the aviation representatives in the Munitions Building. 
Making no promises, he told them that tens of thousands of 
planes would be needed. The aircraft manufacturers were 
used to negotiating for as few as six planes, but they were 
not shocked. They had been following the events in Europe 
too. Some of them balked, but most accepted Arnold's ideas 
for farming out the production of subassemblies to converted
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industrial plants. The meeting was successful and broke up 
with plans for more meetings in the future. Having won the 
support of the aircraft industy, Arnold s u b m i t t e d  his 
expansion plan to the War Department on October 19.14
The American public first l e arned of R o o s e v e l t ' s  
concern about the German and Italian threat when William 
Bullitt returned to Washington on October 13. Roosevelt and 
B u l l i t t  talked late into the night, and the next day 
Roosevelt told a press conference that the defense needs of 
the nation were under reevaluation. The reappraisal had 
been in progress for over a year but had "been forced to a 
head by events, developments and information received within 
the past month." A War Department spokesman announced plans 
to ask Congress to increase the Army Air Corps to more than 
twice the authorized level of 2320 planes. Reporters asked 
General Arnold to name the types of planes under considera­
tion. He explained that the Air Corps, concentrating on 
speed rather than size, would not order any more thirty-two 
ton B-15s. Purchases would be limited to ground support 
b o m b e r s  and seventeen ton B-17s for distant strategic 
objectives and to reinforce Hawaii, Panama and Alaska.15
The supporters of air power saw in the reappraisal an 
opportunity to obtain a larger air force. On October 15, 
Johnson sent Roosevelt and the Chief of Staff a memorandum
14Arnold, pp. 171-175; McFarland, pp. 164-165.
15Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 131-132; New York Times,
October 15, 1938.
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outlining America's aerial requirements in wartime and 
calling for a larger air force. In 1937, the United States 
had produced only 949 military aircraft of all types and had 
a shortage of 5000 aircraft. America had to build enough 
planes to meet its requirements at the outbreak of war plus 
s u f f i c i e n t  reserves to make good wartime losses until 
production could be expanded. Reading press reports that 
Roosevelt would ask Congress for 10,000 airplanes and a 
large increase in aircraft factories, G e n e r a l  A n d r e w s  
attempted to convince the General Staff that the bulk of the 
planes should be B-17s. Writing to Deputy Chief of Staff 
Marshall, he said that Army fliers wanted the GHQ Air Force 
to consist of a larger percentage of long-range, heavy 
bombers. In addition to being "of inestimable value" in 
supporting the Monroe Doctrine, the long-range bomber was 
the best weapon for controlling the narrow waters around 
Singapore, the Mediterranean, and Panama. He also warned 
that purchasing large numbers of airplanes would strengthen 
the aircraft industry, without creating an air force. The 
GHQ Air Force needed personnel to operate the new planes. 
Great Britain and France did not fear Germany's potential 
air power. "Their principal worry was the German and 
Italian airplanes sitting on their airdromes with trained 
combat crews, ready to go." Andrews' appeal to Marshall had 
little effect. Scheduled to end his tour as commander of 
the GHQ Air Force in early 1939, Andrews was left out of the 
planning for the President's expansion program. Never the-
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less, Andrews had done his part by instructing G e o r g e  
C. M a r s h a l l  about the problems involved with aircraft 
production.16
On October 25, Roosevelt met with Bullitt, Secretary 
Morgenthau and Jean Monnet to discuss ways to enlarge the 
Armee de I'Air. Roosevelt said that the American aircraft 
industry could supply France with one thousand pursuit 
planes and one thousand bombers. Later that day, Roosevelt 
told Assistant Secretary Johnson that he wanted to expand 
the Army Air Corps and the production of aircraft. Placing 
him in charge of a three-man committee, which included 
A u b r e y  Williams, the Deputy Administrator of the WPA, 
Roosevelt instructed Johnson to report on ways to increase 
the monthly production of military aircraft. Unhindered by 
presidential restrictions, the committee submitted a plan on 
October 28 to produce 31,000 planes within two years and 
increase production capabilities to more than 20,000 planes 
annually. Private industry would be called on to increase 
its annual production capacity from 2600 to 11,000 planes. 
Meanwhile, government-owned factories would be built with 
the capacity to produce 20,000 planes a year. They antici­
pated the plan would cost $855 million. Realizing that 
Secretary Woodring's plan for purchasing 4000 airplanes fell
16Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of War Louis 
Johnson to Roosevelt, October 15, 1938, FDR Papers, PSF, 
D e p a r t m e n t a l ,  Box 105, War Department, Louis Johnson; 
Andrews to Marshall, October 18, 1938, and Marshall to 
Andrews, October 25, 1938, Andrews Papers, General Corre­
spondence, Box 5, Personal Correspondence, "M" 1929-1939.
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short of what the President would want, General Arnold 
s u b m i t t e d  a new plan. Less ambitious than Johnson's, 
Arnold's plan proposed expanding the Army Air Corps to 7000 
planes and increasing production capacity to only 10,000 
planes annually.
The 14,000 plane difference between the plans submitted 
by Johnson and Arnold demonstrated that Arnold had failed to 
convince the Assistant Secretary of War of the need for a 
balanced air force in March. The disparity also showed the 
influence of Harry Hopkins, Aubrey Williams and the other 
liberal New Dealers, who hoped to reduce the economic peak 
and boom periods by increased government spending during 
hard times and increased taxes during prosperity. Since the 
first of the year, these New Dealers had tried to convince 
Roosevelt to move away from the idea of a balanced budget to 
a more Keynesian approach. They wanted a multi-billion 
dollar spending program. Secretary Morgenthau opposed them, 
but when the Stock Market crashed again on March 25, 1938, 
Hopkins and Williams convinced the President to support the 
spending program. On April 14, Roosevelt asked Congress to 
authorize a large scale spending program, and Congress gave 
him $3.75 billion. Johnson's expansion program was another 
victory for the Keynesian New Dealers. Williams exploited 
Johnson's enthusiasm for a large air force and created 
another way to pump money into the economy. And Roosevelt 
knew what would happen. After all, Roosevelt knew that
^McFarland, PP* -^65 and 182-184.
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Williams favored expanded government spending and Johnson 
favored an expanded air force. The President might have 
wanted to increase spending or expand the Army Air Corps, 
but his main concern was producing the aircraft to stop 
Hitler.18
Over the second weekend of November, Roosevelt informed 
key military and civilian leaders of a meeting on November 
14. When the conference gathered that Monday afternoon, 
Roosevelt had before him Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, 
Administrator of the WPA Harry Hopkins, Solicitor General 
Robert Jackson, General Counsel of the Treasury Herman 
Oliphant, Chief of Staff General Malin Craig, Deputy Chief 
of Staff General George Marshall, Chief of the Air Corps 
General Hap Arnold, Executive Assistant to the Assistant 
S e c r e t a r y  of War Colonel James Burns, the President's 
Military Aid Colonel Pa Watson, and the President's Naval 
Aid Captain Daniel Callahan. The President did most of the 
talking. The defenses of the United States were very weak 
and needed a heavy striking force of Army planes. The Navy 
also needed more planes. Any production plans adopted by 
the Army must leave sufficient facilities for naval aircraft 
production. Congress should amend procurement bills to 
a l l o w  the use of c o st-plus and f i x e d - f e e  contracts.
18Memorandum from Arnold to Johnson, March 9, 1938, 
Arnold Papers, Box 15, File 228, General Correspondence; 
Arthur Krock, "In the Nation," New York Times, December 9, 
1938, p. 24; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, pp. 244-245 and 256-257.
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Roosevelt wanted to assure the manufacturers that they would 
receive adequate returns on all investments in expanding 
their factories. The Government would assign construction 
to any available factory suited for the design. Mass 
production would flow from the assembly lines which would 
not be halted to incorporate alterations. Manufacturers 
delivering planes below cost estimates and ahead of time 
could earn a premium. Late delivery dates and excessive 
costs would incur a penalty.
After Arnold described British and French inferiority 
to Germany and Italy in numbers of airplanes and productive 
capacity, Roosevelt said that the United States needed an 
air force large enough to protect the Western Hemisphere. 
America must not repeat its 1918 failure to provide air­
planes. Since Congress would provide only half of the
20,000 planes and capacity to produce 24,000 planes annual­
ly, the War Department had to present an "acceptable" 
two-year program for 2500 trainers, 3750 combat planes and 
3750 reserve combat planes. One-fifth of the 10,000 planes 
would be built in new government factories, and the rest 
would come from existing commercial facilities. The WPA 
needed to construct seven new factories, two building the 
government's portion of planes and the other five remaining 
idle until needed for a larger air expansion program.
The President's strong stand on aviation startled most 
of the men attending the conference, but not Johnson, Burns, 
Hopkins and Arnold. Having discussed the expansion before­
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hand, they had already agreed on a plan. After the meeting,
Arnold and Burns gave General Craig what Arnold called a
"get-rich-quick course" on how to build an air force. This
time, he found Craig to be a "very apt pupil." Arnold left
the White House feeling that the Army Air Corps had finally
"achieved its Magna Carta." With the President's support
for a larger air force. Hap Arnold had the power to create
the balanced air force he wanted. Later, Arnold wrote that
A battle was won in the White House that day which 
took its place with— or at least led t o - - t h e  
victories in combat later for time is a most 
important factor in building an Air Force. There 
is no substitute— five years to secure a plane 
after the designers get the idea, and one year to 
train personnel after they are inducted.19
The airplanes with which the Army Air Forces drove the 
L u f t w a f f e  from the skies of Europe in 1943-1944 were 
available because of Roosevelt's actions in 1938.
President Roosevelt's decision to expand the Army Air 
Corps marked a significant reversal of his earlier efforts 
to reduce the Army Air Corps and reduce military expendi­
tures. The events in Europe forced the reversal. With arms 
limitation a dead issue, the military threat to liberal 
government from overseas outweighed the threat of being 
"wrecked on the rocks of loose fiscal policy."20 However,
19Notes taken by Arnold, November 14, 1938, FDR Papers, 
OF, War Department, Box 30, OF25, Chief of Staff, 1935-1939; 
A rnold, pp. 177-180; Watson, pp. 136-139; McFarland, 
pp. 165-166; Interview of Marshall, March 6, 1957, in Bland 
and Ritenour, pp. 650-651.
20Burns, Lion and the F o x , pp. 166-171. See note 
number 5 in Chapter Two.
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FDR's willingness to increase spending did not mark a shift 
from the First New Deal. He opposed monopoly by ordering 
the Army Air Corps to carry the mail, and his expansion 
program embodied the idea too. Government owned factories, 
like the TVA, would insure increased prod u c t i o n  w h i l e  
providing a "yardstick" to compare the prices charged by the 
aircraft industry. Similar to the defunct NRA's codes, the 
government would assign construction to insure that no 
plants remained idle. Also reminiscent of the relief 
measures of the PWA under the NRA, the WPA would provide 
increased spending.
Many people believed that Roosevelt really wanted the 
planes for the British and French rather than the Army Air 
Corps. The absence of Secretary Woodring and General 
Andrews from the November 14 conference substantiates that 
supposition. Roosevelt did not invite Woodring because he 
opposed the expansion of the Army Air Corps without a 
commensurate increase in the rest of the Army.21 if the 
President wanted to build a strike force of Army planes to 
defend the Western Hemisphere as he said, Andrews, who 
commanded the strike force of the Army Air Corps, should 
have been present. Instead, only Arnold, who controlled the 
procurement of aircraft, attended the meeting. Since 
Roosevelt said nothing about airfields or personnel, the 
production of large numbers of planes, not their tactical 
usage, concerned him. Leaving tactics to the British and
21McFarland, pp. 166-167; Watson, p. 138.
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French, Roosevelt dealt with the production of airplanes.
Roosevelt told the press that he would ask Congress to 
defend the Western Hemisphere by expanding the Army Air 
Corps. Privately, he indicated that he really desired 
aiding the British and French. Soon after the November 14 
conference, he suggested to Arthur Murray ways that the 
Allies could match the German and Italian air programs. 
Roosevelt also described methods, outside the Neutrality 
Law, by which the United States could help them build an 
o v e r w h e l m i n g  aerial superiority. Murray relayed the 
information to Chamberlain.22
Despite the President's explicit desire to concentrate 
upon the production of airplanes, his military advisors drew 
up plans to create a balanced ground force to go along with 
the airplanes. General Marshall asked General John J. Per­
shing to lobby Roosevelt for increased funding of the ground 
forces. Assistant Secretary Johnson instructed Chief of 
Staff Craig to prepare a two-year budget for 10,000 planes 
and seven government aircraft factories. But going far 
beyond Roosevelt's instructions, Johnson told the General 
Staff to include the necessary provisions to prepare for a 
much larger ground force. Under pressure to finish its 
plans for inclusion in the President's January address to 
Congress, the General Staff used Air Corps officers. Rather
22white House Press Conference, November 15, 1938, in 
Schewe, vol. 7; Arthur Murray to Roosevelt, December 15, 
1938, and Roosevelt to Murray, January 19, 1939, in Schewe, 
vol. 8, December 1938-February 1939.
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than planning for the 10,000 airplanes Roosevelt wanted, 
they planned for a balanced air force. The War Plans 
Division presented its own plan for a ground force capable 
of rapidly taking control of potential air bases in the 
Western Hemisphere.
On December 1, Johnson sent Roosevelt his rearmament 
program. It included $1.3 billion for an air program, $421 
million for supplies to equip the Protective Mobilization 
Plan Army, and $122 million for industrial preparedness. 
Roosevelt called his military advisors to another meeting 
and sharply explained that Congress would not approve more 
than $500 million. He had asked for airplanes and was being 
offered everything but airplanes. Less compliant than two 
weeks before, his advisors complained that the 10,000 planes 
would become obsolete before they could be used. To this he 
said that the British could use the planes if the Air Corps 
could not. Clearly intending to use airplanes as a deter­
rent, R o o s e v e l t  explained that planes, not "barracks, 
runways and schools for mechanics," would influence Hitler. 
But by the end of the meeting, his advisors changed Roose­
velt's mind. Of the $500 million, $320 million would go to 
the ground forces, leaving $180 million to purchase 3000 
airplanes. On January 12, 1939, Roosevelt asked Congress 
for the agreed upon numbers.
Roosevelt had political reasons to scale down his
10,000 plane program. Between November 14 and December 1, 
Johnson had publicly spoken of the need for a large air
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force, and Senator Bennett Clark from Missouri criticized it 
as a cover for a pump-priming, spending program. Senators 
George Norris, Gerald Nye, David Walsh and William Borah 
expressed the same suspicions, and many newspapers across 
the nation opposed the building of a huge air force. Had 
the public greeted Johnson's remarks more favorably, Presi­
dent Roosevelt might not have been so c o mpliant. The 
aviation program that Roosevelt finally accepted was based 
upon the program Woodring had asked Arnold to prepare back 
in October. Later known as the Woodring Plan, the plan 
called for a 5500 plane Army Air Corps by the middle of 
1941. Passed by Congress and signed by Roosevelt on April 
26, 1939, the Woodring Plan raised the strength of the Army 
Air Corps to 6000 planes, 3203 officers and 45,000 enlisted
men.23
Roosevelt's speech to Congress initiated new calls for 
long-range bombers. Three days after the speech, the New 
York Times printed a graph showing the range of the B-17:
23Watson, pp. 137-143; McFarland, pp. 167-171; "State­
ment to the Assistant Chiefs of Staff" by Marshall, November 
17, 1938, Marshall to John J. Pershing November 23 and
December 20, 1938, in Bland and Ritenour, pp. 652-653,
654-655, and 680; Orders relieving Eaker of duty in the 
Information Division and transfering him to duty as the 
Executive of the Executive Division, Eaker Papers, Corre­
spondence Box 3, 1939 File; Acting Secretary of War Louis 
Johnson to General Craig, December 10, 1938, Letter and 
Memorandum entitled "Army Two-year Augmentation Program," 
D e c e m b e r  19, 1938, FDR Papers, PSF, Subject Box 116,
Aviation; Dallek, pp. 171-174; Roosevelt's address to Cong­
ress, January 12, 1939, in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The 
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 10 
vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1938-1950), vol. 8, 1939: War 
and Neutrality, pp. 70-74.
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with five tons, it could fly from New York City to Washing­
ton and back, a 300 mile radius; with three tons, it could 
make a round trip to Cincinnati, a 900 mile radius. The 
inference was obvious, if a B-17 could fly 900 hundred miles 
westward over the United States, it could as easily fly the 
same distance eastward over the Atlantic. Although not 
credited to the GHQ Air Force, the g raph l o o k e d  like 
something made by Andrews and his men. But Andrews was 
blunter than that. On the seventeenth, he w a r n e d  the 
National Aeronautic Association that air power could not be 
created by purchasing airplanes. To possess real air power, 
the U n i t e d  States needed trained crews and long-range 
bombers to meet any emergency.2^
Like so many others, General Andrews thought that FDR 
only wanted to strengthen the Army Air Corps. However, the 
American people discovered that was not necessarily the 
case. After meeting with Roosevelt on October 25, Monnet 
had convinced Premier Daladier to place a large order for 
American planes. Warning of the need for absolute secrecy, 
Daladier told his Defense Council on December 5 that France 
might receive one thousand of the United States Army Air 
Corps' latest planes, and Monnet returned to Washington to 
purchase them. Aware that Woodring, Craig and Arnold would
24»F1ying Range Qf the 'plying Fortress' Bombers," New 
York T i m e s , January 15, 1939, sec. 4, p. 6; Andrews to 
Lieutenant Colonel Clinton W. Howard, January 13, 1939, 
Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 4, Personal 
Correspondence, "H" 1929-1940; New York Times, January 17, 
1939.
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oppose the sale of American planes to the French, Roosevelt 
had Monnet deal with Secretary Morgenthau, who favored 
aircraft sales to the Allies. Roosevelt justified his
decision by claiming that the Procurement Division of the
Treasury Department was more experienced in handling large 
scale purchases than the War Department. Woodring learned 
of Monnet's mission when the Frenchman asked to see the 
newest Army planes. The Secretary of War objected. Stating 
that France was America's first line of defense, Roosevelt 
gave Morgenthau a note granting the French permission to 
inspect and purchase the planes.25
The press learned of the Monnet mission when a bomber 
carrying a French inspector crashed on January 23. General 
Arnold was testifying before the Senate Military Affairs 
committee when the Senators heard about the crash. Arnold 
admitted knowledge of the Frenchman's presence to Senator 
Clark and tried to explain that the plane carried no secret
devices. Clark asked who had permitted the Frenchman to see
the plane, and Arnold said that permission came from Secre­
tary Morgenthau. The Committee forced Secretary Woodring to 
admit that Roosevelt had authorized the inspection. Chair­
man Morris spoke to Roosevelt and reported that there was
%
nothing to worry about. Still skeptical, the whole Commit­
tee called upon the President. FDR explained that he wanted 
the American people to gradually realize the danger of world 
domination by Germany, Italy and Japan. A series of Pacific
25McFarland, pp. 182-185.
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islands defended by the Navy, Army and Army Air Corps formed 
America's first line of defense, but England and France 
acted as America's first line of defense in the Atlantic. 
If the Axis destroyed the British and French air forces, 
"...their factories, including their airplane factories, 
which, of course, are in a very small area— you could put 
the whole of England into the State of New York and you 
could put France very easily into the area of New England—  
would be put out of commission in short order." Without 
planes and other implements of war France and England would 
be defeated and forced to cede their African colonies. The 
rest of Europe would fall under Hitler's domination. His 
next step would be the domination of Latin America by 
controlling their commerce with Europe or inciting fascist 
revolutions. A Nazi foothold in L atin A m e r i c a  w o u l d  
threaten the United States. From Venezuela, their planes 
could fly to Miami in two hours and fifty-five minutes, and 
planes from Columbia could reach the Panama Canal in fifty 
minutes. Germany had 1500 bombers capable of flying from 
Germany to Colombia within forty-eight hours. The United 
States had "about eighty that can go down there." To 
prepare for such an emergency, Roosevelt wanted to achieve 
the mass production of airplanes through large orders. 
Since French and British orders furthered that goal, the 
President welcomed them. Moreover, foreign orders reduced 
u n e m p l o y m e n t  in A m e r i c a  and strengthened France. He 
promised make the Allies pay cash for the planes and protect
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America's only real military secret, the Norden bomb sight. 
Despite pledging to keep the meeting secret, someone on the 
Military Affairs Committee told the press that Roosevelt 
regarded Prance as America's frontier. Roosevelt called it 
a "deliberate lie," but the public controversy did not abate 
until Monnet purchased 555 planes and returned to France in 
M a r c h . 26 g y  then, the American people knew that Roosevelt 
planned to sell planes to the Allies. His intention to make 
America the arsenal of democracy was clear long before he 
announced it.
Roosevelt's use of New York and New England as examples 
showed that warnings about their vulnerability to air attack 
had impressed him. The GHQ Air Force's highly publicized 
cold-weather and Farmingdale blackout tests had studied ways 
to d e f e n d  the area. Therefore, the comparison of the 
vulnerability of the British and French aircraft factories 
to that of the New York-New England area would not have been 
lost on the Senators. Because of the B-17 flights to Latin 
America, nobody could ignore his warning about 1500 German 
planes in South America.
M o n n e t ' s air mission influenced President Roosevelt's
26conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee 
in the White House, January 31, 1939, and Press Conferences 
on February 3 and 17, 1939 [Roosevelt repeated much of what 
he told the Senators to the press on February 17, 1939], in 
Schewe, vol. 8; Arnold, pp. 184-186; Coffey, pp. 192-195; 
McFarland, pp. 185-191; Arthur Krock, "Foreign Policy Mix-up 
Follows Secret Moves," New York Times, February 5, 1939, 
sec. 4, p. 3.
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decision to compromise on his 10,000 airplane plan.2? His 
arrival with the money and the authority to buy American 
planes suggested that more foreign orders would follow, 
having the same effect on America's aviation industry as 
would more orders from the Army Air Corps. Factories would 
be expanded, and American productive capacity would grow. 
Also, when war had seemed imminent in September 1938, 
Ambassador Bullitt had told Roosevelt that "the horror and 
hatred evoked by German bombings will be so great that the 
people of the United States...will not feel inclined to 
prevent planes purchased before the outbreak of war from 
being sent to defend whatever may be left of France from 
further German bombings." Should war break out, Roosevelt 
knew that he would have less difficulty in shipping planes 
bought beforehand than shipping planes designated for the 
Army Air Corps. Between the opposition from his military 
advisors, the threats from isolationists and the prospect of 
increased French orders, Roosevelt had every reason to agree 
to a smaller, but balanced, Army Air Corps.2^
2?Other possiblities are: FDR might have agreed to a 
smaller number after the public responded negatively to 
Louis Johnson's call for a large air force; he may have 
spoken about such a large number to appear judicious when he 
accepted a smaller number; or, he may have hoped to jar the 
Army Air Corps into thinking and planning in large numbers. 
For further information, see Stetson Conn, gen. ed., United 
States Army in World War II: Special Studies, (Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 
Army, 1964), Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the 
Army Air Forces by Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., pp. 172-173.
2®Bullitt to Roosevelt, September 28, 1938, in Schewe, 
vol. 7. For an example of how Roosevelt's reduced request 
made him appear moderate see the New York Times, January 13,
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The Neutrality Law would not have hindered the shipment 
of American planes to France. Roosevelt had gotten around 
it for half of 1938. By not declaring the Sino-Japanese 
conflict a war, Roosevelt allowed American arms manufac­
turers to sell weapons. But the Roosevelt Administration 
insured that only the Chinese received American arms. In 
June, Secretary of State Hull publicly condemned the bombing 
of civilians and discouraged American manufacturers from 
selling bombers to countries p r a c t i c i n g  that form of 
warfare. Since Japan was bombing civilians in China, the 
manufacturers understood what Hull meant. To further that 
policy, the Hull warned that the State Department would 
issue "with great regret" licenses authorizing exportation 
of airplanes, parts or bombs to countries "making use of 
airplanes for attack upon civilian populations." Aircraft 
sales to the Chinese were not prohibited, because they were 
not bombing Japanese civilians.
S e c r e t a r y  Hull stopped the sale of aircraft and 
aircraft parts to Japan with the President's approval. 
After seeing an article about markets for airplanes and 
parts in Asia, Roosevelt asked Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles if aviation sales to Japan might be cut 
further. Welles gave the President a copy of the letter 
sent to the manufacturers and reported that, with the 
exception of the United Aircraft Corporation, most had 
cooperated. Sales of airplanes and parts to Japan had
1939.
233
dropped from $1,710,049 in June to only $7215 in October. 
To force United Aircraft to cooperate, Welles planned on 
publicizing the company's "failure to c o n f o r m  to the 
Department's policy...." Since Roosevelt did not object, he 
approved the State Department's actions. The National 
Munitions Control Board reprinted Secretary Hull's letter in 
its annual report to Congress, and a New York Times editor­
ial pointed to it as evidence of Roosevelt's skirting the 
Neutrality Law by declaring that a "war" did not exist. The 
Times supported Roosevelt's actions because in this case the 
Neutrality Act did not represent the opinion or serve the 
interests of the American people.29
The Times and other Americans did not know how far the 
President would support the Chinese and oppose the Japan­
ese. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Leahy sent Roosevelt 
a memorandum containing parts of another letter on policy 
from Admiral Yarnell. Motivated by a lack of raw materials, 
Japan wanted to turn China into another Manchukuo. Since 
China lacked oil, iron ore, rubber, wool and other necessi­
ties, Japan would "extend her domination over the Philip­
pines, Netherlands Indies, and any other lands containing 
the necessary items." If the United States chose to oppose 
the Japanese, it had to make a joint announcement with the
29Memorandum from Roosevelt to Under Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles, December 10, 1938, and Welles to Roosevelt, 
December 15, 1938, with enclosure from Joseph C. Green, 
Chief, Office of Arms and Munitions Control, Department of 
State, July 1, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 8; New York Times, 
January 11, 1939.
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other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty that no Sino-Jap- 
anese agreement would be recognized unless it maintained 
Chinese independence and territorial integrity. The 
signatories could not make loans or ship war materials to 
Japan. The United States had to strengthen its defenses in 
the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii. He specifically recom­
mended an "increase of Army and Navy a v i a t i o n  in the 
Philippines." Japan depended upon sea communications for 
supplies and to supply its troops in China. "Any threat 
against these lines of communication will have a profound 
effect on her attitude of mind regarding the settlement of 
the p r e s e n t  c o n t r o v e r s y . A s  relations with Japan 
deteriorated in 1941, President Roosevelt remembered what 
Yarnell had said about threatening Japan's supply lines as a 
way to halt Japanese aggression.
However, Yarnell's recommendations had a more immediate 
effect. When the Seventy-sixth Congress met in January, the 
first document filed was the report of the Naval Board, 
headed by Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn. Among other 
places, the Board recommended the construction of air and 
submarine bases at Guam, Wake, Johnson, Palmyra, Canton, and 
Rose Islands. Establishing a base at Guam would assure the 
practical immunity of the Philippines to a major attack, 
simplify the defense of Hawaii and the West Coast, and allow 
the United States Fleet greater freedom to operate in the
^ M e m o r a n d u m  from Admiral William Leahy to Roosevelt, 
December 15, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 8.
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Atlantic Ocean should an emergency arise.
Fortifying Guam meant a major extension of American 
naval power into the Western Pacific. In the middle of the 
Japanese held Marianas and only 1353 miles from Yokohama, a 
strong base at Guam threatened Japan's predominance in the 
area. Kokumin, a newspaper that expressed the views of the 
Japanese army and ultranationalists, warned the United 
States against establishing fortifications on Guam or Wake 
Islands. Representative Carl Vinson introduced legislation 
to implement the Hepburn Report, and Roosevelt supported 
it. The House passed the Naval Appropriations Bill but 
deleted the provision to improve the harbor and seaplane 
facilities at Guam.31
The roots of President Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy 
in 1941 came from Admiral Yarnell and the Hepburn Report. 
Yarnell suggested that threatening Japan's sea communica­
tions would force them to stop their aggressive behavior. 
The Hepburn Report declared that the establishment of a base 
at Guam would assure the practical immunity of the Philip­
pines to a major attack, simplify the defense of Hawaii and 
the West Coast, and allow the United States Navy greater 
freedom to operate in the Atlantic Ocean should an emergency
31Hanson Baldwin, "Vast Defense Plans are Started on 
Their Way," New York Times, January 9, 1939, sec. 4, p. 3; 
Hanson Baldwin, "Island Defense Plans Alter Pacific Pic­
ture," New York T i m e s , February 12, 1939, sec. 4, p. 7; 
Hanson Baldwin, "Navy Still Presses for Fund for Guam," New
York Times, March 12, 1939, sec. 1, p. 26; New York Times,
January 15 and 17-20, 1939; White House Press Conference,
January 17, 1938, in Schewe, vol. 8.
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arise. The destruction of the French navy in 1940 created 
that emergency. When the Japanese threatened to move into 
the Dutch East Indies in 1941, Roosevelt combined Yarnell's 
recommendations with those of the Hepburn Report. Deter­
rence became the cornerstone of America's foreign policy 
toward Japan.
CHAPTER VIII
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE ARMY AIR COPRS
Despite Hap Arnold's appointment as the Assistant Chief 
of the Air Corps, officers in the Air Corps and GHQ Air 
Force continued to struggle for dominance. The General 
Staff realized that the divided command was unworkable and 
reorganized the Army Air Corps. The Adjutant G e n e r a l  
placed, effective March 1, 1939, the GHQ Air Force under the 
command of the Chief of the Air Corps "to meet the difficult 
problems relating to personnel and training due to the 
augmentation of the Air Corps." Believing the primary task 
of the Army Air Corps was an orderly expansion, General 
Arnold once again opposed efforts to form a separate air 
force. In February 1939, Arnold warned the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee that any drastic organizational change 
might hinder the rearmament program. However, the GHQ Air 
Force objected to being placed under the Chief of the Air 
Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Russell L. Maxwell, who had been 
transferred to the War Department, expressed the GHQ Air 
Force's view to General Marshall. Since the Air Corps took 
care of materiel and aircraft development, the GHQ Air Force 
was free to develop tactics and train personnel. If the 
Chief of the Air Corps took control over the GHQ Air Force,
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materiel and personnel a s s i g n m e n t s  might b ecome more 
important than leadership, tactics, and bombing. Further­
more, the division of the Army Air Corps created a "healthy 
growing condition" that suppressed the clamor for a separate 
air arm. Arnold convinced Marshall that the expansion 
program required clear lines of authority, and the reorgan­
ization proceeded.1
The General Staff trusted Arnold enough to give him 
command of the air arm, but the vocal advocates of long- 
range bombers lost their leaders. General Delos C. Emmons 
replaced Andrews, who became the Air Officer of the Eighth 
Corps Area. When Billy Mitchell had lost his job as the 
Assistant Chief of the Air Service, the Army had sent him to 
the Eighth Corps Area. The meaning of Andrews' assignment 
could not have been missed. Also, Lieutenant Colonel Knerr 
was forced to retire.2
Like Billy Mitchell and General Fechet before him, 
Knerr did not remain silent after leaving the Army. 
Unfettered by superiors, Knerr did something he would never 
have dared if still in uniform. Somehow, possibly through 
Pa Watson, Knerr got a paper entitled "Air Power for the
1Watson, pp. 284-286; Craven and Cate, p. 114; Para­
p h r a s e  of m e m o r a n d u m  from Lieutenant Colonel Russell 
L. Maxwell to Marshall, February 13, 1939, and Memorandum 
from Marshall to General Robert Beck, February 15, 1939, in 
Bland and Ritenour, pp. 698-700.
2Andrews to Marshall, October 18, 1938, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 5, Personal Correspondence, "M" 
1929-1939; DuPre, U.S. Air Force Biographical Dictionary, 
pp. 6 and 67-68; Coffey, pp. 234-235.
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United States" into the hands of President Roosevelt. This 
paper contained the usual claims made by the advocates of 
air power: air power had become the most powerful "instru­
ment" available for national defense, offense or "diplomatic 
threat;" national policies had to be backed up with air 
power; air power could greatly augment a small military 
force and insure greater freedom of action to the Navy; and 
the inertia of military conservatism had hindered air 
power. Placing the GHQ Air Force under the command of the 
Chief of the Air Corps, who always placed "convenience of 
administration...over efficiency in opera t i o n , "  was a 
mistake. By taking experienced personnel from tactical 
units to fill supply and administrative functions, the Chief 
of the Air Corps had made the operations of the tactical 
units "unduly hazardous." To correct the situation, the 
paper recommended the creation of a Chief of Staff for Air, 
who w ould report d i r e c t l y  to the Secr e t a r y  of War. 
President Roosevelt became angry after reading the paper, 
and once General Arnold learned about it, he became furi­
ous. Suspecting Knerr, Arnold sought proof that he had 
written it. One of the President's Cabinet members warned 
Knerr, and he quickly covered his tracks.3
The reason for Arnold's anger was understandable. He, 
Westover, and Andrews had worked hard at convincing the
^Letter and paper entitled "Air Power for the United 
States" from Knerr to Andrews, May 14, 1939, Andrews Papers, 
General Correspondence, Box 5, Personal Correspondence, "K" 
1929-1941; DuPre, p. 6; Coffey, pp. 234-236.
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General Staff and the President that the Army Air Corps was 
made up of reliable team players, who no longer used the 
antagonistic methods of Billy Mitchell. For the first time, 
Arnold had the authority and the funds to build the balanced 
air force he sought, and Knerr had jeopardized his plans. 
However, Arnold was angered by the way Knerr acted, not by 
what he said. With the exception of the complaint about 
military conservatism, Knerr expressed ideas that matched 
the reasons for sending B-17s to the Philippines in 1941.4
The expansion p r o g r a m  o c c u p i e d  most of A r n o l d ' s  
attention, but he continued to publicize the abilities of 
the Army Air Corps with well staged feats. On August 2, 
1939, the thirtieth anniversary of the purchase of the 
Army's first airplane, the Army Air Corps celebrated with a 
nation-wide event. Upon a signal from President Roosevelt 
in Washington, over 1500 Army planes simultaneously took to 
the air from airfields across the nation. Between thirty 
and fifty million Americans witnessed the A rmy p l a n e s  
f l a s h i n g  through the skies. At Wright Field, Arnold 
informed several hundred listeners that the Army Air Corps 
had broken a number of aviation records over the past four 
days, and he stressed that the fliers had used standard Army
4 In his b i o g r a p y  of Hap Arnold, Thomas M. Coffey 
relates the incident without commenting upon the reason why 
Arnold became so upset over Knerr's actions. He also fails 
to note how worried Knerr was that Arnold would find out 
from Andrews the source of the paper. Coffey, Hap, pp. 235- 
236.
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equipment.5
Sending up 1500 Army planes on his signal must have had 
a special significance for President Roosevelt. In Febru­
ary, he had observed naval maneuvers in the Caribbean. The 
exercises presumed that a European nation was sending troops 
to aid a revolution in South America. These attackers 
planned to occupy a base in the Windward Islands, from which 
their bombers would weaken the United States fleet enough 
for their main fleet to defeat it. Roosevelt had no idea 
that, for seven days straight, the United States could 
launch six hundred planes from airfields, cruisers and 
aircraft carriers without losing a single plane. Still, he 
remained unconvinced that airplanes alone could stop a 
fleet. The attacking force managed to send planes, sub­
marines and cruisers into the Windward Islands, where they 
theoretically destroyed several bases. Discussing the 
maneuvers with the press, Roosevelt expressed his apprehen­
sion that bombers from Latin America would attack the United 
States. To make all Americans aware of the threat, he said 
that bombers from Tampico could reach Kansas City in three 
and a half hours. The Axis had "somewhere around 1500 
planes which can leave their countries tonight, be in the 
Cape Verde Islands tomorrow m o r n i n g  and be in B r a z i l  
tomorrow afternoon. They have got them. We have eighty 
planes that could get there in time to meet them. They have
5Hanson Baldwin, "Army Corps Sends 1,500 Planes in 
Air," New York Times, August 3, 1939, p. 3.
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1500."® Roosevelt overestimated the capabilities of the 
Axis aircraft, but his concern about air attacks from Latin 
America demonstrated the influence of the Army Air Corps. 
Over the last five years, General Andrews had stated that 
one of the GHQ Air Force's primary missions was to keep 
"nests" of enemy bombers out of range of the United States. 
The B-17 flights to South America a year earlier had shown 
Roosevelt that long-range bombers could be rushed there to 
meet an enemy attack. By the spring of 1939, the Army Air 
Corps had convinced President Roosevelt that the GHQ Air 
Force could defend the United States with enough long-range 
bombers. His conversion came about not as a result of 
rancor and wild claims but from clear-cut demonstrations of 
the Army Air Corps' abilities.
Roosevelt had not forgotten the role of bombers in 
modern warfare. The war in China would not let him forget. 
On July 6, the American Ambassador to China complained that 
the Japanese were still indiscriminately bombing civilian 
targets and had almost hit American property. In response, 
Roosevelt sent the Japanese Ambassador a personal protest, 
and he asked for an informal reply. Ambassador Kensuke 
Horinouchi dismissed the charges, saying that the Japanese 
military commanders in China had orders to avoid injuring 
persons or property of other nations. Ten days later, 
Horinouchi gave Secretary Hull two informal statements from
®White House Press Conference, April 20, 1939, in
Schewe, vol. 9, March 1939-May 1939.
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the Japanese government. Hull said they were unsatisfactory 
but advised the President to drop the subject. Roosevelt 
continued to pressure the Japanese. When the Japanese 
forced the British to acknowledge Japan's responsibility for 
maintaining order in occupied areas, Roosevelt announced the 
a b r o g a t i o n  of a 1911 trade agreement with Japan. The 
bombing of Chinese citizens continued, but the Japanese 
f eared p u s h i n g  the U nited States into taking harsher 
measures.?
The possibility of a war in Europe grew after the Nazi- 
Soviet nonaggression pact of August 23 cleared the way for a 
German attack on Poland. This time, the British and French 
refused to submit to German aggression. On September 1, the 
German armies swept into Poland, the same day that George 
C. Marshall became Chief of Staff, and the blitzkrieg of the 
Luftwaffe and Panzer units was displayed for the world. 
France and Great Britain declared war on Germany two days 
later, and the European war, dreaded for so long, had begun.
The war brought reminders of the accuracy and range of 
America's bombers. In preparation for war, Prime Minister 
Chamberlain asked Roosevelt to provide Norden bomb sights 
for the RAF. With its accuracy, the Norden sight would 
increase British power more than any other weapon avail-
^Memorandum from Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, July 7, 
1939, Memorandum of conversation between Kensuke Horinouchi 
and Hull, July 10 , 1939, and Memorandum from Hull to
Roosevelt, July 25, 1939, in Schewe, vol. 10, June 1939-Au- 
gust 1939; Dallek, 193-196; William L. Langer and S. Everett 
Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation; 1937-1940 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 150-159.
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able. Promising to attack only legitimate military targets 
and avoid indiscriminate bombing of civilians, Chamberlain 
said that "air bombardment accuracy and humanity really go 
together." Roosevelt refused the request, but it reminded 
him of the accuracy attained by the GHQ Air Force's bombers. 
President Roosevelt had only a vague notion of the perfor­
mance characteristics of the Flying Fortress. In late 
September, Roosevelt discussed with Senator Sheridan Downey 
the importance of long-range bombers to national defense. 
Downey asked what the range of the planes was, but Roosevelt 
did not know. Pa Watson overheard their conversation and 
telephoned General Arnold for the information. Without 
bombs, the B-17 had a range of 3000 miles and a radius of 
1000 miles. With a maximum bomb load of 8800 pounds, it had 
a range of 1000 miles and a radius of 400 miles. The normal 
load was 4000 pounds, giving the plane a range of 1800 miles 
and a 750 mile radius.8 Roosevelt's inability to recite the 
range of the B-17 was not as important as his perception of 
the B-17 as a long-range weapon. The long flights to South 
America had influenced the President.9
^Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, July 10, 1939, Prime
Minister A. Neville Chamberlain to Roosevelt, August 25, 
1939, and Roosevelt to Chamberlain, August 31, 1939, in 
Schewe, vol. 10; Memorandum from Watson to Roos e v e l t ,  
September 25, 1939, FDR Papers, Departmental, Box 103, PSF, 
War Department 1939.
^General Marshall understood how to impress important 
points on President Roosevelt. Thinking that the President 
might visit Fort Benning, Georgia, on a trip to Warm 
Springs, Marshall told the commandant of the Infantry School 
how Roosevelt's interest in the practical side of training 
might be awakened. No one should "press him to see this or
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Roosevelt's plans to expand the Army Air Corps initiat­
ed a new debate within the Army about the mission of the 
Army Air Corps. To settle the question, Chief of Staff 
Craig created a board on March 23 to study the strategic and 
tactical use of the Army Air Corps in accordance w ith 
national policies. General Arnold presided over the Air 
Board. Acting on the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Spaatz, 
Arnold convinced the other members to expand the scope of 
the study to include the mission, the doctrines and the 
composition of the forces required by the Army Air Corps. 
Submitting its report on May 7, the Air Board made two basic 
assumptions. First, the primary function of the armed 
services was to defend United States territory by deterring 
or defeating an invasion. Second, an enemy would establish 
a series of ever closer bases from which attacks on the 
vital centers of the United States would be launched. The 
Air Board defined air power as "the measure of a nation's 
capacity to wage air warfare," but it could be effective 
only while the combat units operated as a single force.
that or understand this or that: that whatever is furnished 
him in the way of data be on one sheet of paper, with all 
high-sounding language eliminated, and with very pertinent 
paragraphed under-lined headings; that a little sketch 
of ordinary page size is probably the most effective method, 
as he is quickly bored by papers, by lengthy discussions, 
and by anything short of a few pungent sentences of descrip­
tion. You have to intrigue his interest, and then it knows 
no limit." Marshall recommended using "a good sergeant with 
the gift of restrained gab" to deal with Roosevelt. "I have 
found," said Marshall, "that the ordinary Army method of 
presenting things to the President gets us nowhere and 
rather irritates him." Marshall to Brigadier General Asa 
L. Singleton, November 22, 1939, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 107-108.
246
Since the mission of air power was offensive, an enemy's air 
force could be defeated only by attacking its air bases. 
Neglecting defensive fighters, the Air Board called for 
b o m b e r s  with a range greater than an enemy's bombers, 
enabling American bombers to attack enemy bases sooner than 
the enemy could strike. The Air Board wanted most produc­
tion devoted to bombers. The President's Aviation Expansion 
Program, concluded on June 12, adopted the recommendations 
of the Air Board. Of twenty-four groups, thirteen were to 
be bomber groups —  five heavy bomber, six medium, and two 
light or attack groups— and only nine were to be fighter 
groups.
When he submitted the Air Board's report to Secretary 
Woodring on September 1, General Marshall made a significant 
addition. Earlier, he had read a memorandum written by 
Colonel J.W. Anderson in the War Plans Division. Anderson 
stated that the Army must be prepared for quick, limited 
operations in the mid-Pacific, Caribbean, Latin America, and 
possibly Europe. Once these needs were met, there might not 
be a need for large armies. Instead, the Army Air Corps 
could conduct "active and aggressive" defensive operations 
beyond American territory. To carry out these operations, 
the United States required advanced bases to deepen the 
defensive zone around its vital areas. General Marshall 
suggested incorporating Anderson's ideas into the report. 
In particular, Marshall wanted to protect America's vital 
installations through "the wise strategic location of our
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Air Bases" and an "adequate radius of action of our a ir­
planes." Woodring approved the report with Marshall's 
suggestions. For the first time, the Army Air Corps had a 
clearly defined mission.10
The General Staff accepted the ideas expressed in the 
Air Board report and incorporated them in official corre­
spondence. President Roosevelt received a letter calling 
for airplanes with a range equal to the Navy's ships. In an 
emergency, these planes could be flown to an overseas base. 
Roosevelt asked the WPD to comment on the letter. Like the 
President, the WPD did not believe that air power alone 
could stop an enemy fleet. Rejecting the call for such 
long-ranged bombers, the WPD said that the Army Air Corps 
only needed planes with a radius greater than an enemy's 
bombers. This requi r e m e n t  could be met by the "wise 
strategic location of our Air Bases" and with an "adequate 
radius of action of our airplanes." The 2000-mile radius 
bomber already authorized for construction would be suffi­
cient. Denouncing the proposal to fly bombers to critical 
areas in an emergency, the WPD stated: "Reinforcement of 
Panama by heavy and medium bombardment and of Hawaii by 
heavy bombardment is not possible without r e c o u r s e  to 
staging points in territory not under our jurisdiction." 
This remark was foolish. General Andrews' p l a n e s  had
•^Watson, pp. 100-101; Robert F. Futrell, I d e a s , 
Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the 
United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama: Air University, 1974; reprint ed., 1979), pp. 49-51.
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already flown nonstop from Miami to Panama and further. The 
President had a better understanding of the range of modern 
airplanes than the WPD did. Nevertheless, the Air Board's 
report had become the official doctrine for employment of 
the Army Air Corps, codified in Field Manual 1-5, Employment 
of the A v i a t i o n  of the A r m y , on April 15, 1940. The
readiness of the General Staff to adopt the Air Board report 
with little criticism indicated that the General Staff no 
longer held the deep suspicion and resentment of the airmen 
it once had.11
Unlike the President and the WPD, the Army Air Corps 
believed that airplanes could stop an enemy fleet. To 
determine the requirements for implementing the Air Board 
report, Arnold instructed Lieutenant Colonel Carl Spaatz, 
chief of the Air Corps Plans Division, to make studies based 
upon five strategic areas: the Far East, Expeditionary 
Forces, the Pacific, the Atlantic Coast, and the Caribbean. 
Spaatz's first plan, "Strategically Offensive Operations in 
the Far East," estimated the composition and the general 
method of employment of airplanes in operations against 
Japan. This plan embodied the Army fliers' belief in air 
power, but it also included ideas similar to A d m i r a l  
Yarnell's about fighting Japan. The ACPD saw three ways of 
forcing Japanese acquiescence to A m e r i c a n  demands: an 
invasion of Japan, a naval blockade, or a sustained air
1 1 "Memorandum for Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, 
Secretary to the President," October 10, 1939, RG 165, WPD, 
Box 75, 888-106.
attack on the critical elements of Japanese industry. Since 
Japanese land-based airplanes could prevent the first two 
methods, the Air Corps planners favored the third. With its 
industries and population concentrated into relatively small 
areas, Japan was extremely vulnerable, and a sustained air 
attack could probably force Japanese acquiescence. However, 
the "mere existence of a land-based striking force, based 
within effective operation radius of Japan, would probably 
be sufficient to restrain Japan from open and a c t i v e  
opposition to our national policies." These operations 
required a secure base near Japan. Obtaining a base in 
Chinese, British or Russian territory involved unwanted 
political encumbrances. Luzon was the most viable location, 
but the Japanese could occupy it before reinforcements from 
America could arrive. However, if an air base was prepared 
befor e h a n d ,  a strike force, using islands as stepping 
stones, could fly across the Pacific at the outbreak of 
hostilities, "establish an air defense zone about the Island 
of Luzon and prevent its seizure by Japan by interdiction of 
its overseas expedition." This strike force could hold 
Luzon until more units arrived to conduct the air campaign 
against Japan. To stop an invasion fleet and prevent the 
Japanese from initiating "counter air force operations," the 
strike force required two groups of heavy bombers, two 
squadrons of long-range reconnaissance planes, three groups 
of medium bombers, three squadrons of medium range recon­
naissance planes and two groups of interceptors. Conducting
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strategic operations against Japan required six more groups 
of heavy bombers.
To fortify the Philippines, the Air Corps planners 
suggested a four-step procedure: first, expand the air base 
facilities on Luzon without increasing the size of the Air 
Corps units stationed there; second, form the initial 
defense force in the United States; third, and only after 
the first two phases had been completed, dispatch the total 
defense force to Luzon; and fourth, maintain in the United 
States the additional force required to conduct a sustained 
strategic offensive against Japan. General Arnold forwarded 
all five of the ACPD's plans to the WPD, but the War 
Department ignored the Far East p l a n . 12
The War Department placed little faith in the ACPD's 
plan and refused to fortify the Philippines, lest the 
Japanese consider it a challenge. Earlier, the War Depart­
ment had joined with the State Department to oppose the 
Navy's plans to improve facilities on Guam. The fear of 
p r o v o k i n g  the Japanese stemmed from a belief that the 
Philippines could not be defended. Since the World War, the 
Joint Army and Navy Board had prepared plans for war with 
any number of adversaries, with each p o t e n t i a l  enemy 
designated by a color. Under War Plan ORANGE, for a war
with Japan, the American garrison in the Philippines would
!2Note the similarities between this plan and Knerr's 
paper. Lieutenant Colonel Carl Spaatz, "Strategically 
Offensive Operations in the Far East," September 1, 1939, 
and Arnold, "Implementation of Air Board Report," October
19, 1939, RG 165, WPD, Box 187, 3747.
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fight holding actions until the main battle fleet relieved 
them. American and Japanese naval officers anticipated a 
great, Jutland-style naval battle to decide the outcome of 
the war, but Army officers doubted the ability of the small 
Philippine garrison to hold the Bataan P e n i n s u l a  and 
Corregidor until the fleet arrived. Even Navy officers had 
their doubts because the fleet would need a secure harbor in 
the Far East to operate effectively. The 1928 and 1938 
versions of ORANGE expected the Japanese to mobilize and 
transport an overwhelming number of troops to the Philip­
pines within thirty days.
By April 1939, the Joint Army and Navy Board recognized 
that the possibility of cooperation between Germany, Italy 
and Japan made the color plans obsolete. Therefore, the 
Joint Board instructed each service to consider fighting a 
coalition of enemies in a variety of different situations. 
The result was a set of five new plans, called RAINBOW plans 
to indicate a coalition of enemies. 'RAINBOW 1 planned for 
the United States defending North America with no major 
allies. RAINBOW 2 envisioned the United States allied with 
Great Britain and France. Under this second plan, the 
United States would conduct offensive actions in the Pacific 
while Great Britain and France fought in Europe. RAINBOW 3 
was similar to RAINBOW 2, except for the United States 
receiving no help from the British and French. RAINBOW 
4 had the U n i t e d  States defending the entire Western 
Hemisphere without allies. RAINBOW 5 called for the United
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States to fight a defensive war in the P a c i f i c  w h i l e  
conducting major offensive operations with Britain and 
France in Europe. Once the Axis had been d efeated in 
Europe, RAINBOW 5 planned for a major attack on Japan. One 
premise did not change in the RAINBOW plans. The Army still 
believed that the Philippines were indefensible.*3 By the 
middle of 1941, however, the War Department had revised its 
appraisal.
Like Yarnell, the ACPD planned for an economic war 
against Japan. Both pictured Japan's industrial strength as 
its weakness. Whereas Yarnell believed a naval blockade 
would cripple Japanese industry by severing its vital supply 
lines, the ACPD proposed crippling it through air attacks on 
the factories themselves. The weakness of Yarnell's plan 
was his presumption that the French and British fleets would 
control the Atlantic, freeing the United States Navy to 
concentrate most of its forces in the Pacific. The strength 
of the ACPD's plan was its indifference to the Navy. When 
Germany conquered France and threatened to defeat Great 
Britain in 1940, the United States had to keep a large part 
of its fleet in the Atlantic, and Yarnell's plan became
13 For a discussion of War Plan ORANGE see Weigley, The 
American Way of W a r , pp. 245-246. Langer and Gleason, 
Challenge to Isolation, pp. 149-150; Maurice Matloff and 
Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 
1941-1942 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 1-10. For an 
example of the public expression of the Army's belief in the 
indefensablity of the Philippines, see Major General (Ret.) 
William C. Rivers' letter to the editor in the New York 
Times, November 26, 1939, sec. 4, p. 9.
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irrelevant. The events of 1941 seemed to validate the 
ACPD's plan.
While the War Department ignored the ACPD proposal to 
fortify the Philippines, the General Staff concurred with 
the idea of using the GHQ Air Force to stop an enemy 
assault. On October 30, Chief of W P D  G e n e r a l  G e o r g e  
V. Strong, who had sat on the Air Board, told General Arnold 
and officers of the ACPD how the Array Air Corps would be 
employed. General Strong considered the GHQ Air Force a 
strategic weapon that should be kept intact. Under the 
RAINBOW plans, Natal, Hawaii and Alaska were the critical 
defensive points, and the quick reinforcement of those 
points required more long-range bombers. Then, Strong 
recognized one of the prime tenets of the advocates of air 
power: that airplanes could defend the coasts against enemy 
fleets. If the United States were on the defensive in the 
Atlantic and the offensive in the Pacific, the GHQ Air Force 
would have to operate in lieu of naval forces. Finally, the 
General Staff trusted the Army fliers enough to rely upon 
them to defend the coasts and incorporated that reliance 
into its planning. The Army Air Corps offered proof that 
the General Staff's trust was warranted. On November 26, 
Army fliers proved that they could quickly reach an endan­
gered area in South America. Carrying ten Brazilian army 
officers, six B-17s flew non-stop from Maracaibo, Venezuela,
■f
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to Bolling Field, a 2100 mile trip.14
The General Staff's willingness to provide more B-17s 
for the Army Air Corps ran counter to Roosevelt's plans to 
provide the Allies with American-built airplanes. Through­
out the summer of 1939, the French and British had ordered 
planes and other war materiel from American manufacturers. 
To prevent chaos and facilitate foreign orders, Roosevelt 
directed the Army and Navy Munitions Board on July 5 to 
c o o r d i n a t e  the French, Br i t i s h  and American military 
purchases. At first, the Clearance Committee, appointed by 
the M u n i t i o n s  Board, succes s f u l l y  assigned orders to 
American manufacturers, which sped up foreign contracts and 
helped build up America's war industries, but when Congress 
replaced the arms embargo provisions of the Neutrality Laws 
with "cash and carry" on November 3, a tidal wave of orders 
swamped the Clearance Committee. Roosevelt formed the 
President's Liaison Committee on December 6 to process all 
foreign orders. To keep from bidding against themselves for 
American war materiel and raising the prices, the Allies 
formed the Joint Anglo-French Purchasing commission the same 
day.
Airplanes and airplane engines were the most pressing 
needs of the Allies, which placed them in direct competition 
with the Army Air Corps' expansion program. Remembering how
14Notes of the October 30 meeting were reconstructed 
from memory and brief notes taken by H.S. Hansell. Memoran­
dum from H.S. Hansell to Eaker, October 31, 1939, Spaatz 
Papers, Diaries, Box 7, April 24-December 1939; New York 
Times, November 27, 1939.
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Secretary Woodring had opposed the sale of aircraft to 
Prance, FDR p laced S e cretary Morgenthau in charge of 
aircraft sales. Morgenthau wanted to divide the aircraft 
p r o d u c e d  in A m e r i c a  fifty-fifty with the Allies, but 
Woodring and Arnold objected, creating a split within the 
Roosevelt Administration. Roosevelt, seeking to expand the 
productive capacity of the aircraft industry through sales 
to the Allies, sided with Morgenthau.
In March 1940, the press learned that Woodring and 
Arnold were opposing Morgenthau's efforts to release the 
Army's newest planes to the Allies. When Congress started 
asking questions, President Roosevelt warned Arnold to "play 
ball" or be sent to Guam. Arnold feared the President's 
warning signaled his replacement as the Chief of the Air 
Corps. Instead, Roosevelt left him out of imp o r t a n t  
conferences at the White House. On March 19, Roosevelt 
publicly announced that every type of A m e r i c a n - b u i l t  
m i l i t a r y  plane would be released to the Allies. That 
evening, he told Woodring that anybody opposing his policy 
faced "drastic" action. Acceding to the wishes of the 
Commander in Chief, Woodring, Marshall and Arnold devised a 
plan to sell the Allies the latest models while giving the 
Army improved models later. Roosevelt approved the plan. 
Woodring publicly supported the plan, but he privately 
hampered it. Eventually, Woodring's obstructionism cost him 
his job.15
15McFarland, pp. 192-193 and 210-218; Arnold, pp. 186-187.
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In 1939, the Army Air Corps lacked modern airplanes. 
Arnold should have opposed the President's release of Army 
planes to the Allies; he was responsible for the condition 
of the Army Air Corps. But the Chief of the Air Corps 
quietly acquiesced. As a soldier, Arnold thought that he 
had to defer to his Commander in Chief, but he also had to 
worry about Roosevelt's threat. Having been exiled after 
B i l l y  M i t c h e l l ' s  court martial, Arnold believed that 
Roosevelt would send him to Guam. Arnold had worked too 
long and too hard for the cause of air power to throw his 
career away when he had gotten in a position to advance the 
cause.
After the fall of Poland, the scenario envisioned in 
RAINBOW 2, the United States conducting offensive actions in 
the Pacific while Great Britain and France fought in Europe, 
seemed most likely. The Army and Navy agreed to conduct 
joint maneuvers off the West Coast in February 1940, to 
simulate the conditions of RAINBOW 2. General Marshall 
realized that the Army Air Corps was unprepared because the 
expansion program had disrupted the training of the tactical 
units. He tried to reschedule the maneuvers, but the Navy 
could not change the date because of previous commitments. 
The press found out about the exercises and portrayed them 
as a test between the Navy's carrier pilots and the GHQ Air 
Force. Although the Navy planes outnumbered them two to 
one, the Army fliers bragged that they would deny informa­
tion to the Navy scouting planes, ward off "bombing attacks"
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on vital military centers, and destroy the aircraft carri­
ers.16
Much to the chagrin of the Army pilots, the Navy fliers 
won the day. From press reports and a careful monitoring of 
Army radio frequencies, the Navy fliers knew the exact 
location of the defending Army planes. On the day before 
the exercises, eight B-17s secretly flew from Langley Field 
to Reno, Nevada, from where they planned to attack the Black 
fleet. But the Navy learned of the Flying Fortresses' 
arrival and their location from a routine warning announce­
ment issued by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. On the 
first morning of the exercises, Navy planes left their 
c a r r i e r s  seventy-five miles out to sea and caught the 
concentrated Army planes on the ground. Afterwards, the GHQ 
Air Force fliers sheepishly said that the expansion program 
had handicapped them. They also considered themselves lucky 
not to have had any accidents because many of the pilots had 
never flown together in formation. Their excuses were true, 
but the Navy pilots had a good laugh. When the Japanese did 
the same thing to Army airfields in December 1941, however, 
more than pride was damaged. Despite the poor showing of 
the GHQ Air Force, General Marshall was pleased with the 
maneuvers, calling them "the most realistic affair in the
16Memorandum from Marshall to Stark, November 7, 1939, 
quoted in editor's note and letter from Marshall to Lieuten­
ant General Albert J. Bowley, November 9, 1939, in Larry 
Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 2, 
"We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941 (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), pp. 100-102; New 
York Times, January 7, 1940.
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air and on the ground, in my military experience, short of 
war." He knew from experience that any expansion program 
entailed disruptions in training and coordination.i?
If General Marshall's confidence in Army fliers was 
shaken, it was soon restored. After the maneuvers, he made 
a tour of American installations throughout the Caribbean 
and Canal Zone. By flying in a B-17, he cut what would have 
been a long trip to just ten days. Generally satisfied by 
what he saw, Marshall was very impressed by the Flying 
Fortress. During the trip, one of the engines quit. The 
pilot pointed out the problem to Marshall, but he assured 
the general that the plane could still make its destination 
easily on the other three engines. He explained that a twin 
engine plane could not. Afterwards, Marshall proudly told 
friends of setting a new speed record on the flight from 
Puerto Rico to Miami and of plans to fly in a B-17 on an 
inspection trip to Hawaii. He flew from Washington to San 
Francisco in a B-17, but last minute problems forced him to 
make the round-trip to Hawaii in a Pan American Clipper. 
Marshall's readiness to fly to Hawaii in a Flying Fortress 
s h o w e d  an a p p r e c i a t i o n  of the range of the airplane. 
Furthermore, he trusted the plane enough that he was ready 
to make the hazardous, over-water flight. During the last 
few months preceding American entry into the Second World 
War, that trust influenced Marshall's decisions.
1^New York Times, February 25, 1940; Marshall to Major 
General Charles D. Herron, February 14, 1940, in Bland, "We 
Cannot Delay," vol. 2, pp. 157-158.
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While inspecting the facilities in Panama and Hawaii, 
Marshall discovered that the local Army Air Corps commanders 
were making derogatory statements about the Navy, Since 
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark was cooperating with 
the Army, Marshall wanted the fliers to cease their provoca­
tive actions, but he reacted in a mild manner. Ordering the 
commanders of the Canal Zone and Hawaiian Department, "when 
the opportunity casually arises," to inform the Army fliers 
of his wishes, he wanted it done "in a tactful way." Only a 
man with great patience and trust could have acted in that 
manner. Marshall trusted the men of the Army Air Corps as 
much as he trusted their Flying Fortresses.18
The Luftwaffe played a critical part in the German 
military victories of 1939-1940. In September 1939, it 
destroyed the Polish air force. With complete air superior­
ity, the Luftwaffe turned on the Polish armies and finally 
to the destruction of Warsaw. German artillery participated 
in the bombardment of the Polish capital, but the Luftwaffe 
received most of the credit. On April 9, 1940, German
troops c r o s s e d  the border into Denmark, crushing all 
organized resistance within a few hours. Meanwhile, other
18Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. "Harold L. George: Apostle 
of Air Power," in Makers of the United States Air Force, 
ed. John L. Frisbee (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 
History, United States Air Force, 1987), pp. 81-82; Marshall 
to Major General Edmund L. Daley, F e b r u a r y  14, 1940,
Marshall to Major General Charles D. Herron, February 14, 
1940, Marshall to Brazilian A rmy Chief of Staff G oes 
Monteiro, March 18, 1940, and Marshall to Major General 
Daniel Van Voorhis, April 2, 1940, in Bland, vol. 2, 
pp. 156-158, 175, and 186-187.
260
German troops, hidden in coal and iron barges, attacked the 
seaports of Norway, and German paratroopers captured the 
airfields and radio stations. The Norwegians put up a stiff 
resistance but were no match for the Germans. Slowly, the 
Allies responded to the German assault and landed troops in 
northern Norway. At Narvik, the Royal Navy defeated the 
German navy; but, using Norwegian airfields, the Luftwaffe 
kept German supply lines open and land-based planes close to 
the action. With command of the air, the Luftwaffe forced 
the Royal Navy to withdraw. The Allied supplies lines were 
w ^ k e n , and their position in Norway became untenable. 
German air superiority played a large part in forcing the 
Allies to pull their troops out of Norway in early May. The 
loss of British ships off Norway incited a new round of 
airplane versus battleship arguments in the United States. 
The debate intensified when the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air 
Force attacked each other's naval bases.^
To prevent Iceland from falling into German hands, the 
British occupied the island. Citing the British action as 
justification, the Japanese, anticipating a German attack on 
Holland, threatened to occupy the Dutch East Indies. The 
United States reacted by stationing the Fleet, which was on 
m a n e u v e r s  in the Pacific, at Pearl Harbor. When the 
commander of the Fleet asked why, Admiral Stark said it was
^ L a n g e r  and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 
pp. 419-426; New York Times, May 2,3,5 and 6, 1940. On May 
6 , a Times e d i t o r i a l  called for yet another advisory 
commission appointed by the President to consider "every 
aspect of our defense problem."
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"because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your 
presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies." 
However, Navy spokesmen told the press that the Fleet would 
stay in Hawaiian waters to perfect anti-aircraft lessons 
learned from the Luftwaffe attacks on the Royal Navy at 
Scapa Flow. Since Secretary of the Navy Edison had admitted 
earlier that the German airplanes had caused the Royal Navy 
trouble off Norway, the press accepted the Navy's story.20 
The deterrent effect of basing the Fleet in Hawaii soon wore 
off. Also, the Navy was forced to move some of its vessels 
to the Atlantic because of surprises on the European battle­
fields.
The Germans invaded Holland and Belgium on May 10. 
That evening, Winston Churchill replaced Chamberlain as 
Prime Minister, and he promised "to wage war by sea, land 
and air, with all our might and with all the strength that 
God can give us." But Churchill's brave words were not 
enough. German armies swept through the Low Countries and, 
avoiding the Maginot Line, into France. As in Poland, the 
German fliers won air superiority. Panzer forces, supported 
by the Luftwaffe, quickly crushed the French and British. 
Only over the beaches of Dunkirk did the Royal Air Force 
defeat the Luftwaffe, and the British pulled what was left 
of their shattered expeditionary forces out of France at the
20Dallek, p. 238; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of 
United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 3, The 
Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 42-43; New York Times, May 8 
and 9, 1940.
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end of the month. On June 22, the French surrendered, and 
all that stood between Hitler's armies and Great Britain 
were the English Channel, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air 
Force. With most of its equipment left in France, the 
British Army was no match for the Germans. Furthermore, the 
English Channel was not the formidable barrier it had been 
in the past. If Germany took the French Navy as part of the 
peace settlement, it could be used to carry German troops to 
Great Britain. Since the Luftwaffe had swept all its 
opponents from the skies of Europe, the RAF seemed to have 
little chance of saving Great Britain.21
Americans, expecting a long repetition of the First 
World War, were stunned by the German victories. Against 
the British and French navies, the highly touted Maginot 
Line, and the industrial potential of the Democracies, the 
Germans appeared to have little chance of victory, and 
Congress had been considering cutting the defense funds 
requested by the Administration. Before the French surren­
der, Roosevelt concentrated on acquiring more aircraft and 
excluded the ground forces. On April 15, General Marshall 
a s k e d  for $25 million to purchase critical items, but 
Roosevelt only gave him $18 million. The President was more 
interested in increasing the size of the Army Air Corps than 
the size of the Army. On May 13, Arnold asked for $80 
million to purchase two hundred B-17s and $106 million for
21Langer and Gleason, pp. 436-468; Matloff and Snell, 
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp. 11-12.
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pilot training, and Marshall asked for an 15,000 additional 
troops. Roosevelt rejected Marshall's request but approved 
Arnold's. When Assistant Secretary Johnson warned that 
aircraft were being delivered too slowly and recommended 
increasing purchases to expand the production of aircraft to 
19,000 a year, the President went much further. Roosevelt 
asked Congress on May 16 to raise the Army and Navy air arms 
to a total of 50,000 planes and expand the capacity of the 
aviation industry to 50,000 airplanes annually. Alarmed by 
the German victories, Congress cooperated and provided half 
a billion dollars more than he had requested.22
Army planners, as anxious as Con g r e s s  over Axis 
successes in Europe, feared that the Germans and Italians 
would capture the British and French fleets and join the 
Japanese. On May 22, they gave Marshall a memorandum 
explaining that, single-handedly, the United States possess­
ed only the resources to defend the Western Hemisphere, 
Alaska and Hawaii as envisioned in RAINBOW 4. Later that 
day, Marshall presented copies of the memorandum to Presi­
dent Roosevelt, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark and 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. All three agreed 
that the United States had to concentrate on South America 
and not become involved with Japan. RAINBOW 4 became the 
basis for WPD's planning.
22Marshall to Bernard M. Baruch, May 14, 1940, and 
editor's note in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 212-213; Langer and 
Gleason, pp. 472-475; Watson, pp. 166-168; President's 
Message to the Congress, May 16, 1940, in Rosenman, 1940: 
War-And Aid to Democracies, pp. 198-205.
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FDR agreed that the Army should contain its planning to 
the Western Hemisphere, but he disagreed with his military 
advisors on two major points. First, his advisors felt 
Great Britain would collapse and wanted to keep the supplies 
to train and equip American troops. Roosevelt believed that 
the British would withstand a German assault and wanted to 
furnish munitions to Great Britain. Second, he wanted 
dissuade the Japanese from making further moves in the Far 
East with a show of strength in the Pacific, but his 
advisors wanted avoid moves that might start a war with 
Japan.23
Trouble between Roosevelt and his military advisors 
over the first point of disagreement arose as the Germans 
pushed across France. The British and French appealed for 
more weapons and materiel. On May 22, General Marshall told 
Secretary Morgenthau that the Army could not afford to give 
the Allies any of its planes. The Army only had 160 pursuit 
planes for 260 pilots and only 52 of the 136 heavy bombers 
it needed to defend the hemisphere. The requests were 
dropped, and for a time the problem faded. But in June, 
President Roosevelt brought up the idea of releasing twelve 
B-17s to the British. Again, Marshall prevented the White 
House from releasing the bombers, but when the destroyer 
deal of September 3, 1940, went through, five B-17s were
23Matloff and Snell, pp. 12-21; Memorandum entitled 
"National Strategic Decisions," May 22, 1940, and Memorandum 
from Marshall to WPD, May 23, 1940, in Bland, vol. 2,
pp. 218-221.
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included. Only an inadvertent omission in the official 
document kept the B-17s from being sent, but Roosevelt had 
had enough. The President told Marshall that he wanted an 
"even-Stephen" division of the bombers with the B r i t i s h . 24
The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
supported Roosevelt and made the dispatch of B-17s to Great 
Britain a public issue. On September 12, William Allen 
White demanded the release of twenty-five B-17s and twenty 
torpedo boats to the British because they "may be the only 
things we can now send to Britain in time to be of major 
help in resisting destruction from air and invasion by 
sea." Isolationist Senators Clark and Holt denounced the 
giving of B-17s or torpedo boats to the British. Calling 
the B-17 "one of the greatest defense weapons" owned by 
American, Senator Holt charged that the Administration was 
planning to declare twenty-five of them obsolete only to be 
able to send them to Great Britain. If the planes fell into 
G e r m a n  hands, they would be used in the "most vicious 
attack" ever made on the United States. With the 1940 
Presidential election approaching, Roosevelt could not 
ignore such powerful opposition to providing weapons to 
Great Britain, and he told Marshall to find a legal way to 
release the planes. In a memorandum, carefully worded with 
help from the Attorney General, Marshall proposed releasing 
a few B-17s to the British for combat tests. The United 
States would benefit by learning what improvements should be
24watson, pp. 305-306.
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incorporated into later models. Arnold and Major General 
G e o r g e  Brett approved the idea. To obtain valid test 
results, Arnold and Brett advised releasing a minimum of 
twenty planes. None of the three generals was pleased about 
releasing the planes, but Brett hoped that g i v i n g  the 
B r i t i s h  a few p l anes might prevent the need to split 
production with them.25 However, Brett underestimated the 
President's willingness to aid the British.
The ever changing course of world events forced the 
United States to reevaluate its strategic plans. On June 
10, the Soviets and Japanese settled their differences over 
the Manchurian border with a peace agreement. With the 
F r e n c h  defeated, the British on the ropes, and their 
northern flank secured by an agreement with the Soviets, 
Japan felt free to press its claims in the Far East. Japan 
forced Great Britain to close the Burma Road, one of the 
supply lines for the Nationalist Chinese. The United States 
responded by restricting the export of oil and scrap metal 
to Japan, but the Japanese were not deterred. On September 
27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and 
Italy, becoming a member of the Axis.25
The Royal Air Force defeated the Luftwaffe in the 
daytime skies over Great Britain, forcing the Germans to
25New York Times, September 13 and 17, 1940; Memorandum 
from Marshall to Roosevelt, November 13, 1940, in Bland, 
vol. 2, pp. 348-349; Watson, pp. 305-309.
26 Langer and Gleason, pp. 193-194, 291-295, and
597-598; Dallek, pp. 238-240.
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concentrate on night raids on London. Throughout the Battle 
of Britain, Edward R. Murrow made his famous live broadcasts 
from London, and Americans became aware of the savagery of 
the German "Blitz," as the attacks on London came to be 
called. More importantly, Americans realized that the 
British would survive. By the end of October, the threat of 
a German invasion of Great Britain in 1940 disappeared. 
Convinced that the British could survive at least six more 
months, the General Staff concluded that the United States 
had at least a year before the Germans and Italians could 
launch an attack on the Western Hemisphere.
Navy planners also responded to the new situation by 
proposing four feasible lines of action. Admiral Stark 
converted them into a memorandum, and he recommended the 
fourth line of action, Plan D or Plan Dog, which was similar 
to the Army's RAINBOW 5. Fighting simultaneous Atlantic and 
Pacific wars was unwise, and the Pacific war would reduce 
the aid available to Britain. If the Philippines and Guam 
were fortified, the situation would be different, but 
"Japanese armed opposition" might be precipitated if the 
United States tried to fortify its Far Eastern possessions. 
Stark opposed the establishment of a blockade around Japan 
because it would lessen the number of ships available for 
the Atlantic. In case of war, the United States had to 
remain on the defensive in the Pacific and prepare for 
f u l l - s c a l e  land operations across the Atlantic. When 
presented with "Plan Dog," the Army planners recommended
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using it as the basis for a joint Army-Navy study. On
November 13, the "Plan Dog" memorandum and the Army recom­
mendation were sent to Roosevelt. Although Roosevelt never 
gave his formal approval to the plan, he authorized conver­
sations with the British about Stark's recommendations.
On January 17, 1941, Roosevelt discussed with the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy, Admiral Stark and
General Marshall the possibility of a sudden war with German 
and Japan. In the event of such an emergency, Roosevelt 
instructed his military advisors to be realistic and avoid 
plans that could be carried out only after several months 
had passed. They had to be ready to fight with what was 
available. What concerned the President was the possibility 
that Japan, acting in concert with Germany, might disrupt 
the flow of American supplies to Great Britain w i t h  a 
Pacific war. Roosevelt wanted to be able to assure Chur­
chill that supplies to Great Britain would not be seriously 
curtailed. At the close of the meeting, Roosevelt gave his 
advisors a general directive as to how the United States 
would meet the world situation and not jeopardize the flow 
of supplies to Great Britain. In the Pacific, the United 
States would stand on the defensive with the Fleet based in 
Hawaii. The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet would have the 
discretionary authority as to how long he could remain in 
the Philippines and as to his direction of withdrawal--to 
the East or to Singapore. There would be no naval rein­
forcement of the Philippines. The Navy should be consider­
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ing bombing attacks against Jap a n e s e  cities. In the 
Atlantic, he wanted the Navy to prepare for convoying ships 
to Great Britain and for maintaining patrols off the coast. 
R o o s e v e l t  instructed the Army to avoid commitments to 
aggressive action until they were fully prepared; keep its 
plans conservative until its strength had been developed; 
and be prepared to give moderate a s s i s t a n c e  to L a t i n  
American countries fighting Nazi-inspired fifth column move­
ments. Then, Roosevelt reiterated that every effort should 
be made to continue supplying Great Britain. Primarily, he 
believed that continued succor would foil Hitler's principal 
objective of involving the United States in a war at that 
time, but he also felt that it would "buck up England."2?
Significantly, Roosevelt wanted the Navy to consider 
the bombing of Japanese cities. Throughout the previous 
month, efforts had been made to provide the Chinese with 
American bombers for attacks on Japanese cities. In October 
1940, Claire Chennault returned from China, where he had 
been training Chinese pilots, with T.V. Soong and General 
P.T. Mow to seek American aid. On November 30, Soong 
presented to Secretary Morgenthau a plan whereby a 500 plane 
force, supplied and maintained by the United States, would 
drive the Japanese out of China and neutralize the Japanese 
Navy. Based only 650 miles from Tokyo, these planes would
2?Matloff and Snell, pp. 24-29; Memorandum from Stark 
to Secretary of the Navy Knox, November 12, 1940, FDR
Papers, PSF Safe File Box 5, Navy Department "Plan Dog;" 
Memorandum from Marshall to General Gerow, January 17, 1941, 
in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 391-392.
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conduct air raids against the Japanese capital.
Realizing that sending any bombers to China would 
decrease those available for Great Britain, Morgenthau asked 
Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador, on December 3 about 
bombing Tokyo and other Japanese cities. At first, the 
British were enthusiastic, but their interest waned as they 
considered the diversion of planes from Great Britain. 
Following a luncheon with President Roosevelt on December 8, 
Morgenthau told Soong that giving the Chinese so m any 
bombers would be impossible until sometime in 1942, but the 
Secretary of the Treasury did not drop the matter. He 
m e n t i o n e d  it to S e c r e t a r y  of State Hull. Expressing 
enthusiasm for the idea, Hull said that he would love to see 
500 American planes "start from the Aleutians and fly over 
Japan just once." Hull also thought it would be nice "if we 
could only find some way to have them drop some bombs on 
Tokyo." Morgenthau told Soong about Hull's comments, and 
immediately, Chaing Kai-shek started cabling Roosevelt for 
bombers.
Just before Christmas, Morgenthau discussed the idea of 
sending bombers with Soong, Mow and Chennault. Saying that 
the President wanted to dispatch some B-17s to China, he 
asked for specifics. Chennault proposed sending an indeter­
minate number of B-17s with crews, released from active duty 
in the Army Air Corps, to serve with the Chinese. From 
airfields protected by 200 fighters, the B-17s could attack 
Tokyo, Nagasaki, Kobe and Osaka. Asking Chennault about the
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methods used to bomb these cities, Morgenthau suggested 
using incendiary bombs since the cities were built of wood 
and paper. Chennault replied that a lot of damage could be 
done that would justify the loss of a few Chinese bombers. 
When Morgenthau broached the plan to Secretary of War 
Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox and General Marshall, 
the Chief of Staff strongly opposed diverting any bombers 
from Great Britain. He was willing, however, to divert some 
pursuit planes to the Chinese. Roosevelt approved that 
idea. Eventually, these pursuit planes were used by the 
American Volunteer Group, better known as Chennault's Flying 
Tigers.28
When Roosevelt told his Naval advisors to plan air 
attacks on Japanese cities, the idea was fresh in his mind. 
The s u r p r i s i n g  aspect of this episode was Roosevelt's 
directive to begin planning air raids on Japanese cities 
with no mention of precision bombing or attacking industrial 
targets. Throughout his entire tenure as President of the 
United States, Roosevelt had denounced the use of bombers 
and had even tried to get them abolished. Suddenly, he 
changed his course and started calling for plans to imple­
ment what he had opposed. The reason for the President's 
abrupt change rested in the conduct of the war overseas. 
The Italian air attacks on Ethiopia, the J a p a n e s e  air
28Michael Schaller, "American Air Strategy in China, 
1939-1940: The Origins of Clandestine Air Warfare," American 
Q u a r t e r l y , Spring 1976, pp. 3-12; William L. Langer and 
S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 302-304.
attacks on China, the Russian air attacks in Finland, and 
the recent, indiscriminate night bombing of London by the 
Luftwaffe had demonstrated how the war would be fought. 
Perhaps Roosevelt had only come to a pragmatic decision that 
this was how modern war would be conducted, or, in what 
should serve as a warning to all civilian leaders, perhaps 
he had become calloused by the war. In any case, the 
Roosevelt Administration seriously considered the bombing of 
Japanese cities at the end of 1940. Why the Army was not 
instructed to plan the same thing was obvious; the Navy had 
a way to get its planes to Japan— on aircraft carriers. As 
he had told his advisors on January 17, Roosevelt wanted 
them to be realistic and avoid plans that could only be 
carried out after several months had passed. He wanted them 
to be ready to act with what was available, and in early 
1940, aircraft carriers were available.
CHAPTER IX
THE BEST LAID PLANS OF MICE AND MEN
The survival of Great Britain became the cornerstone of 
Franklin Roosevelt's foreign and military policies in 1941. 
Maintaining an uninterrupted stream of supplies to the 
B r i t i s h  took precedence over other considerations. A 
conflict with Japan had to be avoided because it would 
threaten the shipments to Great Britain. During the first 
half of 1941, the Roosevelt Administration's plans turned 
from avoiding a war with Japan to deterring a war. This 
shift was due to events in the European war and to a growing 
faith in the Army's air arm and its planes.
Throughout the summer of 1940, the Army opposed the 
release of American planes and surplus war materiel to the 
Allies, but it remained silent after Roosevelt w a r n e d  
General Arnold to "play ball" or be sent to Guam. Word of 
the President's warning quickly spread throughout the Army 
and muted any further objections from that quarter. Arnold 
made the right decision when he acceded to Roosevelt's 
wishes. Not only for himself, but for the Army Air Corps as 
well. By continuing as the Chief of the Air Corps, he 
provided the experience and the political acumen necessary 
to see the Air Corps through a very difficult period of
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transition.
Convinced that the Army should have first priority. 
Secretary of War Woodring continued to voice his opposi­
tion. Roosevelt was reluctant to remove Woodring because 
they were friends, because doing so would anger congres­
sional isolationists, and because he needed Woodring's 
support at the Democratic Convention. But Woodring finally 
pushed Roosevelt too far when he opposed the release of ten 
B-17s to the British. On June 19, Roosevelt asked for 
Woodring's resignation. It gave Roosevelt a free hand to 
reform his Cabinet.
Hoping to unite the country behind him during the war 
emergency, Roosevelt created a coalition by placing promi­
nent Republicans in the Cabinet. In May, Secretary of the 
Navy Charles Edison had resigned to run for Governor of New 
Jersey, and Roosevelt decided on Republican Frank Knox to 
fill that post. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter 
recommended Republican Henry L. Stimson for Secretary of War 
because he had been Taft's Secretary of War and Hoover's 
Secretary of State. Moreover, Stimson agreed with Roosevelt 
on foreign policy and aid to the Allies. Roosevelt accepted 
Frankfurter's recommendation but waited until just before 
the Republican Convention opened to announce the appointment 
of Knox and Stimson. A great cry went up from the Republi­
cans. Condemning the President for stooping to d irty 
politics, they talked of running Knox and Stimson out of the 
party. The Republican charges backfired. For by making the
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Cabinet bipartisan, R o o s e v e l t  gave the a p p e a r a n c e  of 
responding to a foreign threat by taking national defense 
out of politics. Consequently, the Democrats successfully 
argued that the Republicans were more interested in politics 
than national defense.1
The large sums of money spent on expanding the Army Air 
Corps failed to produce airplanes as quickly Roosevelt had 
hoped. Bottlenecks hampered the flow of mass produced 
airplanes, and under public pressure, General Marshall 
restructured the Army. In November, Arnold became the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and remained the Chief of the 
Air Corps. The General Staff retained control over the GHQ 
Air Force, but Arnold was given control over production 
allocations to prevent bottlenecks. This new arrangement 
satisfied the public critics, but it proved to be impracti­
cal. Only the close relationship between Marshall and 
Arnold prevented a complete breakdown of administration. 
Also, Arnold's new position meant nothing without the 
support of the President. In September, he gave Elliot 
Roosevelt a captaincy in the Air Corps. By skillfully 
answering claims that it was a political appointment, Arnold 
demonstrated that he could handle embarrassing questions. 
Harry Hopkins and General Marshall convinced Roosevelt of 
A r n o l d ' s  reliability, and he soon received a position
-^McFarland, pp. 223-234; Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 
p. 424; Bruce Allen Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connec­
tion: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court 
Justices (New York and Oxford; Oxford University Press, 
1982), pp. 195-200.
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reflecting the increased importance of the Army Air Corps.
Both Secretary Stimson and General Marshall realized that a
reorganization of the Army Air Corps was necessary to end 
the long standing squabbles between the combat and the
supply units. Under their guidance, the Army Air Corps
became the Army Air Forces on June 20, 1941. Divided into 
two branches, the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and 
the Air Force Combat Command, formerly the GHQ Air Force, 
the new organization was commanded by Arnold. Named the 
Chief of the Army Air Forces, he also retained the position 
of Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.2
The reorganization effectively gave Arnold the command 
of an autonomous air force, but not all of the supporters of 
air power were pleased. Hugh Knerr, working for the Sperry 
Gyroscope Company after his retirement, had kept in touch 
with other advocates of a separate air force. Plotting to 
achieve total independence, Knerr won the support a close 
friend of the President by suggesting that this person would 
be made the new Secretary of Air. Knerr wanted Andrews 
named the first air marshall, but when Arnold became the 
Chief of the Air Forces, Knerr told Andrews it "looks like 
the old slicker is sitting pretty again." Andrews, who had 
been transferred to the Canal Zone, agreed with Knerr that 
the air force could not reach its full potential until it 
won its indepen d e n c e ,  but he disagreed about Arnold.
2Watson, pp. 286-295; Craven and Cate, pp. 114-116; 
Arnold, p. 194; Coffey, pp. 219-220.
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Andrews said that Arnold would be "the best man available" 
to head up a separate air force because of his political 
skills. However, the new organization upset Andrews. He 
told Knerr and Alexander de Seversky that it left too much 
control with the General Staff. Marshall was a progressive 
thinker, but he could be replaced as Chief of Staff by a 
reactionary. Fortunately, Knerr's plot failed. Arnold 
faced great problems in the middle of 1941, and he could not 
have afforded further disruptions.3
By the end of 1940, the United States and Great Britain 
realized that their military and naval forces needed to plan 
for possible joint action against the Axis powers. Secretly 
meeting from late January to March 1941, the representatives 
at the American-British Conversations (ABC) agreed to defeat 
Germany and Italy first, then deal with Japan. The Ameri­
cans rejected a British request for aid in d e f e n d i n g  
Singapore. They believed that the American fleet in the 
Pacific, actively threatening the Japanese flank, would keep 
Japan from conducting extended operations. The views of 
both sides were presented in a final report, ABC-1, on March 
27. Then, allocations of aircraft were discussed, and an 
arrangement, ABC-2, was reached two days later. The Joint 
Army and Navy Board approved ABC-1 and directed that RAINBOW
3Knerr to Andrews, June 18, 1941, Andrews to Knerr, 
June 23, 1941, and Andrews to Knerr, July 1, 1941, Andrews 
Papers, General Correspondence, Box 5, Personal Correspond­
ence, "K" 1929-1941; Andrews to Alexander de Seversky, July 
30, 1941, Andrews Papers, General Correspondence, Box 6, 
Personal Correspondence, "S" 1930-1942? Coffey, pp. 234-237.
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5 be prepared with the defeat of Germany as the primary 
s t r a t e g i c  objective. In Europe, RAINBOW 5 called for 
putting economic pressure on the Axis, conducting a "sus­
tained air offensive against German Military power," and 
building up the forces needed for the eventual offensive 
against Germany. In the Pacific, the Army would remain on 
the defensive. The Navy would destroy the Axis sea lanes 
and divert the enemy from the Malay Barrier with attacks in 
the Marshall Islands. In the Far East, the Army and Navy 
w o u l d  not be reinforced and would have to defend the 
Philippines with what they had. Adding their approval, the 
Secretaries of War and the Navy sent RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1 to 
the President. Roosevelt read both plans but returned them 
unsigned on June 7. He wanted to wait until war broke out 
before signing them. General Marshall, unable to wait for 
war before building up the Army, took the position that 
Roosevelt had tacitly approved RAINBOW 5. Marshall con­
tinued preparing the Army for war.
With the approval of their superiors, military repre­
sentatives from the American, British, Australian, Dutch, 
and New Zealand governments met in Singapore from April 21 
to 27. The American-Dutch-British (ADB) representatives 
formulated a military plan for the Far East. Calling the 
security of sea communications and Singapore the primary 
objectives, ADB recognized the importance of the Philip­
pines. Submarines and airplanes from those Islands would 
threaten the flank of an expedition against Malaya or the
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Dutch East Indies. An economic blockade consisting of naval 
pressure and air bombardment would cause the collapse of 
Japan. The Japanese particularly feared air attacks. 
Luzon's defenses needed strengthening. Bomber forces there 
and in China were required to block Japanese communications 
with Thailand and Indo-China. ADB1s plans for strengthening 
the defenses of Luzon ran counter to RAINBOW 5, and in early 
July, General Marshall and Admiral Stark rejected ADB. As 
it had for twenty years, the Army rejected any suggestion to 
significantly reinforce the Philippines. In February, the 
Air Corps had requested the General Staff to provide routes 
for flying heavy bombers across the Pacific to the Far East, 
but the General Staff refused, saying that there was no need 
to send heavy b ombers there.4 Within three weeks of 
rejecting the ADB report, however, the G e n e r a l  Staff 
r a d i c a l l y  changed its o pinion about r e i n f o r c i n g  the 
Philippines.
On June 22, Hitler sent his armies crashing into the 
Soviet Union. Stunned and overpowered by the German Blitz­
krieg, the Soviets reeled back toward Moscow. Hitler 
claimed that victory would soon be his, and few people 
doubted him. Although it was half way around the world, the 
German attack still had a tremendous effect on the situation 
in the Far East. With their traditional Russian enemy 
engaged in a life or death struggle in Europe, the Japanese
4Ma t l o f f  and Snell, pp. 32-48 and 65-67; Watson, 
pp. 423-425; Arnold, p. 209.
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were free to move troops from the Soviet border for use
. . . »  ■ ,
elsewhere. At the same time, the General Staff concluded 
that the Philippines could be defended. This new attitude 
was due in part to optimistic reports from General Douglas 
MacArthur, who had gone to the Philippines as a military 
advisor in 1935. Preparing the Philippines for independence 
in 1946, MacArthur started building a Filipino army of 
250,000 men, a balanced air force, and a navy consisting of 
high-speed torpedo boats. This force, he told Marshall, 
could "provide an adequate defense at the beach against a 
landing operation by an expeditionary force of 100,000, 
which is estimated to be the maximum initial effort of the 
most powerful potential enemy." If given more coastal 
artillery, MacArthur promised to defend not only Manila Bay, 
as called for in Plan ORANGE, but all of Luzon and the 
Visayan Islands. After being assured by the WPD that giving 
MacArthur some smaller caliber guns would not interfere with 
shipments to Great Britain or the American forces under 
General Grunert in the Philippines, Marshall and President 
Roosevelt approved the shipment.5
Marshall wanted to sent more aid to the Philippines, 
but he did not have enough equipment to adequately arm Pearl 
Harbor, the Philippines and the Panama Canal. Protecting 
the Fleet at Pearl Harbor remained his primary concern. He 
recommended to the President only minor increases in the 
Philippine Scouts and their officers. He also wanted to
5Watson, pp. 425-432.
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publicize the reinforcement of the Hawaiian garrison with 
P-36s and P-40s. General Gerow in WPD agreed that releasing 
that information "may worry the Japanese a bit. At least it 
can do no harm." Before releasing the information, Marshall 
told the Senate Military Affairs Committee in a secret 
session that additional P-36s and P-40s were being sent to 
Hawaii. On February 21, the New York Times printed the 
information in a front page story. From this episode, 
Roosevelt, Marshall and the War Department learned that a 
shipment of aircraft to the Far East would be difficult to 
hide. Roosevelt and his military advisors sought ways to 
deter the Japanese without risking the flow of supplies to 
Great Britain. The President on the twenty-sixth thought 
about sending cruisers and destroyers to the Philippines on 
a "training cruise" to illustrate America's commitment to 
defend the Islands. But at the suggestion of G e n e r a l  
Marshall and Secretary Stimson, he agreed to building a few 
airfields for pursuit planes instead. The following day, 
the War Department announced that fifty planes were being 
sent to the Philippines. The airfields and pursuit planes 
were for defense, but the idea of reinforcing the Philip­
pines with more aircraft had been put into the heads of 
Roosevelt and his military advisors.6
Passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March exacerbated the
^Memorandum from Marshall to Gerow, February 10, 1941, 
extract of memorandum from Gerow to Marshall, February 11, 
1941, and memorandum from Marshall to Gerow February 26, 
1941, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 416-418; New York T i m e s , 
February 21, 22, and 28, 1941.
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shortage of materiel available for the Army and Army Air 
Corps, but it forced the Army to coordinate demand with 
supply. Late in May, Marshall directed the WPD to prepare a 
rough estimate of the production requirements necessary to 
defeat America's potential enemies and prepare a production 
plan. Roosevelt learned of the Army plans, and he became 
concerned that the Army, Navy and British might prepare 
competing programs instead of one overall program. On July 
9, he directed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to 
formulate a joint plan for production requirements. Sub­
mitted to the President in September, the "Victory Program" 
called for an Army of 8,000,000 men, with about a quarter of 
them allotted to the Army Air Forces. Consistent with 
RAINBOW 5, the Victory Program envisioned the defeat of 
Germany the as first objective while avoiding major military 
and naval commitments in the Far East.7
British war plans called for an intensive air offensive 
that would destroy Germany's industrial capacity, a strategy 
the President supported. On May 5, he released for publica­
tion a letter to Secretary Stimson stating that the "effec­
tive defense of this country and the vital defense of other 
democratic nations" required "a substantial increase in 
heavy bomber production." Believing that "command of the 
air by the democracies must and can be achieved," the 
President instructed Stimson to cooperate with the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Office of Production Management to
^Watson, pp. 331-343; Matloff and Snell, pp. 58-62.
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achieve that increase. In a private directive to Stimson 
the day before, Roosevelt had demonstrated his awareness of 
the importance of air power. "I know of no single item of 
our defense today," he wrote, "that is more important than a 
larger four-engine bomber capacity."8 Since the ABC-2 
agreement had allocated any increase in aircraft production 
for Great Britain, Roosevelt insured that the production of 
heavy bombers was increased. The fall of France had not 
changed President Roosevelt's idea about fighting Germany 
with a blockade and an airwar. Instead of striking Germany 
from airfields in France, the RAF would strike from British 
airfields.
Soon after R o o s e v e l t  called for increased bomber 
construction, the war in Europe demonstrated the importance 
of air power in naval actions. Skipping over the Royal 
Navy's ships, the Germans attacked Crete on May 20 with 
paratroopers and gliders. The Royal Navy was powerless to 
prevent them from gaining a foothold on the island, and Ger­
man air power forced it to retire. Without naval support, 
the British army was forced to e v a c u a t e  Crete, as in 
Norway. From Cairo, the American military attache reported 
on May 27 that the situation in the Mediterranean was 
precarious. "The British Navy," he wrote, "is now certain 
that naval vessels cannot stand against shore based air
^New York Times, May 6, 1941; Roosevelt's directive was 
included Tn a letter from Stimson to Representative Carl 
Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, July 
24, 1941, RG 107, Secretary of War (Safe File), Box 2, "Big 
Bomber Project," National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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superiority." Even at Alexandria, the Royal Navy was in 
danger because it had no place to avoid attacks from 
land-based planes., The attache estimated that the strength 
of the Royal Navy was "now so low that the Italian fleet is 
likely to seek battle with it." Brigadier General Sherman 
Miles passed the report on to the President, the Secretary 
of War, the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Division, the 
Office of Naval Intelligence and General Embick, with the 
observation that "the British position in Crete is now 
definitely untenable and that the British fleet in the 
Eastern Mediterranean is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
vulnerable to air attack, both at its bases and at sea."9
While the Luftwaffe mauled Royal Navy at Crete, the 
German battleship Bismarck made its famous sortie into the 
North Atlantic. After sinking the vaunted British battle­
ship Hood and damaging the Prince of Wales, the Bismarck ran 
for the protection of the land-based Luftwaffe. Before the 
German ship could escape, torpedo planes from the British 
aircraft carrier Ark Royal damaged its control system, 
allowing other British ships to sink the German battleship 
on May 26. When the Navy called to inform Roosevelt that 
the Bismarck had gone down, the President hung up the
M e m o r a n d u m  from Brigadier General Sherman Miles to 
Marshall, "Information from Cairo, Egypt," May 29, 1941, and 
Paraphrase of Code Cablegram sent from Cairo, May 27, 1941, 
FDR Papers, PSF Departmental, Box 103, War Department 1941.
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receiver and exclaimed "She's sunk!"10 Over the next few 
months the importance of air power, as demonstrated in the 
fight for Crete and the Bismarck episode, greatly influenced 
the Roosevelt Administration and the United States Army.
The events of May reopened the airplane-versus-battle- 
ship question in the American press. In a May 26 editorial 
entitled "Sea Power vs. Air Power," the New York Times said 
that a revolution had taken place in the conduct of war. 
The sinking of the Hood was dramatic, but it was not as 
important as the actions around Crete. There, the British 
losses had been much more serious and were brought about 
almost entirely by air power. The Luftwaffe had shown the 
supremacy of air power "in any place within its range." The 
editorial cited an article printed in The American Mercury 
before the Germans attacked Crete. The author, Alexander de 
Seversky, pointed to the Norwegian campaign as proof that 
fleets could no longer approach hostile shores guarded by 
first class aviation. The Times was worried that "our own 
defense program is seriously lopsided in its expenditure on 
and plans for capital and other heavy ships compared with 
bomber planes." This editorial signaled quite a switch for 
the Times. Only a year earlier it had held the battleship 
as almost sacrosanct. Roosevelt may have missed the Times
10James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt; The Soldier of 
Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1970), p. 76; Russell Grenfell, The "Bismarck" Episode (New 
York; Macmillan, 1948), reprinted m  Reader's Digest; Illus­
trated Story of World War II (Pleasantville, New York; Read­
er's Digest Association, 1969), pp. 136-142.
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editorial, but he knew about de Seversky's ideas. On May 26 
Roosevelt received a memorandum written by de Seversky on 
American air power. Over the following months, the Roose­
velt A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  showed it accepted de Seversky's 
argument.11
The Battle of the Atlantic forced a change in America's 
military plans. As German submarines sank merchant ships 
faster than they could be replaced, Britain's situation 
became desperate. On April 3, to insure the continued 
d e l i v e r y  of A m e r i c a n  supplies, Roosevelt tentatively 
approved the transfer of three battleships, one aircraft 
carrier, four cruisers and other vessels from the Pacific to 
the Atlantic for convoy duty. He soon gave up the idea of 
convoying ships, choosing to extend the area protected by 
American naval patrols. The extended patrol was announced 
on April 24, and Roosevelt emphasized that ships were not 
being convoyed. Fearing it might e n c o u r a g e  J a p a n e s e  
aggression, Roosevelt hesitated to give final approval to 
the transfer of almost a quarter of the Pacific Fleet. 
R o o s e v e l t ' s  concern intensified when the Soviets and 
Japanese signed a neutrality pact on April 12. After the 
Japanese demonstrated a willingness to continue diplomatic 
discussions, he approved the transfer in the middle of May. 
The transfer left the Pacific Fleet inferior to the Japanese
1]-New York Times, May 26, 1941; Abstract of a memoran­
dum for the President's information, May 26, 1941, FDR 
Papers, Official File, OF 25u, War Department Box 32, Chief 
of the Air Corps, Abstracts.
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Navy in every category of combat ship. The President agreed 
to the transfer after he had been assured that Hawaii's air 
defenses would make Oahu virtually i m pregnable. W h e n  
completed, the defenses would include 35 Flying Fortresses, 
48 light and medium bombers and 150 pursuit planes and could 
be reinforced by heavy bombers flying in from the main­
land. 12
Since 1935, the Army Air Corps had claimed that Hawaii 
could be reinforced with long-range bombers flying in from 
the mainland. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, 
twenty-one B-17Ds of the 19th Bombardment Group made the 
first massed flight of Army bombers from California to 
Hawaii in May. Leaving their planes and fifteen instructors 
behind, the crews of the 19th sailed back to the mainland, 
having proved that Hawaii could be reinforced by long-range 
bombers. Reporting on the transfer of ships to the Atlan­
tic, Hanson Baldwin stated that they had been compensated 
for by the Flying Fortresses, "the most modern Army aircraft
l^Dallek, pp. 261-265; Morison, The Rising Sun in the 
P a c i f i c , pp. 56-58; Undated Aide-Memoire, "Defense of 
Hawaii," FDR Papers, PSF Departmental, Box 103, War Depart­
ment 1941. The aide-memoire was undated and unsigned, but 
an o f f i c e  note s t a t e d  that it was added to President 
Roosevelt's files on May 3, 1941. Also, somebody (possibly 
General Marshall) added a hand-written footnote that a mass 
flight of B-17s from the mainland to Hawaii was scheduled 
for May 20 and that a number "of this type of plane could be 
dispatched immediately if the situation grew critical." 
Since planning for this flight started in early April, the 
paper was written when Roosevelt was still considering the 
transfer of the ships to the Atlantic. Written by a third 
person at the top of the document is the statement: "Modern 
Planes have completely changed the situation as to defensi- 
bility."
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ever stationed in the islands— an aerial fleet capable of 
carrying great loads of bombs many long miles above the 
Pacific." Even Hanson Baldwin, a skeptic about air power, 
had changed his opinion by the summer of 1 9 4 1 . <riie 
successful flight to Hawaii added validity to all the other 
claims about the potential of air power.
Convinced of the importance of air power against sea 
power, the New York Times espoused a greater role for 
airplanes in national defense. The paper published reports 
and photographs of a British bomber successfully bombing an 
Axis ship off the Dutch coast. When the Dutch East Indies 
broke off trade discussions with Japan, a Times editorial 
stated that Dutch air power in the area forced the Japanese 
to acquiesce. The invasion of Crete and the torpedoing of 
the Bismarck showed that the Japanese fleet needed air cover 
to attack the Dutch East Indies, but the inferior Japanese 
air force could not provide it against the American, British 
and Dutch land-based airplanes in the area. The editorial 
called for the United States to build up its pursuit and 
long-range bomber forces in the Philippines to maintain a 
potentially aggressive defensive. On the day H i t l e r  
attacked Russia, the Times followed up its editorial with an 
article by Henry N. Dorris, who reported an increase in the 
air forces in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and 
Sing a p o r e .  A l t h o u g h  no general understanding existed
^^craven and Cate, pp. 172-173; Hanson Baldwin, "The 
Atlantic Fleet Grows" New York Times, May 30, 1941, p. 6.
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between them, the military commanders in the area believed 
that a strong air force could prevent a Japanese invasion of 
the Philippines or the Dutch East Indies. They believed 
that the lessons of the battle of Crete could be applied in 
the South Pacific.
As long as a war in the Pacific could be avoided, 
President Roosevelt refused to j e o p a r d i z e  the peace. 
Earlier, Harold Ickes had asked him to cut off shipments of 
American oil to Japan, but Roosevelt refused because "every 
little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the 
Atlantic." When negotiations between the United States and 
Japan broke down in late June, the chances of avoiding war 
dwindled. The German invasion of Russia left Japan free to 
move against Russian or the South Seas. Roosevelt told 
Ickes that the Japanese were fighting among themselves over 
their future moves, but he did not know "which way they are 
going to jump...." On July 2, the Japanese Imperial Council 
decided to move into Indochina for its raw materiel and 
strategic location for attacks on China and further south. 
Unable to resist them, the Vichy government allowed the 
Japanese to occupy French airfields and naval bases in 
Indochina. Finally knowing which way the Japanese were 
jumping, Roosevelt reversed his Far Eastern policy. On July 
26, he froze all Japanese assets in the United States, 
closed the Panama Canal to Japanese ships, mustered the
^ Mew York T i m e s , June 12, 18 and 19, 1941; Henry 
N. Dorris, "Philippines Arm as Key in Defense," New York 
Times, June 22, 1941, p. 22.
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Philippine army into United States service and named Douglas 
MacArthur the commander of the United States Forces in the 
Far East.-*-5
The G e n e r a l  Staff's unwillingness to fortify the 
Philippines disappeared between June and July. General 
Marshall approved a proposal to send tanks and antitank guns 
to defend Luzon. In his volume for the official history of 
the United States Army in World War II, Mark S. Watson 
suspected that the increased activity in the Philippines 
"came about not so much from alarms over the new threats 
[from Japan] as from a sudden awareness that in the newly 
developed B-17 heavy bomber America at last had a weapon 
with which the Philippines could actually and effectively 
and for the first time be armed against such threats."1** 
Watson was correct, as was revealed by Secretary Stimson 
toward the end of July 1941. Replying to the Navy's objec­
tions to the priority given to the long-range bomber program 
by the President, Stimson told Representative Carl Vinson:
While I do not pretend to know all of the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  be a r i n g  upon the President's 
decision in this matter, I have no doubt that 
f a c t o r s  of common knowledge entered into the 
decision in addition to the special information of 
strategical and tactical character. We have all 
seen the devastating effect of long-range bombers, 
both against shipping and land objectives. We 
have recently had the dramatic incident of Crete 
in which land-based aircraft inflicted serious 
losses on the B r i t i s h  fleet in the E a s t e r n
^ B u r n s ,  Soldier of Freedom, pp. 106-110; Watson, 
pp. 434-438? Telegram from Marshall to MacArthur, July 26, 
1941, in Bland, vol. 2, p. 577.
16Watson, pp. 436-440.
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Mediterranean and made the Naval forces impotent 
to save the Island. The record of sinkings by 
German aircraft of both merchant and Naval vessels 
is most impressive. The development of long-range 
aircraft has reached the point where it is very 
dangerous for Naval craft to operate in waters 
which can be commanded by long-range bo m b i n g 
planes. The situation on the coast of France, in 
the channel and on the North Sea, and in areas as 
far West as the northern approaches of Ireland, 
give ample proof of the increasing role played by 
long-range bombers in attacking British sea lanes.
This recognition of the effectiveness of long-range bombers 
against naval and land targets resulted in the dispatch of 
B-17s to the Philippines.17
Stimson overestimated the influence on the President of 
air actions around Crete. Roosevelt had given the produc­
tion of l o n g - r a n g e  bombers priority weeks before the 
Luftwaffe forced the Royal Navy to withdraw from Crete. For 
years, Roosevelt had seen the results of bombing tests like 
those conducted against the Utah, and he knew the potential 
effect of air power on naval warfare since his comments in 
1919. The RAF's strategic bombing campaign against Germany 
was what Roosevelt had suggested in 1938,18 an<j he called 
for increased production of heavy bombers to aid that 
campaign.
The fighting in Europe and China had greatly influenced 
Roosevelt, and he had moved away from the idea that a war
17Stimson to Vinson, July 24, 1941, RG 107, Secretary 
of War (Safe File), Box 2, "Big Bomber Project." The terms 
"long-range" and "heavy" referred to four-engine bombers. 
The Army referred to the B-17s and B-24s as heavy bombers. 
Twin-engine B-18s and B-25s were called medium bombers.
i^Ickes, pp. 467-470.
could be fought humanely. At the national convention of the 
Young Democrats, Lyndon Johnson read a letter from President 
Roosevelt: "Across both oceans, on the oceans, and above the 
oceans the struggle is one of armed forces, with the ghastly 
result of destruction and slaughter on a scale unparalleled 
in modern history....Against naked force the only possible 
defense is naked force. The aggressor makes the rules for 
such a war; the defenders have no alternative but matching 
destruction with more destruction, slaughter with greater 
s l a u g h t e r . . . . Roosevelt understood that modern war 
escalates to its most savage level and ends only when an
e n emy's will to resist is crushed. When the Germans,
Italians and Japanese resorted to bombing civilian popula­
tions, Roosevelt decided that the Allies had to pursue the 
same methods. A weapon remains a deterrent until it is 
used. Then, it becomes just another weapon in a nation's 
arsenal. When the Japanese bombed Chinese civilians, the 
Italians bombed Ethiopian civilians, and the Germans bombed 
civilians in Warsaw, Rotterdam and London, the p r ewar 
deterrence of bombers evaporated. The British, no longer 
having to fear a German retaliation if they bombed Berlin, 
made use of the weapons in their arsenal. Ey 1941, the
rules of the Second World War had been laid out, and the
savagery reached two of many peaks at Hiroshima and Nagasa­
ki .
Knowing that the Japanese intended to move toward the
19New York Times, August 22, 1941.
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Dutch East Indies, General Marshall told Arnold on July 16, 
that the Philippines had become strategically important as a 
naval and air base to threaten the flank of a Japanese 
movement southward. Arnold suggested that a striking force 
of heavy bombers would be necessary to insure the defense of 
the Philippines. Concurring, the General Staff reversed an 
earlier rejection of an Air Corps request for ferry routes 
to the Philippines, and the War Department approved Arnold's 
suggestion to reinforce the Philippines. After the war, 
Secretary Stimson explained that the War Department had 
"decided that if a sufficient number of our bombing planes, 
which would be able to proceed to the Philippine Islands 
under their own power, could be gathered there, this would 
present a very effective nucleus of a defense against the 
advances of the Japanese Navy or convoys in South Asiatic 
waters." The General Staff approved the movement of four 
heavy bomber groups and two pursuit groups to the Islands, 
but shortages of aircraft forced them to cut those numbers 
in half. Secretary Stimson approved the proposal in early 
August.
2°Craven and Cate, pp. 177-178; Statement by Former 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to the Joint Committee on 
the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Seventy-Ninth 
Congress, Second Session, April 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 
1946, p. 5417; Memorandum from Marshall to Arnold, July 16, 
1941, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 567-568; Memorandum from Arnold 
to Marshall, "Status of Airplanes and Pilots in the Philip­
pine Islands," July 18, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official File, 
1932-1946, Box 51, Philippine File No. 254; Memorandum from 
Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General L.T. Gerow to 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3: "Deterrent to Japan's Move 
South," July 25, 1941, RG 165, WPD, 4544-2.
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Once he learned of the Army's interest in strengthening 
Philippine defenses. Admiral Stark asked Marshall for more 
information. Marshall detailed what was being shipped, 
which included "six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, 
B-24 type planes" in November. Marshall did not know that 
the nickname of the B-24 was the "Liberator," but his 
reference to it as a "super" Flying Fortress showed an 
awareness of its superior performance characteristics. 
"These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles," 
he told Stark, "with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means 
that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a 
partial load." By the middle of September, the General 
Staff had decided not only to reinforce the Philippines with 
America's most modern planes, but it knew how those rein­
forcements would be used.21
In spite of the War Department's increased interest in 
the Philippines, the defeat of Germany remained the top 
priority in all American plans. As Commander in Chief, 
Roosevelt made the avoidance of war with Japan a key part of 
his strategy. However, there were limits on what he would 
tolerate. While sailing to the Argenitia (or Atlantic) 
Conference on board the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, Roosevelt told 
Generals Marshall and Arnold that the United States would 
not be concerned if the Japanese moved into Thailand, but if 
they went into the Dutch East Indies, then "we are vitally
21Memorandum from Marshall to Stark, September 12, 
1941, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 605-606.
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interested and will do our utmost to get them out. "22 
Unlike the President, the War Plans Division could not base 
its planning on Japanese actions. It had to work within the 
framework of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5 and plan for a major 
American effort in Europe while maintaining a defensive 
posture in the Pacific. As they worked out the estimates 
for the Victory Program, the WPD kept these points in mind.
Shorthanded, the WPD suggested that Arnold detail some 
officers from the Air War Plans Division to assist in 
drawing up the requirements for aviation. Upon hearing the 
suggestion, Lieutenant Colonel Harold "Hal" George, Chief of 
the Air War Plans Division, objected. He believed that AWPD 
should develop the plans because that was why it had been 
created. General Gerow in WPD concurred, asking only that 
the AWPD stay within the guidelines of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5. 
Going beyond their instructions, the Air War Plans Division 
drew up a plan for the strategic bombing of Germany, named 
AWPD/1, and submitted it in the second week of August. The 
Joint Board approved AWPD/1 on September 11. In accordance 
with RAINBOW 5, AWPD/1 called for the defeat of Germany 
first through a strategic bombing campaign against German 
industry. For the defense of the Philippines, A W P D / 1  
assigned one pursuit and two heavy bomber groups, substan­
tially fewer planes than the two heavy bomber, two medium 
bomber and two pursuit groups the Air Corps Plans Division
^Arnold's notes on the Argentia Conference for August 
7, 1941, Arnold Papers, Conference File 1941-1945, Box 181, 
"Argentia" Conference.
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deemed necessary "for the initial defense of Luzon, pending 
the arrival of reinforcements from Hawaii or the mainland," 
in September 1939. Furthermore, the Army dispatched its 
planes to the Philippines in the piecemeal fashion the ACPD 
had warned against. These problems were easily overlooked. 
While the Joint Board studied AWPD/1, nine B-17Ds island 
hopped from Hawaii to Manila. This flight not only proved 
the feasibility of sending more bombers to the Far East, but 
it added validity to the other claims made by the Army
fliers.23
The decision of the General Staff to let the AWPD draw 
up the requirements for aviation under the Victory Program 
surprised George and his officers. In part, the General 
Staff was under pressure to meet a deadline, but Gerow's 
cursory instructions to stay within the guidelines of ABC-1 
and RAINBOW 5 showed that the General Staff trusted the 
fliers. Thus the efforts of the Army Air Corps to prove 
itself as part of the Army team had finally paid off. The 
Army Air Forces had won a degree of autonomy from and 
equality with the General Staff that would have been unimag­
inable when Roosevelt took office in 1933.
Major General Lewis H. Brereton was given command of
23Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. The Air Plan that Defeated 
Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter, 1972), 
pp. 57-67; Craven and Cate, pp. 146-148; Memorandum from 
Spaatz to Arnold, "Strategically Offensive Operations in the 
Far East," September 1, 1939, RG 165, WPD, Box 187, 3748-18; 
Craven and Cate, pp. 178-181; Arnold to MacArthur, October 7 
and 14, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official Decimal File 1938- 
1946, 686 Far East File.
the new Far Eastern Air Force. Before Brereton left for the 
Philippines, Marshall and Arnold briefed him on the status 
of the aerial reinforcement and said that two more squadrons 
of heavy bombers were being sent to the Islands. Eventual­
ly, four bomber and four pursuit groups would be assigned to 
the Islands, but the pursuit groups would not be there for 
several more months. Brereton pointed out that putting 
bomber forces into a sensitive area before establishing the 
fighter protection and an air warning system w o u l d  be 
extremely hazardous. If the situation in the Far East 
became critical, the presence of unprotected bombers might 
incite an attack. The Japanese, said Brereton, "would have 
everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before 
the arrival of the units necessary for their protection." 
Brereton was concerned because only two airfields in the 
Philippines, Clark Field on Luzon and Del Monte on Mindanao, 
could support the operations of heavy bombers during the wet 
season. Concentrated on only two fields, the bombers would 
be more vulnerable to air attack. Without support units, 
the bombers presented too inviting a target. Marshall and 
Arnold explained that the risk was necessary because a 
strong force of heavy bombers in the Philippines would allow 
the United States to enforce its demands on Japan. Also, he 
could use airfields from China to Australia to disperse his
bombers.24
24Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries; The War in 
the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October
1941-8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company,
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On October 7, Arnold informed MacArthur about Brere- 
ton's assignment, and he explained the primary function of 
the Far East Air Force was "opposing the advance of surface 
forces over water." The range of the bombers being sent to 
the Philippines allowed them to fly to Australian, British 
and Dutch airfields for joint action against an invasion 
force while it was afloat and highly vulnerable to air 
attack. Arnold explained that efforts were underway in 
Washington to arrange for the joint use of airfields, and 
he asked MacArthur to accelerate or expand those plans at 
his end. One week later, Arnold told MacArthur that, by 
using the airfields at Singapore, Darwin, Rockhampton, 
Rabaul, Davao and Aparri, "the sea routes between Japan and 
Singapore, and Japan and the Dutch East Indies can be very 
well covered by B-17 and B-24 types of aircraft. Further­
more, B-24s operating out Aparri can cover the south section 
of the Japanese Islands as far north as Nagasaki." If the 
airfields around Vladivostok could be used, "operations from 
that point can cover most of the Japanese Islands."25
The General Staff believed that the air and ground 
units in or on their way to the Philippines had changed the 
strategic balance in the Far East. Using the threat of air 
power to deter Japanese aggressions became the basis of the
1946), pp. 3-11; Rough draft of Brereton's book, pp. 2-5, 
Arnold Papers, Subject File, 1918-1949, Box 225, Philippine 
Islands Defense.
25Arnold to MacArthur, October 7 and 14, 1941, Arnold 
Papers, Official Decimal File, 1938-1946, 686 Far East File.
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Army's strategic planning for the Far East. W i t h  the 
concurrence of General Marshall, WPD sent Secretary Stimson 
a memorandum outlining its strategic concepts for the 
Philippines on October 8. The main concern of the planners 
was to avoid a war with Japan because it would interrupt the 
flow of supplies to Britain and Russia. They were particu­
larly nervous about the supply line through Vladivostok 
because it could handle 3000 tons per day as compared to 
only 270 tons by the Persian Gulf route. When Marshall and 
Arnold briefed Brereton in Washington, they explained that 
Lend-Lease supplies would be shipped to Russia through 
Vladivostok, and they were worried that Japan might block 
the route. By placing heavy bombers in M a n c h u r i a  to 
threaten Japan's northern flank, they hoped to protect the 
Dutch East Indies and the ships going to Vladivostok. WPD 
suggested that the "present deterrents should be maintained 
and further strengthened by the provision of strong offen­
sive air forces in the Philippines." The range of the heavy 
bombers would allow them "to operate from bases in British 
possessions to the south and from eastern Russia." The 
General Staff had accepted the idea of using long-range 
bombers as a mobile strike force that could quickly move to 
wherever it was needed, from Australia to Vladivostok. When 
the strike force was in the Philippines, the Japanese would 
be deterred from moving southward. Their lines of attack 
and supply would be exposed to naval and air assault. 
Should the Japanese attack the Russians and the United
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States enter the war, the Japanese home islands would be 
"open to aerial attack by U.S. and Russian heavy bombardment 
based in Siberia." The Army planners believed that the air 
power based in the Philippines made an attack on them a 
"hazardous military operation" because the Japanese would 
have to rely upon carrier planes and "intermittent support" 
from long-range planes from Taiwan for air support.26
Underlying the General Staff's Far Eastern strategy was 
the mistaken belief that the Japanese were inferior pilots, 
but the strategy had two other had two fatal misconcep­
tions. First, it discounted the Japanese carrier planes. 
The General Staff overlooked the West Coast maneuvers of 
February 1940, when the Navy's carrier planes caught the GHQ 
Air Force's planes concentrated at Reno and destroyed them, 
remembering only the more recent battle of Crete. This 
misconception created a false sense of security in the 
Philippines and Hawaii. Japanese carrier pilots corrected 
that misconception in December. Second, the s t r a t e g y  
assumed only "intermittent support" from the long-range 
planes based in Taiwan but expected the American long-range 
planes to maintain constant protection. This misconception 
was founded in the GHQ Air Force's successful flights to 
South American and the Rex interception in foul weather.
26Rough draft of Brereton's book, p. 4. Arnold Papers, 
Subject File, 1918-1949, Box 225, P h i l i p p i n e  I slands 
Defense. Mention of Vladivostok and Russia in the rough 
draft was marked for exclusion and left out of the published 
book. Memorandum from Gerow to Stimson, "Strategic Concept 
of the Philippine Islands," Oc t o b e r  8, 1941, RG 107,
Secretary of War (Safe File), Box 11, "Philippines."
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Because the Army pilots had proved that they could do these 
things, the Army planners believed that they could do it 
every time. Overconfident, the Army planners underestimated 
the threat from airplanes on Taiwan.
By the first week of October 1941, the feasibility of 
air strikes on Tokyo had been impressed upon the State and 
War Departments. Since the Army Air Corps had done what it 
had promised during the prewar years, the Roosevelt Adminis­
tration assumed the Army Air Forces could fulfill this 
plan. Secretary Stimson recognized the strategic value of 
stationing heavy bombers in the Philippines b e f o r e  he 
received the WPD's memorandum. On October 4, he had sent 
Secretary of State Hull, by way of Stanley Hornbeck, a map 
of the Western Pacific to show him "the tremendous change 
which is being introduced by the new establishment of the 
heavy bombers in the Philippine Islands." Drawn on the map 
were concentric circles representing the radius of action of 
B-18s, B-17s and B-24s flying out of Singapore, Manila, 
Vladivostok, Rabaul, Rockhampton and Darwin. The circles 
overlapped and graphically demonstrated how most of the 
China Sea and Coral Sea were under the p r o t e c t i o n  of 
American air power. Just as important, however, the map 
also had lines drawn to show that the B-24s from the Philip­
pines could fly over Tokyo and on to Vladivostok for a
landing.27
^ M e m o r a n d u m  and Map of the Western Pacific from 
Stimson to Hull, October 4, 1941, RG 107, Secretary of War 
(Safe File), Box 11, "Philippines."
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The idea of using Vladivostok for attacks on Japan 
fired the imagination of the State Department. After Pearl 
Harbor, the State Department d i r e c t l y  a p p r o a c h e d  the 
Soviets. On December 11, Secretary Hull met with Soviet 
Ambassador Maxim Litvinov and asked for two air bases, one 
on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the other near Vladivostok, 
which would allow American bombers to fly over the Japanese 
home naval bases, fleet and cities. Litvinov accepted the 
idea of sending bombers over the Japanese Navy, but in view 
of the experiences in Moscow, London and other cities, he 
said that the bombing of cities would not necessarily settle 
the matter. Hull vainly argued that there was no substitute 
for the injury that American planes could and would inflict 
upon the Japanese if allowed to operate over all parts of 
J a p a n .  28 with the Germans at the gates of Moscow, the 
Soviets refused to be drawn into a two-front war to imple­
ment a dubious plan.
The Army Air Forces had proved that they could get 
their B-17s to the Philippines, but there was no assurance 
that they would have the planes to send. Roosevelt wanted 
the British and Russians to have as many B-17s as possible, 
but every plane sent to them meant one less for the Army Air 
Forces. American industry, still on a peacetime basis, 
could not meet the growing demand for bombers. The only 
solution was to put American industry on a wartime basis,
28Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Hull and 
Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov, December 11, 1941, FDR 
Papers, PSF, Diplomatic Correspondence, Box 68, Russia 1941.
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but it took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to force the 
United States into full production. Even then, it took 
another year before the production of aircraft was in full 
swing. In late September, Roosevelt had asked Secretary 
Stimson to estimate how many heavy bombers could be sent to 
other nations w i thout e n d a n g e r i n g  American defenses. 
Stimson attempted to dissuade the President from releasing 
any heavy bombers because the United States lacked suffi­
cient numbers to adequately meet its own defense require­
ments. Two groups of bombers in the Philippines was "the 
smallest force" that could have any influence in the Far 
East, and a larger force would be needed to retard Japanese 
aggression. Roosevelt agreed about the need for the heavy 
bombers in the Philippines and Hawaii, but he instructed 
Stimson to divert the planes bound for Newfoundland to Great 
Britain instead of the Philippines.29
General Arnold complained to Secretary Stimson about 
giving heavy bombers to Great Britain or Russia. He was 
particularly opposed to releasing any B-24s to the British 
because they would not use them effectively. Furthermore, 
the range of the B-24s made it possible "to reach the 
interior of Japan, while the range of the B-17 brings only 
the southern tip of Japan within our b o mbing range." 
Spurred by Arnold, Stimson again pleaded with the President 
to keep America's bombers for the Army Air Forces. A
2 9 S t imson to Roosevelt, September 22, 1941, and
Roosevelt to Stimson, October 14, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF 
Departmental, Box 103, War Department, 1941.
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strategic opportunity of the "utmost importance" had arisen 
in the Far East. After being "impotent to influence events" 
in the Far East for twenty years, the United States was 
"vested with the possibilities of effective power." Sending 
bombers to Great Britain had limited the number available 
for the Philippines, but even this "imperfect threat" could 
stop Japan's southward march and secure the s afety of 
Singapore. If given the heavy bombers scheduled for Great 
Britain, the Army Air Forces could fly from Alaska to 
Vladivostok. From there, they could fly over Japan and land 
in the Philippines. This threat would give the United 
States "control over the Western Pacific" and assure the 
Russians of continued American aid. Furthermore, it might 
force the Japanese to quit the Axis.30
After the Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931, 
Stimson had advocated stern responses to Japanese aggres­
sion. But the weak condition of America's defenses made 
Hoover and Roosevelt reluctant to risk war in the Far East. 
Suddenly, American technology had revolutionized the balance 
of power in the Far East. With its long-range B-17s, 
Stimson believed the United States had negated the power of 
the Japanese navy and could force its will on Japan. The 
Secretary of War was convinced that the Army Air Forces 
could fly its bombers the long route from Alaska to the
3°Memorandum from Arnold to Stimson, "Diversion of 
Additional Heavy Bombers," O c tober 16, 1941, RG 107,
Secretary of War (Safe File), "Big Bomber Project;" Stimson 
to Roosevelt, October 21, 1941, RG 107, Secretary of War 
(Safe File) Stimson, Box 15, "White House Correspondence."
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Philippines over Japan. It had never been done, but he did 
not doubt that the Army fliers could do it. As a conse- 
quence, Stimson took a less compromising attitude toward 
Japan.
Secretary Stimson was advocating the employment of 
America's technological superiority to further its foreign 
policy goals. Its numerical inferiority would be compensat­
ed for by superior weaponry. Thus, four years before the 
atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a 
policy of Atomic Diplomacy— without the atomic bomb— was 
being considered by the United States government. Deter­
rence had been advocated by the supporters of air power 
throughout the interwar years, and the atomic diplomacy 
practiced by the United States to deter Soviet expansion in 
the years following the Second World War was nothing more 
than an extension of an earlier, if only slightly less 
terrifying, application of air power.
In addition to everything else, there was a shortage of 
bombs in the Philippines. To remedy the situation, Chief of 
Air Staff Spaatz asked the General Staff to rush four 
hundred tons of various sized bombs to the Philippines "at 
the earliest possible date." Spaatz requested 2000, 1000, 
500 and 100 pound bombs, but no incendiary bombs. However, 
the Army Air Forces soon rushed to send incendiaries too. 
On a trip to Great Britain in April 1941, General Arnold had 
been impressed by the effectiveness of British and German 
incendiary bombs. When he returned to the United States,
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Arnold instructed the Army Ordnance Department, Chemical 
Warfare Service and the National Defense Research Committee 
to produce bombs equivalent to those used in Europe. To 
clarify what was wanted, Dr. Roger Adams, a chemist at the 
University of Illinois and a member of the NDRC, asked 
Lieutenant Colonel Max Schneider for exact details. Finding 
one incendiary equally capable of igniting evergreen woods, 
docks, or dwelling houses, said Adams, would be "almost out 
of the question." Schneider explained that the "major 
function" of the small incendiary bomb requested was "to 
ignite structures built of burnable materials or containing 
burnable stores." All other uses were "secondary." Also, 
large numbers would be dropped to insure that "some should 
find a burnable resting place." If enough were dropped to 
overwhelm the fire departments, "the desired results will be 
obtained, i.e. an uncontrolled fire will sweep through the 
target area and either destroy the structures therein or so 
damage them as to materially reduce their economic and 
social value."31
Since it was common knowledge that Japanese cities were
31Memorandum from Spaatz to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G-4, "Bombs and Fuses, Philippine Department," July 
31, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official Decimal File, 1938-1946, 
Box 136, SAS 471.6 (4) File; Arnold, p. 243; Arnold to 
Vannevar Bush, September 24, 1941, Bush to Arnold, September 
29, 1941, and Memorandum from Colonel Edgar P Sorensen, 
Chief of A-4 Division, to Arnold, October 13, 1941, Arnold 
Papers, Official File, 1932-1946, Box 41, File No. 39, 
"Bombs;" Dr. Roger Adams to Lieutenant Colonel Max Schnei­
der, October 14, 1941, and Schneider to Adams, October 
24, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official Decimal File, 1938-1946, 
Box 136, File No. 471.6 (52).
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built of highly inflammable materials, there is no question 
about how the Army Air Forces intended to use the small 
incendiaries. It was what General Marshall had in mind when 
he told Admiral Stark that the B-24s had "an operating 
radius of 1500 miles with a load of 14,000 bombs, which 
means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo 
with a partial load." They planned to build uncontrollable 
fires in the Japanese cities.
In the last month before Pearl Harbor, the General 
Staff made hurried efforts to arm the Far East Air Force 
with bombs to carry out these plans. A shortage of magnesi­
um hindered the production of incendiaries, but 100-pound 
chemical bombs filled with gasoline would work. In Novem­
ber, five thousand of these empty bombs were shipped to the 
Philippines. On December 1, with Marshall and Arnold's 
approval, General MacArthur was told how he could adapt 
eight hundred white phosphorus bombs already in the Philip­
pines. During the first week of December, twenty thousand 
more empty chemical bombs were flown to San Francisco from 
across the United States for shipment to the Philippines. 
Also, the Army Air Forces arranged to ship fifty thousand 4 
to 6 pound incendiaries before New Year's Day. The Japanese 
attack on December 7 halted the shipments.32 One should
^Memorandum from the Adjutant General to the Chief of 
Chemical Warfare Service, "Shipment of Air Corps Bombs to 
the Philippines," November 4, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official 
Decimal File, Box 136, File 471.6 (26); Memorandum from 
Arnold to Marshall, "Bomb Situation in the Philippines," 
December 1, 1941, Arnold Papers, Official File, 1932-1946, 
Box 51, Philippine File No. 254.
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note that all of these secret preparations were made before 
Pearl Harbor incited hatred and demands for revenge from the 
American people.
When diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Japan deteriorated in the fall of 1941, people questioned 
the hard line the United States was taking toward Japan. In 
Tokyo, Ambassador Joseph Grew thought an embargo or blockade 
of Japan was being planned, and he warned the State Depart­
ment that Japan would not collapse as a military power from 
an exhaustion of its economic and financial resources. The 
Japanese had successfully adapted to a loss of commerce, a 
drastic curtailment of industrial production and a depletion 
of natural resources by integrating their national economy 
without regard to the capitalistic system. On November 15, 
E. Ruffcorn Armstrong, a state senator in Montana, expressed 
his concern over America's relations with Japanese to United 
States Senator Arthur Capper. Having just returned from a 
five month stay in the Philippines, Armstrong warned that 
there were only 125 planes in the Islands. He asked: "WHY 
ARE WE TALKING SO STRONGLY TO JAPAN WITH SUCH A WEAK SHOWING 
IN OUR AIR FORCE?" Senator Capper forwarded Armstrong's 
letter to General Arnold for his consideration. Lieutenant 
Colonel William W. Dick ans w e r e d  for Arnold. M a k i n g  
Armstrong look like a crackpot, Dick explained to Senator 
Capper that the War Department had already answered other 
letters from Armstrong. He assured the Senator that the 
General Staff was "completely cognizant of the military
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situation in the Philippines and that all necessary steps 
are being taken." Obviously, the War Department was afraid 
to let even a United States Senator know about the changed 
situation in Far East.33
General Arnold almost revealed the secret during a 
speech at West Point on October 10. "Suppose it is neces­
sary," he said, "to reinforce the Philippines immediately 
with several squadrons of Heavy Bombers. War Plans must 
figure out to the last detail how we can get them there 
safely and quickly." Catching himself, Arnold quickly 
changed the subject and concluded his address. War Depart­
ment officials tried to keep the reinforcement of the 
Philippine Islands secret, but they knew word would leak out 
eventually. They prepared a statement for use when the 
story that B-17s had arrived in Manila broke: "As a routine 
initial strengthening of our Island outposts we are replac­
ing obsolescent aircraft in the Philippines with modern 
combat planes." On Halloween, to prevent any contradictory 
statements, Secretary Stimson sent copies of the announce­
ment to General Marshall and Secretary Hull.34
33rpe iegram from Grew to Secretary of State Hull, 
November 3, 1941, FDR Papers, PSF, Confidential, Box 30, 
Japan, 8 May 1939-17 November 1941; E. Ruffcorn Armstrong to 
Senator Arthur Capper, November 15, 1941, Capper to Arnold, 
November 25, 1941, and Lieutenant Colonel William W. Dick to 
Capper, December 4, 1941, Arnold Papers, Offical File,
1932-1946, Box 51, Philippine File No. 254.
34speech delivered by General Arnold at West Point, 
October 10, 1941, Eaker Papers, Speech Article Book File Box 
38, Speeches by General Arnold prepared by Ira C. Eaker; 
Memorandum from Stimson to Marshall, "Proposed Announcement 
as to the Rearmament of the the Philippines," October 31,
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General Marshall, remembering how quickly the press had 
reported the shipment of a few pursuit planes in February, 
was amazed that the reinforcement of the Philippines had 
been kept secret, but he wanted the secrecy maintained until 
the defenses became truly effective on December 10. After 
that date, he believed, it would be advantageous for the 
Japanese to learn that the Philippines had been effectively 
reinforced. Admiral Stark also feared going to war with 
Japan before the Navy was ready. He and Marshall met on 
November 3, and the next day, they expressed their views to 
Secretary of State Hull. On November 5, they signed a joint 
memorandum for Roosevelt which stated: "By about the middle 
of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength 
in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any 
Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U.S. Army air 
forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected 
strength by February or March, 1942." Until that time, they 
warned, war in the Far East had to be avoided.35
To prevent the publication of any information about 
what the United States was doing in the Philippines, General 
Marshall asked the press for their help. On November 15, 
Marshall met with key members of the press to keep their 
interpretations of current and forthcoming events from
1941, RG 107, Secretary of War (Safe File), Box 11, "Philip­
pines. "
^ M e m o r a n d u m  by Colonel C harles W. Bundy of his 
conversation with Marshall, November 1, 1941, and editor's 
footnote, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 657-660.
311
upsetting American military strategy. He said that anyone 
who did not care to share secrets was at liberty to leave. 
Nobody left. The United States and Japan were on the brink 
of war, but the United States had the advantage. Under 
great secrecy, the United States had built up the defenses 
of the Philippines to an extent unimagined by the Japanese. 
MacArthur was unloading ships at night, building air fields 
in the carefully guarded interior, and allowing no one 
within miles of military reservations. The United States 
was p r e p a r i n g  for an offensive war, but the Japanese 
believed that America was only preparing for a defensive 
war. Without mentioning that Japan's codes had been broken 
with "Magic," Marshall said that a leak was informing the 
United States about everything the Japanese knew of American 
military preparations, and they were unaware of the build up 
in the Philippines. Moreover, the Japanese thought the Army 
Air Forces had only eighteen B-18s in the Philippines, but 
it actually had "35 Flying Fortresses already there— the 
largest concentration anywhere in the world." More planes, 
artillery and tanks would arrive very soon.
Calling it a miracle that the Japanese had not found 
out about the B-17s, Marshall said that two attempts to 
publish the fact had been thwarted. The information would 
be allowed to leak out, but it had to be done privately and 
from the White House or the State Department to Japanese 
officials. If the information became public knowledge, 
fanatics in the Japanese army would demand war before the
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Philippines were better fortified. But if the Japanese 
officials knew first, they could tell the cabinet that the 
Americans "'really mean to bomb our cities, and they have 
the equipment with which to do it. We'd better go slow.'" 
This tack would make any public face-saving unnecessary and 
might avert a war. America wanted to avert a war with Japan 
because it would divert supplies from the British. Yet, 
should war be unavoidable, the United States would fight 
"mercilessly." Flying Fortresses w o u l d  be d i s p a t c h e d  
immediately to set the paper cities of Japan on fire, and 
there would be no hesitation about bombing civilians— it 
would be all-out. The B-17s could not make the round trip 
to Japan from the Philippines, but arrangements were being 
made to provide landing fields in Vladivostok. Safe landing 
fields could be provided in China. The new B-24s could make 
the round trip, and they would be dispatched to the Philip­
pines as soon as they came off the assembly line.
Marshall demonstrated his great faith in the Army Air 
Forces and its bombers by saying that the United States Navy 
would not play much of a role in a war with Japan. The Army 
bombers could take care of the Japanese navy and cities 
"without the use of our shipping." As evidence, he display­
ed a map with concentric circles marking the range of 
American bombers. It showed that the Army Air Forces could 
fight throughout the entire Western Pacific, from Australia 
to Alaska. Looking at the map, the correspondents saw that 
Japanese naval bases in the mandated islands were within
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range of the bombers and highly vulnerable, but Marshall 
emphasized that Japan was the main target. Plying weather 
over Japan was "propitious" at that time because the rainy 
season had ended, and with such good weather the high-flying 
bombers could wreak havoc, unmolested by Japanese fighters. 
Repeating a mistaken belief held by most Americans, Marshall 
claimed that the Japanese had no fighters that could reach 
the B-24s. Marshall emphasized the need for secrecy, but he 
should have known that military secrets are the most 
difficult to keep. Only four days later, Arthur Krock 
e x p o s e d  in the New York Times almost everything that 
Marshall had asked to be kept secret.36
Krock's article had little effect on Japanese-American 
relations. On November 7, Roosevelt had told Secretary Hull 
to do everything possible to keep negotiations with Japan 
from collapsing, but the Japanese were moving toward their 
decision for war. Early in November, after six months work, 
the Japanese completed their plans to attack the United 
States, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies. They made 
only minor changes in the plan before implementing it on 
December 7. Tokyo told Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura on 
November 5 that a peace agreement had to be reached by the
36Memorandum from Robert L. Sherrod to David W. Hul- 
burd, Jr., November 15, 1941, in Bland, vol. 2, pp. 676- 
681. The Americans believed that the Japanese fighters had 
a ceiling of only 15,000 feet, half that of the B-24. 
Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought with what They Had (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 5-6; Arthur Krock, 
"Philippines as a Fortress: New Air Power Gives Islands 
Offensive Strength, Changing Strategy in Pacific," New York 
Times, November 19, 1941, p. 10.
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twenty-fifth or Japanese-American relations would go into a 
"chaotic condition." Through "Magic," President Roosevelt 
knew of Tokyo's order, but he rejected two more Japanese 
peace plans as unacceptable to the United States. From 
another intercepted message, Roosevelt learned that the 
Japanese would extend the deadline for successful talks from 
the twenty-fifth to the twenty-ninth and that after that 
date, "things are automatically going to happen." On 
November 22, Roosevelt pessimistically offered Japan a 
counter proposal. FDR feared that the Japanese would place 
him in a difficult situation by attacking British or Dutch 
territory but not American territory. If the United States 
responded militarily without having been attacked, it would 
share the blame for war with Japan. The President wanted 
Japan to be recognized as the aggressor. He told Hull, 
Knox, Marshall, Stark and Stimson on the twenty-fifth that 
the "question was how we should maneuver them into the 
position of firing the first shot without allowing too much 
danger to ourselves." The next day, Roosevelt was told that 
ships carrying five divisions of Japanese soldiers had been 
sighted south of Formosa. Believing that the Japanese had 
tried to dupe him by negotiating for a truce and a with­
drawal from Indochina while sending this expedition south, 
Roosevelt became enraged. Roosevelt and Hull sent another 
proposal to Tokyo on November 26, but they both knew that 
negotiations with Japan were over.
On December 1, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador,
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suggested issuing parallel warnings to Japan. Roosevelt 
wanted to ask the Japanese about their troop movements 
first, but he gave Halifax the impression that the United 
States would support any British response to a Japanese 
reinforcement of Indochina or an attack on Thailand. More 
importantly, Roosevelt spoke to Halifax about using the air 
force in the Philippines and a long-distance naval block­
ade. The Japanese gave him an evasive answer about their 
troop movements on December 6, and Roosevelt decided to ask 
the Emperor to remove the troops as the only way to have 
peace in the South Pacific. That night, FDR r e c e i v e d  
thirteen parts of the fourteen-part Japanese answer to his 
latest proposal. After reading them, he told Harry Hopkins 
that the answer meant war. Hopkins suggested a first 
strike, but Roosevelt refused to fire the first shot and 
ruin America's record of being a peaceful nation.37
President Roosevelt was not maneuvering the Japanese 
into firing the first shot in order to get America into the 
war through a back door. He wanted to avoid b e c o m i n g  
embroiled in a Pacific war because it would drain supplies 
from the Atlantic war. But if war had to come, he wanted a 
clear case of Japanese aggression to unite the American 
people in a common cause. Yet, by choosing to let the 
Japanese fire the first shot, Roosevelt displayed neither a 
callous disregard for the lives of American servicemen nor a
3?Dallek, PP* 305-310; Memorandum for the President, 
"Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China," November 26, 
1941, in Bland, vol. 2, p. 686.
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naive belief that a democracy should not strike the first 
blow in a fight. Rather, Roosevelt's decision was proof of 
his confidence in the Army Air Forces.
Frank Andrews, Oscar Westover and Hap Arnold had proven 
throughout his presidency that the Army Air Corps could 
fulfill their promises. They had won the confidence of the 
War Department and General Staff by turning from the 
antagonistic methods used by Billy Mitchell and working 
within the system. As the bitterness between the airmen and 
the General Staff subsided, the General Staff became more 
receptive to their needs and gave them greater responsibil­
ity. Through hard work and careful planning, the GHQ Air 
Force added validity to the claims about air power with a 
record of successful bombing tests and long-range flights. 
By the time the Munich Crisis had forced Roosevelt to give 
up hope of eliminating bombers, the Army Air Corps had 
proven itself as a capable and efficient organization,, 
After the war in Europe demonstrated that unopposed air 
power could defeat naval power, the Roosevelt Administration 
became confident that the Army Air Forces could do to the 
Japanese navy what tfte Luftwaffe had done to the Royal Navy 
off Norway and Crete.
On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt believed he had 
found a way to maneuver the Japanese "into the position of 
firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to 
ourselves." Expecting the Japanese to attack Malaya, the 
Dutch East Indies or the Philippines, Roosevelt believed the
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Army Air Forces would destroy the invasion fleet before much 
damage could be done.
Unfortunately, the Japanese devastated the United 
States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the Army Air Forces 
at Hickam Field on December 7, 1941. In the Philippines, 
despite knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese 
planes from Formosa caught the Far Eastern Air Force on the 
ground and destroyed eighteen of its thirty-five B-17s and 
fifty-three of one hundred seven P-40s on the first day. 
With counter air activities that Spaatz had warned of much 
earlier, the Japanese made the American air fields unten­
able.-^® Japanese pilots won complete mastery of the skies 
over the Philippines and saved their navy and cities, but 
their victory was temporary. All too soon, Curtis LeMay's 
B-29s would bring to life Japan's greatest fear: the burning 
of their cities.
®®Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the 
Philippines, United States Army in World War II (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of 
the Army, 1953), pp. 77-88; "Telephone Conversation Between 
General Arnold and General Brereton, Manilia, 12-8-41," 
Arnold Papers, Miscellaneous Official Records 1941-1946, Box 
185.
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of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet at the Air Corps 
Tactical School, 1921-1935" (Doctoral Dissertation, Univer­
sity of Oklahoma, 1965). Zealously, Emile Gauvreau, The 
Wild Blue Yonder: Sons of the Prophet Carry On (New York:
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Few other Army a i rmen have r e c e i v e d  a t t e n t i o n .  
Although he leaves out important Army fliers like Hugh 
Knerr, Flint 0. DuPre, U.S. Air Force Biographical Diction­
ary (New York: F r a n k l i n  Watts, 1965), provides brief 
sketches. John L. Frisbee, Makers of the United States Air 
Force (Washington, D.C.: Office Air Force History, 1987), 
has compiled article length biographies of twelve key Air 
Force officers.
Benjamin D. Foulois with C.V. Glines, From the Wright
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Benjamin D. Foulois (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), is the 
only work that encompasses this airman's entire life. 
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aircraft purchasing scandals. Norman E. Borden, Jr., Air 
Mail Emergency, 1934: An Account of Seventy-Eight Tense Days 
in the Winter of 1934 When the Army Flew the United States 
Mail (Freeport, Maine: Bond Wheelwright, 1968), provides a 
detailed narrative of the air mail episode with little 
analysis. John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air 
Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 
History, 1983), fills an important gap in the years between 
Mitchell and Pearl Harbor. Foulois' troubles with Congress 
are detailed in Edwin H. Rutkowsky, The Politics of Military 
Aviation Procurement, 1926-1934: A Study in the Political 
A s s e r t i o n  of C o n s e n s u a l  Values (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1966).
Although sometimes confused about the date of events, 
H e n r y  H. "Hap" A r n o l d ' s  memoirs, Global Mission (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), give a valuable informa­
tion on Army aviation to the end of the Second World War. 
Thomas M. Coffey, Hap: the Story of the U.S. Air Force and 
the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold (New 
York: Viking Press, 1982), is the only biography available. 
Arnold and Ira C. Eaker coauthored two books before the 
Second World War, This Flying Game (New York and London:
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Harper and Brothers, 1941). Written for a general audience, 
these two books provide a view of prewar military and 
general aviation.
The other commanders of the Army air arm have been 
neglected. For information on the Utah and Rex episodes and 
the South American flights, see Curtis E. LeMay and Macinlay 
K a n t o r , Mission with LeMay: My Story (Garden C i t y , New 
York: Doubleday, 1965) and George W. Goddard with DeWitt 
S. Copp, Overview: A Life-Long Advenure in Aerial Photogra­
phy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969). Thomas 
M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis 
LeMay (New York: Crown, 1986), deals mainly with LeMay's 
career after 1941. James Parton's biography of Ira Eaker, 
"Air Force Spoken Here": General Ira Eaker and the Command 
of the Air (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1986) is 
too episodic. A brief sketch of Hugh Knerr is found in 
Murray Green, "Major General Hugh J. Knerr, Hard Campaigner 
for Air Power," Air Force Magazine 61 (October 1978): 90-92.
America's strategic planning before World War II is 
described in Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans 
and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, 
Department of the Army, 1950), and Maurice Matloff and Edwin 
M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941- 
1942 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1953). Haywood S. Hansell, 
The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McAr-
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thur/Longino and Porter, 1972), gives an inside look at the 
Air War Plans Division and AWPD/1. Problems in the Pacific 
are described in Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of the 
United States Naval Operations in World War II, volume 3, 
The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1948).
Information on the Philippines may be found in Louis 
Morton, The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Department of the Army, 1953), and Walter D. Edmonds, They 
Fought with what They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces 
in The Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1951). The first hand account of the commander of 
the Far Eastern Air Force is in Lewis H. Brereton, The 
Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle 
East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York:
William Morrow and Co., 1946). A draft of Brereton's book 
with editorial suggestions is in the H.H. "Hap" Arnold 
Papers.
Most of the works I consulted have a conservative slant 
and point to the past as proof that more tax dollars should 
be spent on the Air Force. Recently, however, historians 
have turned away from the traditional studies to investigate 
the motives behind the use of bombing. Ronald Schaffer has 
looked at the ethical considerations of America's military 
aviators in "American Military Ethics in World War II: The 
Bombing of German Civilians," Journal of American History
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(December 1980) and Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in 
World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
Michael Sherry has studied how perceptions of air power, 
racism and bureaucracy influenced American bombing campaigns 
in The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armaged­
don (New York: Yale University Press, 1987).
The New York Times printed notices of its commitment to 
aviation, and every Sunday it devoted a page to aviation 
news. The editors often objected to spending more money on 
the Army Air Corps and supported battleships over airplanes 
for defense. At the same time, the aviation correspondents 
were writing articles that supported the Army Air Corps. 
Fliers are not very good at leaving documents, but they love 
to tell stories. Taking advantage of that quirk, correspon­
dents from the Times would report what the Army fliers at 
Mitchel Field, Long Island, said, leaving a written record. 
As the Times' military affairs correspondent, Hanson Baldwin 
exhibited a pro-Navy bias.
The official organ of the Army Air Corps was the Air 
Corps News Letter. Published intermittently by the Office 
of the Chief of the Air Corps, the News Letter contained 
notices of transfers, deaths, retirements, and pilots' 
anecdotes. However, it contained speeches and articles by 
the commanders of the Army Air Corps. The General Staff's 
ideas on military subjects may be found in Infantry Journal, 
published by the United States Infantry Association.
Before starting any research project on the United
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States Air Force or its predecessors, one should consult 
Lawrence J. Paszek, United States Air Force History: A Guide 
to Documentary Sources (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 
Force History, 1973). This guide describes collections 
pertaining to the Air Force at Air Force depositories, the 
National Archives, Presidential Libraries, the Library of 
Congress, and university libraries around the nation.
I consulted included the Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers 
at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
Most of the records deal with the war years, but the 
Official File (OF 25-U), the President's Secretary's File 
(PSF), and the President's Personal File (PPF) proved 
useful. The cross reference sheets for 1933-1941 in OF 25-U 
were helpful.
At the M a n u s c r i p t  Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. I used the papers of Frank M. Andrews, 
Henry H. Arnold, Ira C. Eaker, Benjamin D. Foulois, and Carl 
Spaatz. Finding aids for all but the Foulois Papers have 
been reproduced in the microfiche publication National 
Inventory of Documentary Sources in the United States; Manu­
script Division, Library of Congress (Teaneck, New Jersey: 
Chadwyck-Healey, 1983). A draft inventory of the Foulois 
Papers is in the Manuscript Division and a photocopy may be 
purchased for a small fee. The Andrews, Arnold and Foulois 
Papers are the most useful for the interwar years.
For research in the National Archives and Records  
Service, W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C., the Guide to the National
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Archives of the United States (Washington, D.C.: National 
Archives and Records Service, General Services Administra­
tion, 1974) is helpful, but Paszek's guide is more useful. 
At the National Archives, Military Archives Division, I used 
Record Group 18 (Army Air Forces), Record Group 107 (Secre­
tary of War), and Record Group 165 (General and Special 
Staffs). I found the manuscript collections at the Library 
of Congress more useful than the records at the National 
Archives. For an organzational history, the reverse would 
be true. Preliminary inventories of these three record 
groups are available in the Military Archives Division.
Before traveling to Washington, D.C., I r e commend 
contacting the staff of Manuscript Division of the Library 
of Congress and the Military Archives Division of the 
National Archives. Their recommendations allowed me to make 
a thorough search of the large volume of material available 
and avoid unprofitable avenues.
Although the congressional hearings on Pearl Harbor 
were concerned with the Japanese attack on the American 
fleet, the published records reveal how the Army intended to 
employ its bombers in the Phili p p i n e s .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  
i m p o r t a n t  are the comments by Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation 
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings 
before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl 
Harbor Attack Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 2nd 
sess., April 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
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